ESTIMATES ON THE GLOBAL THREAT OF ISLAMIC STATE TERRORISM IN THE FACE OF THE 2015 PARIS AND COPENHAGEN ATTACKS

By Arno Tausch*

This article estimates the probable conflict intensity in connection with Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS and ISIL) terrorism. Based on Pew data, covering 2/5 of the global Muslim population, it is estimated that 17.38 percent of Muslims worldwide openly express terror sympathies (five terrorism support indicators used). Quantitative estimates on terror support rates for a number of additional countries are also provided, based on European Social Survey (ESS) data and their statistical relationship to Pew data. Also evaluated is Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies survey data on Islamic State support in eight Arab countries and territories.

Nothing will be the same in the European debate about Islamism following the January and February 2015 Paris and Copenhagen attacks. The Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL))1 has been making advances in much of Syria and Iraq.2 In addition, there has been an influx of thousands of “foreign fighters” into the region--including from Europe.3 This context would thus seem to necessitate a serious analysis of global Islamist terror support among Muslim populations worldwide.

In the current global debate about the subject, there are those who warn against “alarmism.” Professor Charles Kurzman writes that, in effect, with more than a billion Muslims in the world, many of whom supposedly hate the West and desire martyrdom, one does not see as many terrorist attacks as would be expected from opinion surveys.4 Out of the 140,000 murders in the United States since the September 11 attacks, Islamist terrorists have killed, Kurzman argues, at most “only” three dozen people. He adds that of the 150,000 people who die each day worldwide, Islamist militants account for less than 50 fatalities. In a January 2015 statement, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed the issue in a similar vein. He warned that “the European Union… should crack down on Islamophobia amid rising anti-Muslim protests rather than ‘trying to teach a lesson’ to Turkey.”5

In view of the lacking survey data on IS support among Muslims worldwide,6 and in order to determine the probable rates of support for terror among the European and global Muslim populations, the current study employs a “forensic sociology” approach.7 As of the writing of this article, only the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies8 has published limited field research on IS support in eight Arab countries and territories. In the United Kingdom,9 a poll of 1,000 representative British Muslims, carried out by the COMRES Research Institute, revealed that while all Muslims living in Britain felt a loyalty to the country (95 percent), 6 percent said they felt a disloyalty, one in four (27 percent) British Muslims said they had some sympathy for the motives behind the attacks in Paris, and one in nine (11 percent) British Muslims felt sympathetic toward people who want to fight against Western interests, while 85 percent did not. As of yet, there have been no other comparable surveys available on Muslim opinions about IS, let alone multivariate analyses.10 For the time being, one is left with no choice but to look for reliable proxy variables from other surveys in the Muslim world. Estimating the probable
degree of support for IS in developed, Western democracies is an even more difficult task.

Despite the limited available data, standard and fairly reliable Pew public opinion survey data on a number of Muslim communities across the globe do exist and shed some light on the question of support for terror among these communities. This perhaps could be a good starting point. At any rate, it is very plausible that someone who supports, say, the Taliban, would also support IS. The Pew surveys address at least 42 percent of the global Muslim population and their rates of sympathy for such terrorist groups as Hamas, Hizballah, the Taliban, and al-Qa’ida as well as their identification with suicide bombings, even when innocent civilians are killed.

At the very least, the average rates of terror support based on these five variables could be regarded as a good and valid starting point to estimate the probable degree of support for Islamic State terror.

For the majority of non-Muslim countries, this study relies on European Social Survey (ESS) data on overall Muslim alienation in order to predict Muslim support for terrorism. Questionable as that may be, it is the only method available for making at least informed guesses regarding the magnitude of the problem Western security is now facing. There is quite a robust statistical relationship (of up to 70 percent) between the ESS data and Pew terror support data from core Western countries, thus allowing one to make at least some informed guesses regarding support for suicide bombings in those countries for which ESS but no Pew data is available. Thus, support for suicide bombings among European Muslims is predicted by using reliable data on European Muslim alienation. The public Pew data are an important element in the overall foreign country assessment of successive U.S. administrations.11

The article first presents the methodology followed by the Pew figures for terror support in key Muslim countries, representing more than 40 percent of the global Muslim population. Next, it analyzes the correlations of the statistically derived global IS support rates with standard structural and opinion data.12 Also studied are the implications and the cross-national correlations of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies survey on IS support in eight countries and territories.

