In 1400 AH (1979/80 CE), a new Muslim apocalyptic millennial movement began and has since gained great momentum. Caliphaters are defined by their millennial goal—world conquest—and the apocalyptic timetable—in this generation; they operate on two major registers: kinetic war (jihad) and cognitive war (da’wa). The movement expanded greatly at the turn of the Western millennium (2000 CE), with the Western news media’s coverage of the “second intifada” (opening round of jihadi war on Western democracies), the U.S. response to September 11. These empowered da’wa campaigns designed to pressure Western infidels into the posture of dhimmi.

Caliphaters believe that now is the time for Islam to fulfill its disrupted destiny, and where there was Dar al-Harb (realm of war, of free kuffar/infidels), there shall be Dar al-Islam (realm of submission to Allah and his servants, of dhimmi kuffar). With this global victory, Caliphaters believe, Islam will redeem humanity through Allah’s/its dominion.

Like all millennial movements, the Caliphaters’ embrace a salvific goal. Indeed, one finds among the faithful of all monotheistic traditions those who believe that the ultimate salvific destiny of humanity is either to convert to their religion (whatever that means) or to serve their superior religion. As long as the faithful believe that those dramatic moments are far off (say, the year 6000 Annuus Mundi), such beliefs have a limited impact on the lives of non-believers. In practice, it can even encourage deep passivity in believers who patiently await a promised redemption.

However, when activated by an apocalyptic sense of “now, at long last, is the time!” millennial dreams gain momentum and can become historical movers. Driven by a sense of cosmic urgency, drawn together with the goal of transcendent beauty, millennial movements are hyperactive. The Deeds of God through the believers will transform the current world along its destined arc of perfection. People who enter apocalyptic time, whether they are violent or not, lose their conventional inhibitions and fears; they stop committing to long-term strategies (“planting trees”), and instead commit to active, daring, radical, agendas whose success they fervently believe will change and transform the (unjust) rules and conventions, that they, apocalyptic warriors, so readily violate.

When the Muslim Brotherhood formed in the 1920s CE/1340s AH, Hasan al-Banna judged the time not yet right for Islam’s triumph. He thus set in motion a multi-generational millennial project of first restoring Dar al-Islam where it once was, and then moving onto the Dar al-Harb. In technical terms, Caliphaters have a triumphalist millennial goal (world dominion), an apocalyptic time horizon (our lives), and an active scenario whereby their deeds would bring on redemption: jihad and da’wa (or summons).

Caliphaters first caught the attention of the outside world with the advent of the mujaddid (renewer) at the Muslim century mark, in this case, 1400 (1979)—most notably in Khomeini’s stunning victory in Iran, but, to those paying attention, also in the assault of followers of a Mahdi on
the Grand Mosque of Mecca on the first day of 1400,\textsuperscript{6} and the emergence of the Maitatsine in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{7} It was also the occasion of a meeting in Switzerland of the Muslim Brotherhood exiles from “secular” Arab countries that, three years later, produced a document that outlined the plan for an invasion and conquest of the West by da’wa.\textsuperscript{8}

From the perspective of several decades since, that mujaddid became a key moment in the emergence of Caliphaters in this century (1500/2076). Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood preacher turned the mujaddid of 1400 into a generations-long process. “This is what I prefer in understanding this noble hadith [mujaddid] and its implementation in our century which we parted from [the fourteenth Hijri century which ended in 1980] in order to receive a new century; in which we ask Allah to make our today better than our yesterday, and our tomorrow better than our today.”\textsuperscript{9}

Five years later, al-Qaradawi made clear what this “better tomorrow” would look like: Da’wa conquers the Crusaders’ in their own lands.\textsuperscript{10} From the perspective of several decades since (late teens of the fifteenth century), the Caliphater energy released by that mujaddid of 1400 became a key moment in the emergence of Caliphaters in this century that will end in 1500/2076.\textsuperscript{11}

Like many other millennial movements, Caliphaters view the current state of the world as irredeemably evil and corrupt: It must pass away to make way for the coming redeemed world. Among their apocalyptic signs of growing corruption and evil are key Western cultural tendencies and values: women’s liberation, freedom of speech and press, equal rights for all (including LGBTs, atheists, Jews, other infidels), freedom of speech and assembly for all.\textsuperscript{12} For them, the permissiveness involved has corrupted morals (sexual freedom, especially for women), and equality between Muslims and infidels undermines social structures (end of patriarchy, of triumphalist religiosity).\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, for them, the West’s very scholarship, with its critical analysis of holy documents and the intellectual movements that produced them, constitutes an unacceptable blasphemy against the one true faith, Islam.

On the millennial question of what this coming heaven on earth, this world of global Dar al-Islam triumphant, will look, Caliphaters like to remain vague, just as Marx and communists were vague about the workers’ paradise. The vaguer, the more people can be drawn into the apocalyptic excitement. Actual attempts to realize it, like the Islamic State, may disappoint, but, as with communists, they don’t dissuade.\textsuperscript{14}

Once inside the apocalyptic time of Caliphater circles, however, major disagreements prevail on three major questions: 1) How fast will the redemption occur? 2) Where are we in the process? 3) How much of what is to come is due to the active work of the faithful, and, if so, what actions do the times demand? The answers to these apocalyptic questions give a wide range of potential groupings within the movement. At the two extremes stand:

