The Kurdistan region’s decision to hold an independence referendum on September 25, 2017, created a new area of conflict in the Middle East. The international players and countries in the region fear that Iraqi Kurdish independence could fuel increased calls for separatism or irredentist activity that would create further instability in the region. China’s position toward the Kurdish question is complex. On the one hand, it maintains cordial diplomatic and commercial ties with the Kurds. On the other hand, it opposes a unilateral Kurdish declaration of independence, and would support an independent Kurdish state only if it obtained the consent of the countries in the region. In any case, the Kurdish question presents a dilemma for China’s foreign policy in the Middle East.
INTRODUCTION
The “Kurdish question” has been one of the thorniest and most persistent political problems in the Middle East over the past century. The Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the region without sovereignty or an independent state. Millions of Kurds live in the area known as Kurdistan, extending across the borders of four states: Iran, northeastern Syria, southeastern Turkey, and northern Iraq. Within each of these states, the Kurds have faced economic discrimination, cultural persecution, and harassment at the hands of government institutions or have been under threat from the Islamic State (IS).[1]
In June 2017, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani announced that an independence referendum would be held September 25, 2017, on the future of the Kurdistan region of Iraq.[2] The referendum took place within the borders of the Kurdistan region and within disputed territories that had been under de facto Kurdish control since their liberation from the Islamic State (like Kirkuk). Kurdish voters were to decide whether autonomous Kurdistan should disengage from Iraq and become independent or should remain within the Iraqi state.[3] The results of the referendum showed that almost 93 percent of the Kurdish voters supported Kurdish independence from Iraq.[4]
The referendum was neither a declaration of independence nor a trigger to immediate change in the nature of Kurdish sovereignty in northern Iraq, since the vote lacked both a legal framework to empower the referendum as a binding measure and was not backed by the international community. However, the referendum was the Iraqi Kurds’ first concrete step toward realizing the more-than-century-long dream of an independent Kurdish state, and the hope was that the vote would give the Kurds more bargaining power vis-à-vis Baghdad and the international community, once the fight against the Islamic State ended.[5] The lack of international recognition following the results of Kurdish independence referendum, the harsh response of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, and the Iraqi military operation to retake the city of Kirkuk led the Kurdish leadership to offer to freeze the referendum results. The KRG also called for an immediate ceasefire and a halt to all military operations in the northern region as well as to open dialogue between Erbil and Baghdad, based on the country’s constitution.[6][7]
The question of independence has existed ever since the Kurds established a semi-autonomous region in the wake of the first Gulf War. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Kurds have enjoyed broad autonomy, which rekindled their aspiration for independence. They thus worked diligently to maximize their control over affairs in northern Iraq. Notwithstanding, tensions arose between the Iraqi central government and the KRG regarding the control and distribution of oil and other resources. This and disputes over territories led the Kurdish leaders to take further steps to realize their national aspirations.[8]
These aspirations gained momentum because the region has been in a period of turmoil due to the ongoing civil war in Syria, the rise of the Islamic State, and the aftershocks of the Arab Spring. This instability was exploited by the Kurds to seize the moment for radical change in the balance of power in the Middle East and to create an independent state. More important, the major role that Kurds have played in the U.S.-backed campaign to defeat the Islamic State have brought the Kurds growing international attention and wider acknowledgment of their achievements and national rights.[9]
Consequently, the question of whether Kurdish national aspirations will lead to a sovereign country is not merely theoretical but appears to be only a matter of time and appropriate international circumstances. As head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart said in a Senate hearing, “Kurdish independence is on a trajectory where it is probably not if, but when.”[10] However, as the failed referendum showed, without international recognition and support, Kurdish statehood remains a dream.
China, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with ambitions to become a major player in the Middle East, cannot avoid presenting a clear position on the “Kurdish question,” which relates to regional security and stability, and is also a matter of international law and moral norms involving Chinese interests and national security. In the post-Cold War era, China has become increasingly engaged in the Middle East region due to broader national interests, namely, to continue its economic growth, preserve its political system ruled by a communist party, defend its sovereignty from foreign threats and other interferences into its internal affairs, and expand its global influence as a rising global economic and political power.[11] Given its location on land and shipping routes to Europe and Africa, the Middle East is a critical trade route between East and West and an important part of the Chinese international networking launched through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing’s search for energy security (In 2014, Middle Eastern crude oil accounted for over half of total Chinese imports.)[12] and the desire to increase its overseas markets and investment opportunities have inevitably brought diplomatic and military involvement.[13]
CHINA NON-SEPARATIST POLICY
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Beijing’s principal approach was strong opposition to separatist movements worldwide as a way of seeking support for its own opposition to separatists within China. China fundamentally and officially considers separatism as one of the “three evil forces,” along with terrorism and extremism.[14] This approach reflects Beijing’s uncompromising adherence to the maintenance of territorial integrity at all costs, primarily with regard to Taiwan, but also to Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Therefore, it avers that self-determination should not necessarily involve national independence and that stateless nations should not necessarily form or be given states.[15]
China’s principled opposition to separatist movements stems from the fears that witnessing successful separatist movements elsewhere in the world could galvanize separatism within its own state boundaries.[16] Outside its own borders, Beijing has attempted to maintain its non-separatist principle when there is no direct benefit for its interests and national security. Generally, China is not willing to support any secessionist or irredentist activity that would create further instabilities in the international system. For example, China opposed the independence of Kosovo from Serbia, opposed Russia’s demand that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) support the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and attempted to preserve the unity of Sudan.[17]
Nevertheless, Beijing is willing to be flexible and pragmatic in its non-separatist policy under circumstances where its interests and national security may have something to gain. For instance, with the outbreak of the crisis in Sudan, China initially tried to preserve the unity of that country. Yet after the 2011 referendum, when South Sudan seceded from Sudan, China did its best to establish trade relations with South Sudan as well.[18] In addition, Beijing has maintained a diplomatic silence over the separatist movements in Georgia.[19] Moreover, according to Japan’s Security Intelligence Agency, China is supporting separatist groups on the Japanese island of Okinawa.[20] In Kashmir, Beijing maintains a neutral position in the conflict between Pakistani and Indian separatists,[21] but claims 20 percent of the region for itself.[22]
CHINA’S NON-SEPARATIST POLICY AND THE KURDISH QUESTION
Beijing’s policy toward the Kurdish question is part of China’s overall policy on Iraq, which is part of China’s Middle East policy, which in turn is part of Chinese foreign policy at the global level.[23] The core of China’s official Middle East policy is to maintain a stable and peaceful regional environment that facilitates continued domestic reform and development,[24] and on the Middle East hotspot issues, to promote peace and the reasonable settlement of disputes through dialogue and negotiation. Beijing’s diplomacy emphasizes the role of the UN Security Council for achieving this.[25] Furthermore, in his speech at the Arab League headquarters in January 2016 in Cairo, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed that the key to resolving Middle Eastern conflicts was through economic cooperation and increasing humanitarian assistance to create a favorable external environment.[26]
Beijing has legally and officially supported the Iraqi central government in its efforts to safeguard sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and to establish mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit based on bilateral relations. It also actively supports political reconstruction and national reconciliation and Iraq’s counterterrorism efforts against the Islamic State. Thus, China firmly advocates the adoption of a peaceful, democratic process to achieve security and stability in Iraq.[27]
Nevertheless, there are a range of interests that motivate China’s variable Kurdish policy. First, a major Chinese role in creating an independent and friendly Kurdish state could provide Beijing with a new ally in the Middle East and a new instrument of influence in region.[28] Second, despite China’s official stance of not supporting separatist movements, Chinese companies have strong energy and economic stakes in Kurdistan making it different from other separatist movements.[29] China has boosted its investment in Kurdish oil fields and infrastructure, and several hundred Chinese citizens live and work in the region.[30] Third, Beijing has also reinforced sympathy for the Kurds that are fighting IS and anti-militants; while according to the Syrian ambassador to China, there are some 5,000 ethnic Uighurs from China’s violence-prone region of Xinjiang[31] fighting for IS in Syria, there have also been some Chinese volunteers who have enlisted in the People’s Protection Units (YPG) to help the Kurds in their fight against the Islamic State.[32] China considers the Kurds a reliable regional ally as well as a lethal force and valuable asset against IS and al-Qa’ida. Given that many jihadists are from China, Beijing would be inclined to support the Kurds as a valuable counterterrorism ally, but also because of the prospects of an independent Kurdistan.[33] Indeed, Beijing is unofficially arming the Kurds in Syria and Iraq with Chinese weapons.[34]
Furthermore, Beijing has used the Kurdish issue as leverage against Turkey, which still hosts Uyghur separatist activists and organizations; China has used the analogy between Uyghur and Kurdish separatism to implicitly threaten that if Turkey continues to support Uyghurs, Beijing would support the Kurds.[35] Last and most important, China is interested in Iraqi Kurdistan’s rich oilfields in order to diversify its oil supplies. For instance, Sinopec paid $8.9 billion to purchase the Swiss-Canadian firm Addax, which had holdings in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. According to the KRG, Iraqi Kurdistan is estimated to have approximately 45 billion barrels of oil reserves, the sixth largest in the world.[36]
Nevertheless, an independent Kurdistan would pose a range of negative implications for regional stability as well as for Chinese interests and national security. First and foremost, an independent Kurdish state could unleash regional instability that would be detrimental to China’s economic and strategic interests, and would encourage other separatist movements (notably the Uyghur and the Tibetan) to fight for the same cause. The birth of a new Kurdish nation would face strong opposition from the major regional states, produce greater instability, and might even be accompanied by war.[37] The Iraqi central government in Baghdad as well as Iran, Syria, and Turkey have been historically opposed to an independent Kurdish state, as it could encourage separatism among their own Kurdish minorities.[38] Support for an independent Kurdistan could harm Beijing’s relations with those regional powers that China has been working hard to cultivate in recent years.