ANALYZING TERROR SYMPATHY

The Pew data analyzed in this article are from the following countries, which between them make up at least 42 percent of the total global Muslim population: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Senegal, Tunisia, and Turkey.13 Graphs 1 and Graph 2 highlight the research strategy employed:
Graph 1: Methodology to estimate Islamic State support in the Muslim world from openly available Pew data

The availability of relatively reliable European Social Survey\textsuperscript{1} data on opinions and perspectives of Muslims in Europe from Muslim subsamples (usually n > 30) for Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom allows one to apply the following research strategy for the Western countries and for Russia:
Graph 2: Methodology to estimate Islamic State support in the European Union, the European Economic Area (EEA), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Russia, and Israel from openly available European Social Survey data

The pivotal Pew survey question in this context asks respondents about their position on suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets as being justified in order to “defend Islam from its enemies.”

Table 1 establishes the correlations between the Pew data on suicide bombing support and the European Social Survey data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESS indicator</th>
<th>Pearson correlation with suicide bombing data Pew % not clearly speaking out against suicide bombing</th>
<th>Pearson correlation with suicide bombing data Pew % saying suicide bombing often/sometimes justified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very low trust in country's parliament in %</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low trust in the legal system in %</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td><strong>0.511</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low trust in the police in %</td>
<td><strong>0.841</strong></td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult or very difficult on present</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ISLAMIC STATE SUPPORT IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Average population weighted terror support rates from published Pew surveys on Muslim favorability of Hamas, Hizballah, the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and suicide bombing is 17.38 percent of all Muslims around the globe.\textsuperscript{16} These results fit in with other data, based on surveys such as the World Values Survey.\textsuperscript{17} The estimate might be lower than what right-wing populist politicians in many European countries would suggest, but still, the figure is very high, especially when considering the huge absolute numbers of persons expressing terror sympathy and terror support.\textsuperscript{18}

The plausibility of these estimates emerges from Table 2 with the country results and the population weighted aggregate results. The survey data imply the following cascade of the acceptance of terrorism and violence among considerable global minority Muslim publics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) % Unconcerned about Islamist extremism</td>
<td>33.850%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) % at least not categorically rejecting suicide bombing</td>
<td>26.860%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) % favoring Hamas</td>
<td>22.480%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) % favoring Hizballah</td>
<td>21.060%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) % favoring Taliban</td>
<td>16.990%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) % favoring al-Qa’ida</td>
<td>16.410%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) % saying suicide bombing often or sometimes justified</td>
<td>9.960%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) implied percentage of Islamic State favorability (average from Indicators 3-7)</td>
<td>17.380%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, support for suicide bombing terror among the following Muslim populations is as follows: 62 percent in the Palestinian territories, 33 percent in the Lebanon, 27 percent in Malaysia, and 25 percent in Egypt, etc.

On population-weighted averages, 17.38 percent of the entire Muslim population in the surveyed countries and territories support hard-core terrorist opinions, based on the five presented indicators. Without controlling for the age structure,\textsuperscript{19} one could conclude that 295 million people globally, i.e. only slightly less than the current U.S. population (316 million), indeed support Islamist terror.
Table 2: The sociological landscape of Islamism and its supporters in the Muslim world according to representative 2014 Pew surveys—percentages of total Muslim population per country and globally population weighted averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Palestinian Territories</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Population weighted average, Muslims of all countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) % Unconcerned about Islamist Extremism</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>33.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) % at least not categorically rejecting suicide bombing</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>26.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) % favoring Hamas</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>22.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) % favoring Hezbollah</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>21.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) % favoring Taliban</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>(6) % favoring al Qaeda</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>16.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) % saying suicide bombing often or sometimes justified</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) implied percentage of Islamic State favorability (average from)</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>17.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicators 3-7)</td>
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<td>41.59%</td>
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<tr>
<td>percentage of</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>14.42</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>4.40</td>
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<td>the total</td>
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<td>Muslim world</td>
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</table>

21
WHEN RADICALISM MEETS POVERTY

Public opinion surveys among the 19 million Muslims in the 28 European Union countries, who are expected to grow to 20 percent of the total EU population by 2050, by and large reveal a widespread rate of poverty combined with a rather lower rate of higher education, and—as European Social Survey data also show—they are far from embracing democracy in several—but not all—European Union countries. Data for Israel, which is included in the European Social Survey project and which also has a sizable Muslim minority within its borders (according to the CIA World Factbook: Jewish population: 75.1 percent, Muslim population 17.4 percent, Christian 2 percent, Druze 1.6 percent, other 3.9 percent), are also available.