**Jihad:** *Active cataclysmic apocalyptic:* The global Caliphate will happen rapidly *because of* the faithful. By destroying evil (the unjust world that now prevails), *they* will bring on Allah’s promised redemption. Thus, *mujahidin* (jihadists) are Allah’s soldiers on earth to destroy evil and pave the way for the Caliphate. For some, like Hama’s, this means implementing the promise of the Hadith of Rock and Trees, and exterminating the Jews.\textsuperscript{15} Tribal jihad has had a remarkable success in the twenty-first century, especially in the Muslim majority world, where whole regions have melted down into states of chronic war, dislocating millions of victims and tens of millions of refugees.\textsuperscript{16} They have also penetrated Western societies with dramatic acts of suicide terror. These *shahids* have turned warriors into apocalyptic weapons, creating a new and extremely potent weapon of twenty-first century jihadi warfare: “The demons released by this age of chaos and war in the Middle East have become an unstoppable force,” notes Patrick Cockburn.\textsuperscript{17}

**Da’wa:** *Active transformative apocalyptic:* At the other end of the range are Caliphaters who believe the process will happen more gradually, through persuasion rather than force. Da’wa (summons to the faith), they insist, is how Islam should spread: The faithful summon, the infidels will respond, and if they do not become Muslims, they become *proleptic dhimmi* (accept subjection before conquest).\textsuperscript{18} The global Caliphate might come now, but it might also take another generation,
it might take till the end of this fifteenth century, so auspiciously begun in 1400 (1979) and destined to conclude with a global Caliphate in 1500 (2076). For Qaradawi, da’wa is an alternative form of conquest: political jihad.

A jihadist forces infidels to convert or die; a *da’i* summons infidels to conversion. Both are Caliphaters striving for global Muslim dominance. Despite their vast and all too often murderous differences, they share an ultimate and fervent cause—the dominion of the umma. For them, *wala wa’l bara*, “one of Islam’s main foundations” means: “two major prerequisites of true faith: *al-wala* is a manifestation of sincere love for Allah, his prophet and the believers; *al-barâ* is an expression of enmity and hatred towards falsehood and its adherents [i.e. infidels].”

Those who fail to keep this perspective can end up having real friendships with infidels—a profound infidel hope, and a cardinal triumphalist Muslim sin that proliferates in modern times.

For Jihadi ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri, *al-wala wa’l bara* was the key to the age: “We believe that the greatest challenge facing Islamic belief in this age is the threat of deviation from allegiance to believers and animosity of the kuffâr.” Al-wala wa’l bara, here, is the religious equivalent of the tribal code of solidarity (*asabiyya*): my side right or wrong. It is by its nature triumphalist, and rejoices in “lording it over” the infidel. For British Muslim Abu Walid, for example, Muslims should humiliate Christians into converting.

Of course, as with all such movements, the scenario with which one enters apocalyptic time never pans out, and all believers end up having to negotiate the inevitable disappointments; but the zealous rarely give up: They shift scenarios in order to maintain apocalyptic time (hope). They are capable of moving back and forth from violence to pacifism, from da’wa to jihad as they feel appropriate. In apocalyptic time, categories are fluid, constantly reconfiguring. One has not begun to see the end of Caliphater creativeness in generating combinations of da’wa and jihad.

**CALIPHATER WAR ON INFIDELS: AIMS, TARGETS, AND STRATEGIES**

For Caliphaters, *Occidens delendus est*: everything that the West prides itself on, and every technical advantage that they have over Muslims and Islam, must either be seized or destroyed. Indeed, for some Caliphaters, Western technologies prepare their way; globalization, the internet, rapid transportation, and open borders are all vehicles of *their* salvific victory, their messiah’s donkey. Just as Eusebius declared the Roman Empire a *praeparatio evangelica* (empire that laid the groundwork for the spread of the Gospels), so is globalization in the twenty-first century a *praeparatio califatae*. Today’s technology enables their global dominion, if only they can seize control. From a Western (infidel) point of view, this is obviously a crazy ambition, based on a wild overvaluation of their capabilities. However, for people moved by “outrageous hope,” nothing is impossible; and right or wrong, like the Taiping and many other messianic movements, they can do immense damage in the process of failing.

Ironically, this Western incredulity at their ambitions has worked greatly to the Caliphaters’ advantage. Westerners hearing of Caliphater goals in the later twentieth century—Queen in a burqa, green flag of Islam flying from the White House—could not take the movement seriously. Anyone warning about the problem was told to stop the bad joke; those who persisted were labeled Islamophobes.

For Caliphaters, the two crucial global targets for destruction in the battle for world dominion are Israel, the invader of (historical) Dar al-Islam, and the West, the most powerful civilization of (current) Dar al-Harb. Both constitute successful autonomous infidel entities, therefore, as insults to Muslim triumphalism, what Shi’i Caliphaters call the “Great and Little Satan.” By their insulting defiance, they are therefore inhabitants of the realm of the sword, *harbis*—destined to the sword. Israel, an autonomous Jewish state into the heart of Dar al-Islam, makes the global humiliation unbearable, and as a result, in the apocalyptic literature of the fifteenth century AH (1979-2076),
Israel is the heartland of evil from which the Dajjal (Antichrist) will appear. Caliphaters do not fight local wars; they grapple with cosmic evil.

Asymmetrical Warfare’s Cognitive Campaigns: Caliphater Da’wa

Under modern conditions, however, an open war with the West is impossible. Thus, like all asymmetrical wars, the early stages largely take place on the cognitive battlefield: Convince your more powerful foe not to use its superior force, while mobilizing your own side to place their faith in promised violence. In the invasive cognitive war (cogwar) that Caliphaters wage, convince your more powerful enemy to stand down and not resist your invasion. Thus while mujahidin attract the most attention from specialists and do spectacular damage where they cannot be controlled (from Afghanistan across the Middle East to Nigeria), by far the most active arm of the Caliphater movement in the West wages cognitive war (da’wa).