Second, Kurdish secession from Iraq could destabilize the rump Iraqi state politically, economically, and militarily. Such developments could significantly weaken what remains of the Iraqi state, potentially creating yet another power vacuum or sectarian conflict in the region.[39] Beijing is hardly interested in further destabilizing Iraq or alienating the government in Baghdad, which it has been assiduously cultivating. Beijing may unofficially be supplying the Kurds with arms to fight against the Islamic State,[40] but this is a far cry from backing a Kurdish effort to undermine Iraq’s territorial integrity, especially when China may be gaining new political influence there.[41]
Third, Washington has historically shunned the idea of breaking apart the Iraqi state out of fear of setting a precedent for secessionism throughout the region.[42] However, the Trump administration’s behavior has created new opportunities for Kurdish independence. Trump’s policy malleability and volatility may prove favorable for Iraqi Kurds’ independence aspirations.[43] U.S. officials tried to convince the Kurdish leaders to delay the independence referendum until after Iraqi parliamentary elections, due to be held in May 2018;[44] while they appreciate the “legitimate aspirations” of Kurds, they nonetheless support Iraqi unity.[45] It is quite clear that if a Kurdish state emerges, although there is no expectation in the near future, it will be a friendly actor vis-à-vis the United States, with important consequences for U.S. regional interests and its national security.[46]
Moreover, the Western countries fear the breakup of Iraq could lead to greater instability in an already unstable Middle East and are traditionally opposed to separatism, unless it is in their direct interest to weaken adversaries. Thus, the West views the Kurds as a necessary part of Iraq’s solution and prefers to see them play a constructive role in the country’s reconstitution rather than its dismemberment.[47] Nonetheless, the emergence of an independent Kurdistan would have a range of favorable implications for the Western powers; the region would likely be relatively well governed, stable, and especially pro-Western.[48] Such developments could significantly weaken Chinese economic and strategic interests in the region.
Finally, the Kurdish oil industry strategy was premised on high oil prices, foreign investments, and the relative political stability of the KRG. Kurdish secession without a prior agreement with Baghdad and unresolved issues concerning the legality of the region’s oil exports create uncertainty that will continue to deter major international oil companies from investing further in the KRG. Thus, a major dispute between the Iraqi central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan region could complicate the future of the KRG’s oil industry.[49] Around 0.5 mb/d of Iraqi crude oil has become baseload supplies to China and can be expected to go forward unless a substantial crisis takes large volumes of output offline. However, a major dispute between the Iraqi central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan region could complicate the future of the KRG’s oil industry.[50] With a financial crisis following the fall in global oil prices, the prospects for Chinese investments in developing Kurdish oil production are limited.[51]
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the Kurdish referendum could not have led to independence without international recognition, a crucial pre-condition to full statehood. Since the KRG is located in a war-torn country and in a region of economic and geopolitical significance, it needs the support and legitimacy of the global and regional powers. Beijing’s position toward the Kurdish question is complex. Traditionally, China has had friendly relations with the Kurds and joined the other four members of the UN Security Council in opening a consulate in Erbil.[52] Nevertheless, Beijing opposes a unilateral Kurdish declaration of independence and will support an independent Kurdish state only if that emerges with the consent of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad and other countries in the region.
There is also a linkage between the situation in Syria and Iraq, and an Iraqi Kurdish precedent of seceding from the Iraqi state would not be received well in Damascus, Ankara, and in Tehran, whose position on the matter may affect that of China. A Kurdish state will likely be pro-Western and not necessarily positive toward China’s economic and strategic interests in the Middle East and its national security. One could, however, imagine a situation where China allows the emergence of an independent Kurdistan while remaining rhetorically opposed as it does so, a common tactic of Chinese diplomacy in the region.