Available scattered Pew data from 2014 have already indicated that 25 percent of Israeli Arabs hold a favorable view of Hizballah, and 24 percent of Israeli Arabs view Hamas favorably. In another Pew survey, from 2006, it was found that 8 percent of Muslims in Germany and 16 percent of Muslims in France, Spain, and the UK openly supported suicide bombing attacks, even against innocent civilians, to “defend, if necessary, Islam.” Following, additional data is discussed that may allow for a better understanding of poverty and alienation as a breeding ground for extremism. Readers are also referred to the evidence presented in the graphs and tables of the current study and in the data appendix available online.

Graph 3 and Table 3 summarize the available European Social Survey evidence on poverty and the alienation of Muslims in Western countries. Of the 19,905 million Muslims in “Western Europe” (i.e., the EU-28, including French overseas territories, the European Economic Area (EEA), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries), some 83 percent of Muslims are represented in the European Social Survey data. On a population weighted basis, 39 percent of Western European Muslims are poor and 13 percent are alienated, underlining the fact that Muslim “integration” in Europe is more of a myth than a reality:
Graph 3: European and Israeli Muslims: Alienation from the political and social system

Table 3: Muslim poverty and Muslim alienation, ESS 2012 survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% difficult or very difficult on present income</th>
<th>% of the Muslim population severely alienated from society in 2012 (4 indicators)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>24.20</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>54.10</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>31.50</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>8.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>49.10</td>
<td>8.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>32.80</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>42.80</td>
<td>13.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>34.20</td>
<td>13.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>60.60</td>
<td>20.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>29.40</td>
<td>28.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables 1, 2, and 3 further summarize the available data and estimates on the basis of the empirical relationships, established in this article. Map 1 summarizes and projects these results on a global level, while Map 2 shows the results for Europe:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>57.90</td>
<td>28.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>87.20</td>
<td>51.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 1: Implied or observed percentage of Muslims not clearly speaking out against suicide bombing

Map 2: Implied percentage of Muslims not clearly speaking out against suicide bombing--close-up for the Euro-Mediterranean region
In light of the evidence and calculations presented here, based on Pew and European Social Survey data, one could assume that in Luxembourg, Switzerland, Indonesia, Norway, Uzbekistan, Germany, Tunisia, and Pakistan less than 10 percent of Muslims supported or likely supported suicide bombings, while in Turkey, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Austria, Senegal, Spain, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, Jordan, Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands more than 10 percent of Muslims supported or likely supported suicide bombings. In Mali, Ghana, Uganda, Lebanon, Tanzania, Egypt, the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Nigeria, and Kuwait, 20 to 50 percent of Muslims supported or likely supported suicide bombings. According to the Pew data, in the Palestinian Territories and Bangladesh, suicide bombing terror support was 50 percent or more of the entire adult population. In the following Table, the countries for which data are only based on linear bivariate regression estimates from ESS data are highlighted. All the other data are direct and hard Pew survey results. The politometric estimates are based on the methodology presented in Graph 2 of this essay.

Table 4: Final data and implied estimates of suicide bombing acceptability among Muslims around the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent not clearly speaking out against suicide bombing (100 minus the percentage of people saying &quot;suicide bombing never justified&quot; (valid answers only))</th>
<th>Percent saying suicide bombing often/sometimes justified (valid answers only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

48 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 2015)
Palestinian Territories | 64.44 | 51.11  
Bangladesh       64.89 | 50.00  
Mali           61.29 | 41.94  
Ghana          51.14 | 34.09  
Uganda         43.48 | 32.61  
Lebanon        55.00 | 29.00  
Tanzania       47.92 | 27.08  
Egypt          60.82 | 24.74  
Russian Federation | 51.85 | 23.35  
Bulgaria       40.98 | 23.18  
Slovenia       57.10 | 22.11  
Nigeria        29.07 | 22.09  
Kuwait         28.13 | 21.88  
Turkey         33.33 | 20.69  
Ethiopia       34.07 | 19.78  
Malaysia       34.78 | 19.57  
Austria        36.56 | 18.90  
Senegal        35.63 | 17.24  
Spain          25.81 | 17.20  
Israel         48.94 | 17.02  
France         36.00 | 16.00  
United Kingdom 27.08 | 15.63  
Jordan         43.88 | 15.31  
Belgium        27.67 | 14.47  
Greece         15.58 | 12.76  
Netherlands    24.19 | 12.56  
Morocco        21.59 | 12.50  
Sweden         27.67 | 12.07  
Denmark        15.38 | 10.14  
Luxembourg     21.37 | 9.91   
Switzerland    17.19 | 9.49   
Indonesia      21.65 | 9.28   
Norway         15.38 | 8.47   
Uzbekistan     14.29 | 7.69   
Germany        14.43 | 7.22   
Tunisia        8.16  | 5.10   
Pakistan        6.74  | 3.37