Da’wa Caliphaters living in Dar al-Harb, however, need to disguise their real goals. (People tend to resist when they know they are being invaded.) Thus the primary early Caliphater concerns while operating in enemy territory are, by their very nature, deceptive. They have to hide their intentions from the people they target; spread dissension in their enemy’s ranks; and leverage jihadi attacks into concessions, even as they publicly condemn those jihadists. In order to do so, da’is must find allies within target cultures, cultural leaders who (like dhimmi leaders throughout the history of Islamic rule) suppress criticism of Islam among their people, and instead attack fellow infidels who criticize the Caliphaters.

In early 2000, shortly after the Y2K bug had passed without incident--with the West leading the global community into a new millennium of civil society--the likelihood of a global Caliphate seemed, even to some wannabe Caliphaters, like an awfully tall order: impossible militarily, ridiculously quixotic as a cogwar. Only the most fervent of true believers could think that, even with Allah’s help, the global Caliphate was possible. In order to succeed, da’wa Caliphaters needed a long list of desideranda among the information professionals of the targeted kuffar population to:

- Disguise their ambition to subject the kuffar, by downplaying jihadi acts of war and their deployment among the targeted population.
- Insist that “except for a tiny minority,” the “vast majority” of Muslims are moderate and peaceful, and Islam is a “Religion of Peace” that has nothing to do with the violence of jihadists.
- Accept those who fight for the Caliphate with da’wa as “moderates” who have “nothing to do” with “violent extremists.”
- Engage these “moderate” Caliphaters as advisors and consultants in intelligence and police work, as prison chaplains, community liaisons, college teachers, and administrators.
- Present Caliphater war propaganda as reliable information, as news.
- Attack those who criticize Islam (including Muslims) as xenophobic and racist Islamophobes.
- Adopt the Caliphater’s apocalyptic enemy as their own, so that the kuffar join in an attack on one of their key allies.
- Legitimate jihadi terrorism as “resistance” and denounce any recourse to violence in their own defense as “terrorism.”
- Respect the dignity of Muslim beliefs even as Muslims heap disdain on their beliefs.
- Take seriously Caliphater invocations of human rights when, in reality, they despise those rights for women, slaves, and infidels.
- Welcome an angry “Muslim Street” in the heart of their capital cities.
Despite how obviously ill-advised such a course of action is for Western information professionals, that is precisely how they behaved, and by the mid-2000s (2005/2006), a spate of books warning of Europe’s pending demise appeared.® These were roundly ridiculed and denounced as belligerent conspiracy theories.® Other authors, ignoring the icebergs, forged full speed ahead toward their dream of Europe replacing the United States as global hegemon.®

Progressives and policymakers have adopted the tropes “Islam is a ‘religion of peace,’” and consider discussions of terrorism as a manifestation of “radical” Islam, as an insult to peaceful Muslims.® They insist that there should be “no lumping” between the “vast majority of moderate Muslims” and violent extremists—pas d’amalgames!®

This in turn has allowed da’wa Caliphaters to claim inclusion among the moderates seeking peace and among the progressives seeking social justice. Intelligence and security services in the (infidel) West have (how often unwittingly?) partnered with da’wa Caliphaters. As a result, no less than the National Security Advisor James Clapper, for example, described the Muslim Brotherhood as “moderate,” and “largely secular,” encouraging that the United States favor them at the time of the Arab Spring (2011).®5

Caliphaters have greatly expanded the presence of a “Muslim Street” in Western capitals, first seen in the anti-Zionist and “anti-War” demonstrations of the early aughts; then taking the initiative by burning suburbs across France (fall 2005); protesting the cartoon blasphemy and papal insult controversies (winter and spring 2006); more recently seen setting fires to cities across Europe in the summer of 2014, in the wake of another wave of lethal journalism about the IDF in Gaza®; and in the summer of 2017, as part of a refugee crisis that can only get worse.

Among activist information professionals—journalists, academics, NGO researchers, policymakers—there is a marked reluctance to identify violence qua Muslim violence,® and to accommodate their genocidal rhetoric.® At the same time, these same professionals showed much greater enthusiasm for attacking those who criticize the Caliphaters. These, they accuse of Islamophobia/racism and consider the provokers of the conflict; and far from criticizing Muslims, instead portray them as victims.

Perhaps the most extensive and spectacular victory for Caliphaters, one that involved major failures on the part of a democratic culture’s defenses, was getting the progressive left to adopt as its own enemy, the worst jihadi apocalyptic foe, Israel.® From the worldwide demonstrations about Muhammad al-Dura (October 2000), to Durban (August/September 2001), through the heights of the “anti-war” movement (February 2003), progressives enthusiastically adopted the Caliphat narrative that Israel is the global evil that must be destroyed for world peace. The ferocious anti-Zionism of the left in the twenty-first century, corresponds exactly to the wave of success in jihadi war propaganda, getting Western journalists to report Palestinian lethal narratives as news.

This meant that Westerner progressives could not—refused to—see the attack on Israel in 2000 as part of a larger Muslim triumphant assault on sovereign infidels everywhere (including them). Instead, thinking they were siding with the little guy, progressives, led by their lethal journalists, cheered on the Palestinian “resistance.”® In 2002, in response to a powerful round of lethal journalism about the Israeli “massacre” at Jenin, progressives demonstrated their solidarity with the Palestinians, cheering on the new and terrible apocalyptic jihadi weapon of the twenty-first century, suicide attacks on civilians (2002).®

Given that the global jihadists would soon (had already) turned this on other infidels (United States, 2001), why would progressives cheer on the weapon of their own destruction? Because they, trusting their media, believed Israel—not they—deserved that punishment at the hand of jihadists: “What choice did the Palestinians have?” asked progressives, assuming that if the Palestinians did such terrible things, the Israelis must have done even more terrible things.® By 2006, members of the “global progressive left” welcomed Hamas and Hizballah into their anti-imperialism of fools.®
Under cover of anti-Zionism, Caliphater violence (jihad) against infidels made inroads in the West in the aughts (2000s) without arousing alarm or defensive measures. Since initially the jihadists attacked primarily Jews in Europe, especially France, Western thought-leaders fell prey to the amalgame they rejected in thinking about Muslims: They misidentified Muslim attacks on the Jews of Europe as attacks only on Jews (because of Israeli sins). When jihad targeted non-Jews, the misinformed infidel public asked in pained bewilderment, “Why?”