For instance, China has consistently maintained opposition to external military intervention in Middle Eastern affairs, as the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated.[53] However, China has reacted positively to Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian civil war since it perceives it as an element of the global fight against terrorism. As Chinese envoy, Xie has praised Russia’s military role in the war, calling it “part of international counterterrorism efforts.” While China has no intention or interest in becoming involved militarily in Syria, it has insisted that the Syrian people should decide the fate of Assad’s regime and has opposed any interference by foreign powers.[54]
*Dr. Mordechai Chaziza is a senior lecturer in Politics and Governance at Ashkelon Academic College Israel, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.
NOTES
[1] Kendall M. Stempel, “The Turkish-Kurdish Conflict in Theory and Practice,” Inquiries Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2014), pp. 1-3.
[2] Keith Johnson and Emily Tamkin, “Kurds Finally Set Date for Independence Referendum,” Foreign Policy, June 7, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/07/kurds-finally-set-date-for-independence-referendum/.
[3] Morgan L. Kaplan and Ramzy Mardini, “The Kurdish Region of Iraq Is Going to Vote on Independence. Here’s What You Need to Know,” The Washington Post, June 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/21/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-kurdish-referendum-on-independence/?utm_term=.3730ffb775c2.
[4] Bethan McKernan, “Kurdistan Referendum Results: 93% of Iraqi Kurds Vote for Independence, Say Reports,” Independent, September 27, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/kurdistan-referendum-results-vote-yes-iraqi-kurds-independence-iran-syria-a7970241.html.
[5] Edy Cohen, “Kurdistan: From Referendum to the Road to Independence,” BESA Center Perspectives Papers, June 24, 2017, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/kurdistan-referendum/.
[6] “Iraqi Kurds Offer to ‘Freeze’ Independence Referendum Result,” BBC, October 25, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41744376.
[8] Alireza Nader, Larry Hanauer, Brenna Allen, and Ali G. Scotten, Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
[9] Gallia Lindenstrauss and Adrien Cluzet, “An Independent Iraqi Kurdistan? On the Prospects and Viability of a Future State,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April 2017), pp. 35-45.
[10] Phil Stewart, “Kurdish Independence in Iraq Likely ‘Not If but When’: U.S. General,” Reuters, May 23, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iraq-kurds-idUSKBN18J2WT.
[11] Jon B. Alterman, China’s Balancing Act in the Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013); Dawn Murphy, Rising Revisionist? China’s Relations with the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Post-Cold War Era (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 2012).
[12] “China,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), May 14, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/China/china.pdf.
[13] Andrew Scobell and Alireza Nader, China in the Middle East: The Wary Dragon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
[14] Shannon Tiezzi, “What Does China Think of Scotland’s Referendum?” The Diplomat, September 19, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/what-does-china-think-of-scotlands-referendum/.
[15] Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Kurdish Policy,” China Brief, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2006), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-kurdish-policy/.
[16] Ankit Panda, “Can China Stomach an Independent Kurdistan?” The Diplomat, August 15, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/can-china-stomach-an-independent-kurdistan/.
[17] Sahan Savas Karatasli and Sefika Kumral, “Territorial Contradictions of the Rise of China: Geopolitics, Nationalism and Hegemony in Comparative-Historical Perspective,” Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2017), pp. 5-35.
[18] “China and South Sudan,” Saferworld Briefing, August 2012, file:///C:/Users/moti/Downloads/China-South%20Sudan%20briefing%20English.pdf.
[19] Damien McElroy, “South Ossetia Conflict: Russia Seeks Chinese Support As West Warns of New Dangers,” The Telegraph, August 27, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2631083/South-Ossetia-conflict-Russia-seeks-Chinese-support-as-West-warns-of-new-dangers.html.
[20] Isabel Reynolds, “Japan Sees Chinese Groups Backing Okinawa Independence Activists,” Bloomberg, December 26, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-26/japan-sees-chinese-groups-backing-okinawa-independence-activists.
[21] Saibal Dasgupta, “China Indicates There Is No Change in Stance on Kashmir Issue,” The Times of India, September 26, 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-indicates-there-is-no-change-in-stance-on-Kashmir-issue/articleshow/54529196.cms.
[22] “Kashmir Fast Facts,” CNN, March 29, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/08/world/kashmir-fast-facts/.
[23] Mohammed Shareef, “China’s Dual Diplomacy: Arab Iraq and the Kurdistan Region,” in Niv Horesh (ed.), Toward Well-Oiled Relations? China’s Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 69-93.
[24] Jon B. Alterman, China’s Balancing Act in the Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013); Dawn Murphy, Rising Revisionist? China’s Relations with the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Post-Cold War Era (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 2012).
[25] Liu Zhongmin, “China’s Diplomacy on the Hot Issues of Middle East: History, Ideas, Experiences and Impact,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), Vol. 5, No. 1 (2011), pp. 68-91.
[26] “China Focus: Xi’s Visit to Highlight China’s Role in Middle East Peace,” Xinhua, January 18, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/18/c_135021120.htm.
[27] “Wang Yi Meets with Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari of Iraq,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Norway, April 24, 2017, http://www.chinese-embassy.no/eng/zgwj_1/t1456873.htm.
[28] Lindenstrauss and Cluzet, “An Independent Iraqi Kurdistan?” pp. 35-45.
[29] Christina Lin, “Turkey’s Anti-China Stance an Opportunity for the Kurds,” The Times of Israel,
July 10, 2015 http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/turkeys-anti-china-stance-an-opportunity-for-the-kurds/.
[30] Ankit Panda, “Can China Stomach an Independent Kurdistan?” The Diplomat, August 15, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/can-china-stomach-an-independent-kurdistan/.
[31] Ben Blanchard, “Syria Says up to 5,000 Chinese Uighurs Fighting in Militant Groups,” Reuters, May 8, 2017, http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1840V6?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Feed%253A+Reuters%252FworldNews+%2528Reuters+World+News%2529.
[32] Vincent Ni, “The Chinese Man Fighting Islamic State with the YPG,” BBC, December 8, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35036879.
[33] Christina Lin, “Will China Support an Independent Kurdistan?” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, No. 424, May 2016, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/424_Lin.pdf.
[34] James Dunnigan, “China Unofficially Arms the Kurds,” Strategy World, June 8, 2015, https://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/China-Unofficially-Arms-The-Kurds-6-8-2015.asp.
[35] Shichor, “China’s Kurdish Policy.”
[36] Shareef, “China’s Dual Diplomacy,” pp. 69-93.
[37] Lindenstrauss and Cluzet, “An Independent Iraqi Kurdistan?” pp. 35-45.
[38] Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “The Kurdish Move Toward Independence,” Atlantic Council,
July 10, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-kurdish-move-towards-independence; Nader, Hanauer, Allen, and Scotten, Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan.
[39] Nader, Hanauer, Allen, and Scotten, Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan.
[40] Dunnigan, “China Unofficially Arms the Kurds.”
[41] Lin, “Will China Support an Independent Kurdistan?”
[42] Morgan Kaplan, “For Iraqi Kurds, Trump Brings Hope for Independence: Why the New Administration Inspires Optimism,” Foreign Affairs, April 12, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-04-12/iraqi-kurds-trump-brings-hope-independence.
[43] Ibid.
[44] “Iraq’s Parliamentary Elections Set for May 12, 2018,”Rudaw, October 22, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/22102017.
[45] “US Proposed Kurds Hold Referendum Vote after Iraqi Elections, says Fuad Hussein,” RUDAW, June 16, 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/mobile/english/kurdistan/160620173.
[46] Nader, Hanauer, Allen, and Scotten, Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan; Paula Pineda, “The Kurdish Issue on the USA Foreign Policy Agenda,” in Alex Danilovich, Iraqi Kurdistan in Middle Eastern Politics (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 175.
[47] Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “The Kurdish Move Toward Independence,” Atlantic Council,
July 10, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-kurdish-move-towards-independence.
[48] Amitai Etzioni, “Grant Kurdistan Arms and Independence,” The Diplomat, August 14, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/grant-kurdistan-arms-and-independence/.
[49] Eliyahu Kamisher, “How the KRG Quasi-State Built an Independent Oil Industry,” Moshe Dayan Center, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 27, 2016), file:///C:/Users/moti/Downloads/iqtisadi_2016_jan_eng_0.pdf; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iraqi Situation Report, Part III: Kurdistan,” Markaz, March 30, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/03/30/iraqsituation-report-part-iii-kurdistan/.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Michal Meidan, “China’s Loans for Oil: Asset or Liability?” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, December 2016, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Chinas-loans-for-oil-WPM-70.pdf.
[52] “China, Kuwait to Open Consulates in Erbil,” RUDAW, December 2, 2014, http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/29122014.
[53] “Opposition to Iraq War Widens,” BBC News, January 3, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2688117.stm; Yun Sun, “How China Views France’s Intervention in Mali: An Analysis,” Brookings, January 23, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-china-views-frances-intervention-in-mali-an-analysis/.
[54] Laura Zhou, “China’s Role in Syria’s Endless Civil War,” China Morning Post, April 7, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2085779/backgrounder-chinas-role-syrias-endless-civil-war.