There is a significant overlap between the list of desideranda above and the plan laid out by Sa’id Ramadan (son-in law of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and father of Tariq), in his 1982 plan for conquering the West. It is not clear how long Sa’id Ramadan thought his plan would take at the time of composition, but after 2000, the timetable speeded up notably.

**LUMPERS VS/ SPLITTERS: IDEOLOGY VS. STRATEGY**

The association of da’wa and jihad as part of a larger millennial project challenges a number of currently prevailing approaches to the problem of religious “terrorism.” Experts prefer splitting, differentiating various groups according to specific characteristics and actions, whereas the notion of Caliphaters lumps a much larger range of believers into a single problematic dynamic.

**Splitting Between Jihadi Groups**

In the case of Hamas and the Islamic State, for example, when the UN condemned the latter for its barbarity, Israeli PM Netanyahu said, predictably, “Hey, the Islamic State and Hamas are the same.” “Oh no they’re not, they’re totally different,” said some pundits, emphasizing that “localized” groups like Hamas “adopt a strong nationalist agenda that separates them starkly from the global
jihadist aspirations entertained by Al Qaeda.” Yet both these movements feed and feed off of a generation of seekers who have come to their Caliphate shores, there to expend their triumphalist passions. These seekers on any side of global jihadi “organizational” divides share a common vision. The Islamic State learned its cyber-savvy from Palestinian cyber-jihadists, and when the two movements actually cross paths, they recruit from the same pool of seekers.

In fact, far from being some local, nationalist movement, Hamas holds a place of special honor in the world of global, Caliphate jihad. Certainly in their own minds, they see themselves as fighting against the blasphemy of Israel, invader and desecrator of Dar al-Islam. In launching the “intifada” against Israel from the river to the sea in 2000, they announced that the time for the apocalyptic hadith of the Rocks and Trees, for the extermination of the Jews had come. With the image of Muhammad al-Dura, broadcast everywhere in the Muslim world by al-Jazeera, they awoke the umma to the threat of Western infidels and aroused a thirst for revenge that literally legitimated suicide terror. Cheered on by Western progressives, Palestinian jihadists legitimated and refined the weapon with which global jihadists intend to conquer the West in this mujaddid.

For Shaykh Raed Salah, head of the Islamic Movement in Israel, “Inshallah, Jerusalem will soon become the capital of the global Caliphate.” Whether other Caliphaters shared the same opinion of their centrality, Hamas certainly shared their global vision. A Palestinian Authority cleric commenting on the genocidal hadith about the rocks and the trees explained the larger apocalyptic scenario of a millennial conquest that began with this slaughter:

We believe in this Hadith. We are convinced also that this Hadith heralds the spread of Islam and its rule over all the lands... Oh Allah, annihilate the Jews and their supporters... Oh Allah, raise the flag of Jihad across the earth... Oh beloved, look to the East of the earth, find Japan and the ocean; look to the West of the earth, find the country and the ocean. Be assured that these will be owned by the Muslim nation, as the Hadith says, “from the ocean to the ocean.”

Bin Ladin and Caliphaters the world over who saw the video applauded every word. In June of 2017, in response to the metal detector incident on the Temple Mount, Palestinian preacher Nadhal Siam urged the faithful to slaughter the infidel to the amens of his supporters:

Oh Allah, enable us to slaughter the Americans! Amen!
And the Europeans! Amen!
And our criminal and treacherous [Arab] rulers! Amen.

A month later, half a way around the world, imams in Davis, California, recited the genocidal hadith of the rocks and trees, calling for the slaughter of every last Jew on earth, and mainstream media helped him “apologize.”

All Caliphaters jihadists, whether operating locally or globally, share five fundamental beliefs that dwarf any differences:

1. They consider all kuffar (infidels) and murtadd (apostates, backsliders) guilty, and, therefore, legitimate targets;
2. They preach the paranoid imperative: The enemy wants to annihilate Islam; we must annihilate the enemy;
3. They teach absolute hatred of their apocalyptic enemies and call for genocidal jihad against them.
4. They have a special apocalyptic fear of Jews (anti-Semitic Judeophobia), who, must be exterminated not only because of the hadith, but because they are “sons of pigs and apes,” and yet also at the heart of an international conspiracy to destroy Islam and enslave mankind;
5. They approve and will use suicide martyrs to target their enemies, including, increasingly, fellow Muslims, and random kuffar in the West.\textsuperscript{64}

Caliphater groups come together, develop, succeed briefly or longer, fail or lose steam, at which point seekers will improvise apocalyptic scenarios; they will either regroup or get replaced by other fresher groups. Caliphater seekers go from leader-driven to acephalous and back again with ease.\textsuperscript{65} For they are fighting a generational war, and their ranks are fed by waves of Muslim seekers--youth like Maajid Nawaz or Ed Husain, attracted to Caliphater identity-entrepreneurs (like Hizb al-Tahrir), who promised to restore their honor by galvanizing their hostility and promising them cosmic rewards for attacking the enemy.\textsuperscript{66}

For varying periods and at different times, these global currents coalesce around religious warlords and their wars, like Hamas' Oslo jihad, al-Qa'ida, Muqtada al-Sadr, the Islamic State: They rise, do damage, and morph into other shapes, all with the same millennial goal.\textsuperscript{67} This surge of triumphal millenniumism has deep roots.\textsuperscript{68} Such assaults on the West will continue to come in waves for decades at the least.

Part of the enduring power Caliphaters exercise over Muslim seekers is a discourse that, within its belligerent parameters, is ecumenical: Its adepts have many visions of the Caliphate and many options on how to get there and when. Whatever path one chooses, whatever combination of/alternation between da'wa and jihad, one holds firm to the faith that the sum total of the efforts of all Caliphaters will lead to ultimate triumph. Caliphaters may scan the horizon: “Who is the Mahdi who will lead the final assault? On Israel? On Rome? On Washington?” And accordingly, messianic candidates do and will appear all the time, bottom-up. Islam’s fifteenth century (1400-1433/1979-2012) has already produced more than its share of jihadi warlords with messianic pretensions;\textsuperscript{69} and the world will probably see still more at the approach of the fifteenth mujaddid, in 2076.

**Splitting Between Jihadists and Da’is**

If Western policy experts tend to overestimate distinctions between jihadi groups, how much the more do they do so with Caliphaters who (for the time being) restrict themselves to da’wa? Indeed, since September 11, the dominant consensus has been to treat da’is and jihadists as fundamentally different. Western infidels may and should want to handle various jihadi and da’wa groups differently, but to fail to see the deep solidarity--the asabiyya of the cosmic tribe--is a potentially lethal conceptual error.

Caliphaters think in terms of (apocalyptic) strategies: When is the time to say and do what, to whom? …to Muslims? …to infidels? In apocalyptic time, scenarios can change dramatically, and ideologies serve primarily as narrative jazz to prolong the apocalyptic experience.\textsuperscript{70} Viewed retrospectively, the apocalyptic “ideologies” appear as rationalizations for behavior driven by the desire to bring on the millennium as fast as Allah will allow it.\textsuperscript{71}

The choice, then, of violence or non-violence, of appropriate relations with varying kinds of infidels (*wala wa bara*) and dissenters (*takfir*), depends more on the perception of an apocalyptic (redemptive) timeline than matters of principle: The more urgent and imminent the anticipated apocalyptic change, the more coercive the Caliphater (strike terror); the more extended the time horizon, the more seemingly patient (speak softly). Overall, the perception of apocalyptic time--how close the redemptive victory--results from a combination of the perception of relative strength or weakness of the Muslim forces, and the urgency of the need to assert dominion.\textsuperscript{72}

Little in these differing assessments of a given seeker’s place in the present timeline prevents Caliphaters of all styles from cooperating. Indeed they have mastered the tough-cop, nice-cop routine, especially successful with those infidels who have difficulty discerning demopathy, like the Human Rights NGOs.\textsuperscript{73} Ironically, da’wa is actually easier after terror strikes: In his “strong horse” speech, bin Ladin exulted in how, after September 11, the Western conversions poured in.\textsuperscript{74}
However, even da’is have limits to their patience. Disappointed transformative expectations (e.g., an insufficiently compliant infidel response to “summons”) inevitably lead to shifts in attitude: Some might extend their timeline and become more patient, while others, exasperated, might turn to violence and coercive purity. The key question about Caliphaters is: When do they think the time has come no longer to conceal (taqiyya) what they really think, namely: Islam is here to dominate: “Happy Hanukah to my Jewish neighbors. Bas ballah jan. I think it’s time you moved out, no?”

Says the Caliphater to the infidel: “Jihadi phase or da’wa phase? Your choice. Cross my da’wa and you’ll get Jihad.”

CASE STUDY: HIZB AL-TAHRIR

Hizb al-Tahrir offers a good look at a Caliphater organization occupying the hinge from normative Islam to the jihadi extreme. Its teachings began in the early 1950s in reaction to Israel’s creation, renouncing Arab nationalism as a divisive Western plot and Muslim “nation-states” as part of a degenerate Westernization. The true Muslim path was a unified Caliphate spanning all of former Dar al-Islam.

A generation later, with Israel still going strong, and the Caliphate not restored to Muslim lands, Hizb al-Tahrir expanded in Europe, shifting its focus from conquest of former Dar al-Islam (too hard in the authoritarian political culture) to the conquest of Dar al-Harb (where the authorities don’t fight back). Hizb al-Tahrir in Britain in the 1990s saw “the Khilafah,” a Muslim superstate, as the answer to all the injustice meted out to the Muslim populations of the world. This Caliphater identity provided a powerful scapegoating meme, attracting a generation of seekers, humiliated by their elders’ disgrace, and desirous of glorious revenge.

Under the leadership of Omar Bakri Muhammad (1986-1996), Hizb al-Tahrir “swept across the UK,” where it recruited youth ready for cyber-Islamism among second generation immigrants. They had particular success in the universities, where they used the al-Dura lethal narrative as an introductory trope. They turned a Middle Eastern Caliphate movement into a global one; they prepared the final generation, “generation Caliphate.”

During this period of strong influence, Hizb al-Tahrir stayed scrupulously on the non-violent side, even as its rhetoric encouraged jihadi violence. Maajid Nawaz describes the modus operandi: “We disguised our political demands behind [freedom of] religion and multiculturalism, and deliberately labeled any objection to our demands as racism.”

This strategy paid off handsomely. Western infidels focus almost exclusively on the open denunciation of terrorist violence as a litmus test for “moderation.”

Here da’i groups split: Some refuse to denounce at all, like Hizb al-Tahrir’s Australian spokesman Wassim Doureihi. Others take advantage of Western naiveté to denounce the killing of “innocent civilians,” meaning innocent Muslims, since kuffar are, by definition, guilty, as Anjem Choudary explained to a stunned Stephen Sackur after the July 7, 2005, London bombings. At this hinge of hatred for the infidel, a group like Hizb al-Tahrir could serve as a way-station to jihadi organizations, whose Muslim right to wage war on the country they lived in were only suspended by their agreement not to be violent… right away.

Hizb al-Tahrir’s formal response to the July 7 London bombings, give us the authentic voice of Caliphater da’wa, complement to jihad. They viewed infidels expressing outrage at Muslims attacking innocent civilians, as an act war on Islam: “These latest [angry] comments… have clearly exposed the reality of this so-called war on terror…. These offensive comments about the Shariah and the Caliphate will leave no doubt in the Muslim world that this is a war against Islam and not about individuals or groups committing acts of violence.”

The West is to blame and every act it takes in its defense aggravates the situation. Note the message to the infidel here: “Do not offend Muslims (even when Muslim beliefs and deeds offend you), for we will take it as a declaration of war and strike back (jihad).”
Astonishingly, this raw, completely unreciprocal, Muslim triumphalism gets the desired response from many infidels: “We can’t go to war with 1.6 billion Muslims, so let’s show them some consideration.” After September 11, an extensive consensus among progressive infidels emerged: Criticizing Islam feeds the fires of jihad; suppressing criticism of Caliphaters makes it possible for dialogue.

Infidels’ reluctance to criticize Muslims, and readiness to criticize their own counter-measures, a stance they so earnestly hope will appease Muslim “anger,” merely quiets the jihadi track and opens up the cognitive attack. For Caliphaters, “dialogue” means one-way da’wa, summons to the true faith. They read infidel compliance as affirming the notion that, with the right display of jihadi terror, infidels will accept da’wa and either convert or submit “voluntarily” (dhimmi). “Jihadi phase or da’wa phase? Your choice.”

Instead of provoking sound Western responses that resisted this accusation of Western guilt, when historically, Muslims in power behaved at least as badly, and current Caliphaters embody everything progressives reject in Western culture, infidel thought leaders, obsessed with their own society’s “evil”--Bush! Sharon!--allowed Caliphaters to wage flourishing anti-Western war campaigns within Western society. Ed Husain, who knew Hizb al-Tahrir from the inside, marveled at the folly of the Western progressives in giving the Caliphaters a free hand, and adopting the rhetoric of appeasement.

This technique of accusing the West and exonerating jihadists, picked up by Western (and Westernized) radicals, has become a staple of Caliphat discourse in no small part because of its success with Western infidels. “I remember how we used to laugh in celebration whenever people on TV proclaimed that the sole cause for Islamic acts of terror like 9/11, the Madrid bombings and 7/7 was Western foreign policy… they did our propaganda work for us. More important, they also helped to draw away any critical examination from the real engine of our violence: Islamic theology.”

Under the guise of moderation (defined by renouncing violence) and anti-imperialism (defined as fervently opposing American imperialism), Caliphaters have invaded the Western public sphere—journalism, academia, even policy circles. No invasive cogwarrior could ask for better cooperation from the target--infidels shouting “We are Hamas!” in European capitals.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

The response of productive societies committed to tolerance of diversity and individual freedoms (Europe, America, democratic countries, including Israel) to this kind of military and cognitive pre-modern religious assault needs to engage on many fronts. This is not a war on terror, but on an imperialist-totalitarian apocalyptic drive that damages and devours everyone in its path, including (so far, especially) Muslims. However well or poorly the West has done on the military front, its work on the cognitive front has been consistently weak. Caliphaters have had great success in dominating what is (not) said about them in the Western public sphere.

Dealing with an invasive cognitive war plan of this magnitude is unfortunately relatively unknown terrain and parallels to the invasive cognitive war waged by the Communists and their useful idiots in the West in the twentieth century, however strong, are only partial. Certainly the number and solidarity of the invaders has significantly increased over the Communists; and suicide bombing has changed the dynamics dramatically. Since Rushdie (1989/1410), the Shari’a of blasphemy can strike fear anywhere in the world, a fear reinforced by the Danish Cartoon riots of 2005-2006/1426-1427, and the executions at Charlie Hebdo in January of 2015/1436. Thus the combination of intimidation and blandishments for Western thought-leaders has a particularly strong force in the new century/millennium, and thus Westerners adopt the narrative da’is want them to adopt--“Islam is peaceful, let’s show them some respect.” Perhaps that explains why today’s useful
infidels behave much as did the useful idiots of yore, but in greater numbers (?), and with far less ideological justification.96

Western infidels don’t even have vague answers to key questions. How many self-conscious Caliphaters are there? How susceptible is any Muslim to the appeal of the Caliphater dream? What will redirect Caliphaters into more sane, demotic forms of millennial religiosity, so that non-triumphalist Muslims can live in peace with members of other religions?97

“Caliphater” is an inherently disturbing term. Once one looks for them, one finds levels of Caliphaters in the Muslim world far greater than any infidel would like to acknowledge, and a much wider range of sympathy for them and their dream among Muslims (who almost all share the triumphalist millennial anticipation that someday, all humanity will “submit” to Allah). When infidels say, “We can’t go to war with 1.6 billion Muslims,” they seem to forget that Caliphaters, however many they are, can and do go to war with those they view as infidels. When infidels repeat after da’is, “it’s only a tiny minority of extremists who have nothing to do with ‘real’ Islam,” they delude themselves.

Nor do infidels who confront this inconvenient truth that Caliphaters have gone to war have to go to war with Caliphaters, at least not kinetic war. Presumably most, hopefully the “vast majority” of Muslims, are people capable of, if not necessarily inclined at the moment, towards the peaceful and tolerant relations with infidels that a free society (dare one say, humanity and Allah) requires. Western progressives have every right to demand it and every right to confront the ideology that assaults them, indeed that seeks either their submission or their annihilation, without being assaulted by their fellow infidels as “Islamophobes.” When infidels cease to view Muslims as stable items they can slot into factitious categories like moderate and extremist, and begin to see them as people making faith choices, analysts can begin to perceive long-term strategies for peaceful relations between Muslims and infidels.

Progressive infidels should, thus, oppose non-violent Caliphaters in the cogwar battlefield in which they operate, not by targeting them as jihadists, but by refusing the da’i’s demand that they become proleptic dhimmi.98 This means not giving them the moral, intellectual, and institutional support that makes their da’wa possible, and not proffering the submissive responses that give that da’wa such success. Rather than adopting their ideological demands—carefully cleaned up for them in the language of “human rights”—progressives need to demand reciprocity.

Of course, this pushback will frustrate no small number of da’is who, aggravated, might then become jihadists. In such a case, it is better to force early recognition than to make concessions to people who respond by upping their demands. It is one matter to go after hate speech when it is a definition that applies to all, and Muslims do not get exemption.99 If infidels go after Islamophobes identified (in their exquisite sensitivity) by da’is, they go after anyone whom Caliphaters consider a threat to the coming Caliphate.

Currently, experts argue differently. In response to a proposed ban on an extremist organization like Hizb al-Tahrir, they warn about alienating the “mainstream” Muslim community.100 These concerns underline the infidel dilemma: They tacitly acknowledge the hinge in the Muslim community between non-violence and terror, even as they try to pretend it is a divide they can discourage “moderate Muslims” from crossing over, by appeasing them. Hence the dilemma’s horns: If Western infidels ban Caliphaters, they help them proliferate; if they do not ban them, they help them proliferate. Says the Caliphat to the kuffar: “Jihadi phase or da’wa phase? Your choice.”

Bluntly put, Westerners have to directly challenge Muslims on the meaning of al-wala wa’l bara, whose tribal nature clashes fundamentally with the ecumenical thrust of progressive values and global civil society no matter how much one is committed to multi-culturalism. If this means holding Muslims accountable like anyone else, if it means asking of Islam what civil society asks of all the religions to which it gives that so precious a gift as freedom of worship, then so be it. In a civil society, every religion renounces religious triumphalism and its hate speech; and they certainly renounce the kind that demands public displays of its superiority.
After an epic, millennium-long, battle against this kind of belligerent zero-sum political religiosity in European and American culture, Western infidels have certainly earned the right to demand reciprocity from others who wish to share in the bounty of civil polities. Freedom is not an entitlement; it is earned. The alternative, a humanitarian racism that has no moral expectations of Muslims, considers them a force of nature, and then paradoxically treats them as if they were already fully engaged in reciprocity, insults all true Muslims, Caliphater and tolerant alike. It is a moral abdication that works to the benefit of the Caliphater (who knows how to exploit useful infidel stupidity), and undermines the tolerant (whom it betrays by belittling their accomplishments).

If, instead, Westerners were as attuned to how their appeasement fueled da’wa, as they were to what they so readily assert is true: that “Islamophobia” (as Caliphaters define it) fuels jihad, they might actually fight the fire with water, rather than pouring on accelerants.

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NOTES

1 On a comparison between global jihad and anti-global climate warming as apocalyptic movements, see Richard Landes, Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience (NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 15.


10 Yusuf al-Qaradawi speaking in 1995 to a gathering of the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA) in Toledo, Ohio; excerpts at The Investigative Project, https://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/167/yusuf-al-qaradawi#_ftnref3; viewable online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzh2mJf2ot4.


12 For the best introduction to the apocalyptic Caliphater imagination, see David Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005); Timothy Furnish, Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, Their Jihads, and Osama bin Laden (NY: Prager, 2005); Murawiec, The Mind of Jihad; Filiu, Apocalypse in Islam.


14 On Marx’s response to disappointment, see Landes, Heaven on Earth, chap. 10. To this very day, believers in the millennial dream will still say, “communism has never really been tried.”

15 “And the end will not come until the Muslims rise up and kill the Jews. And the Jews will hide behind rocks and trees, and the rocks and trees will say, ‘Oh Muslim, oh servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me, come kill him’.” Sahih Muslim, The Book Pertaining to the Turmoil and Portents of the Last Hour, Book 41:6981-85, http://cmje.usc.edu/religious-texts/hadith/muslim/041-smt.php.

16 On tribal Jihad, see Murawiec, Mind of Jihad, chap. 4.


On Messiah’s donkey, which takes many forms, see Seffi Rachlevsky, Hamoro shel meshiach [Messiah’s Donkey], (Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Aharonot, 1998).

24 Eusebius, Demonstratio Evangelica, Books 3-5.

25 On the Taiping, see Landes, Heaven on Earth, chap. 7.


27 Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic, chap. 5; Filiu, Muslim Apocalyptic, chap. 5.


29 See Bat-Ye’or on both the Muslim identification of criticism with blasphemy, and a mimicry complex in which the dhimmi adopt the beliefs of their masters in order to ingratiate themselves: Bat Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude, Trans. from French by Miriam Kochan and David Littman (Madison, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 2001), pp. 106-10.


34 In France, the expression “pas d’amalgames (no lumping)” has become so common, especially after jihadi atrocities, that it has become a subject of derision: “Pas d’amalgame !” http://catechisme-adulte.blogspot.co.il/2015/01/pas-damalgame.html.


Murawiec calls it “Manichaean tribalism,” The Mind of Jihad, chap. 4.


On Messiah’s donkey, which takes many forms, see Seffi Rachlevsky, Hamoro shel meshiach [Messiah’s Donkey], (Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Aharonot, 1998).

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37 To cite only two of the countless examples of this Omertà, see the case of expurgating any mention of Islam in the case of Major Hassan’s attack on Fort Hood in 2009 (Andrew McCarthy, The Grand Jihad: How Islam and the Left Sabotage America [New York: Perseus Books Group, 2010], pp. 357-66); and the taharush (mob harassment/rape) of the celebrations in Cologne the night of December 31, 2015, which went unmentioned in the mainstream news until discussions on Facebook forced it into the open: Justin Huggler, “‘Cover-Up’ over Cologne Sex Assaults Blamed on Migration Sensitivities,” Daily Telegraph, January 6, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12085182/Cover-up-over-Cologne-sex-assaults-blamed-on-migration-sensitivities.html.

38 A notable early example came from William Orme in 2000, who cited a sermon from Palestinian Shaykh Halabiya that called for extermination of the Jews everywhere in the world, and left out any genocidal passages: Alex Safian, “NYT Covers Up Call to ‘Kill the Jews,’” CAMERA, October 25, 2000, http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=6&x_article=118. For a more recent example, see the Washington Post’s Michele Boorstein’s treatment of two California imams who preached the genocidal hadith of the rocks and trees (below, n. 60).

39 This is an explicit goal of “The Project,” Besson, La conquête de l’Occident. “To adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic plan, with the policy plan and by means of jihad, since it acts as the keystone of the renaissance of the Arab world today… To create a link between the moujahadin in Palestine and those throughout the Islamic world. To nourish a sentiment of rancor with respect to the Jews and refuse all coexistence.” See Landes, “Fatal Attraction: The Shared Antichrist of the Global Progressive Left and Jihad,” in Cary Nelson and Gabriel Brahm (eds.), The Case Against Academic Boycotts Of Israel (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2014), chap. 20.


Islamic Antisemitism: French Silence?

49 For an example of this attitude, see BBC’s Tim Wilcox interviewing a French Jew after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper-Cacher: Nick Cohen, “The BBC: Blaming the Jews after the attacks on Jews,” Spectator, January 12, 2015, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2015/01/the-bbc-blaming-the-jews-for-attacks-on-jews/.

47 Besson, La conquête de l’Occident, pp. 193-205. Besson calls it a 100-year plan (which it may have been) but the only reference to 100 years in the document refers to the previous century. Note that for Muslims in 1982, the year is 1402, and references to a century would mean the fourteenth (1882-1979) and fifteenth (1979-2076). The important point here, however, is that the Muslim Brotherhood can and does think in generational terms, which very few Westerners do. Should circumstances change, members are only too happy to conclude that, Allah willing, things are happening even faster than expected.


49 Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), p. 59; see Table 1.1 for a list of differences.


55 See Cockburn, Rise of Islamic State, above, n. 11.


58 For bin Laden’s use of the al-Dura footage in his recruiting video for global jihad, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqJqaIxuGf0.


63 Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic, chap. 5.


68 For critical insights into the psychology of jihadists, see Nancy Kobrin, The Jihadi Dictionary (Mamaroneck, NY: Multieducator Press, 2016).


For a discussion of the role of apocalyptic (imminent) expectations in setting millennial dreams into action, see Landes, *Heaven on Earth*, chap. 2.


See the role of redating the End several centuries into the future (Filiu, *Apocalypse in Islam*, p. 80-83; Landes, “Lest the Millennium Be Fulfilled”).


Haitham Ibn Thabit of the American chapter of Hizb al-Tahrir, speaking at the Khilafah 2016 conference, held in Chicago on May 15: “Islam is here to dominate! This was an ideological struggle, the sole purpose of which was to organize Man's affairs in accordance with a system revealed by Allah.” “Muslims to Refrain from Voting in USA Elections: ‘Islam Is Here to Dominate,’” MEMRI, November 12, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3oe9YFe4Pl8.


Ibid., p. 71.


See the remarkable exchange between Steven Sackur of BBC’s *Hardtalk* and Anjem Choudary: “Transcript: Anjem Choudary HARDTalk Interview-7/7 London Bombings,” September 9, 2008,
On the “covenant of peace” the British thought they had with their jihadists, see Phillips, *Londonistan*, chap. 3.


Hillary Clinton represents this trend, explaining that she refuses to use the term “radical Islam” because it “sounds like we are declaring war against a religion. It doesn’t do justice to the vast number of Muslims in our country and around the world who are peaceful people... No. 2, it helps to create this clash of civilizations that is actually a recruiting tool for ISIS and other radical jihadists who use this as a way of saying, ‘We are in a war against the West – you must join us.’” Eric Bradner, “Clinton Explains Why She Won’t Use Radical Islam,” CNN, December 7, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/06/politics/hillary-clinton-radical-islam/index.html.

For an excellent example of this aggressive victim rhetoric, see Linda Sarsour’s address to the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) Convention, in which, invoking the victim status of Muslims, and in solidarity with intersectional revolutionaries, she called for jihad against the president of the United States, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zsMnvh5D0Q.

Despite the enthusiasm of Muslims for suicide bombing when Israelis were the target in the early aughts, Muslims are now, by far, the largest number of victims of suicide terror.


Richard Landes, “Triumphalist Religiosity.”

In response to a concocted outrage sparked by fake and deeply blasphemous “Danish Cartoons” forged by Caliphater imams, the UN and EU came out with the following statement: “We understand the deep hurt and widespread indignation felt in the Muslim world. The freedom of the press, which entails responsibility and discretion, should respect the beliefs and tenets of all religions.” Javier Solana, “Joint UN, European Union, Islamic Conference Statement Shares ‘Anguish’ of Muslim