Even if the given percentages are lower than may have been expected, the security risk from the sheer absolute numbers of persons potentially involved is truly staggering.
POSSIBLE DRIVERS OF PRESUMED MASS SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE

It is also absolutely vital to look at the correlations of the presumed or explicitly available terror support rates (see Table 4). The following hypotheses, based on the current study’s data and international standard cross-national data emerge and can be further scrutinized in the appendix to this study:27

- General support for democracy and non-violence will impede terrorism;
- Objective poor conditions further increase the potential of terrorist groups;
- The status of a country as a periphery leads to increased terrorism support, and, above all
- Terror support is driven by a particular hatred towards Israel and
- Terror support is driven by a revolutionary and backward-looking Islamist trend

The results of the current study suggest the need for improving the state of higher education in the Arab world and the Muslim world in general. While the strengthening of property rights and the respect of the law do play an important role against terror support, the matter cannot be disconnected from the issue of gender inequality in the Muslim world. The establishment and expansion of academic exchange programs and libraries as well as facilitating access to academic sources and materials in the local languages of the countries involved may be the best way to reduce support for terror. This applies in particular to such fields as the social sciences and history. The establishment of major Western universities and think-tanks in the Gulf countries is a positive step in this
direction. Academic reference services, such as Thomson, Reuters, Scopus, and others would be well advised to expand their indexing of Arab and other academic journals from the region. Arabic language and other news media should be translated and indexed in the data bases. During the Cold War, for example, the West knew a great deal about the Warsaw Pact countries, while research institutes and universities in the latter studied Western literature.

CALIBRATING THE RESULTS WITH DIRECT OPINION POLLS ON ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE

The first and only publicly available opinion survey data on direct and explicit Islamic State support were provided by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). These data are also further evaluated in the available data appendix to this study. A principal component analysis of the available country data was performed. Even if Islamic State favorability is 24 percent in the Palestinian Territories; 10 percent or greater in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, among the Syrian refugees, and in Tunisia; and is below 10 percent in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, the answers to the other survey items are truly alarming: “Islamic State is strong because of declaring the Caliphate; Islamic State is strong because of its commitment to ‘Islamic principles,’” etc.

The data also show correlations of the imputed or documented Islamic State support rates with the aggregate data of the current study. Arab nationalism and traditional hierarchies are clear factors driving support for terrorism, while military conscription and a strong national military; democracy and non-violence; outward migration; and religious pluralism reduce terror support.
Table 5: Islamic State terror support rates in the Arab world according to opinion survey data of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Qatar in eight Arab countries and territories. Opinions in percent of the total adult population of the given country/territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ACRPS - % Islamic State outright rejection</th>
<th>ACRPS - % Islamic State outright favorability</th>
<th>ACRPS - % Islamic State favorability to some extent</th>
<th>Opinion on Islamic State positive/positive to some extent</th>
<th>Islamic State was created by foreign actors</th>
<th>Islamic State strong because of military achievements</th>
<th>Islamic State strong because of declaring Caliphate</th>
<th>Islamic State strong because of commitment to Islamic principles</th>
<th>Islamic State strong because of willingness to stand up to the West</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>Palestinian territories</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<td>Syrian refugees</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
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Map 3: Islamic State acceptance rates among Muslim publics based on estimates from ACRPS data and PEW suicide bombing support data
Even if one were to assume a positive, downward trend in mass support for terrorism as it emerges from the Pew data, mentioned in the available appendix, it would take years, if not decades for support in the Muslim world for radical organizations like al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, and Hamas to come to an end, especially in the Arab countries. Strictly speaking, there are hardly any linear, let alone rapid downward observable trends in the Pew figures on support for al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, and Hamas, thus vindicating the arguments of those who maintain that President Barack Obama’s Middle East policy has not changed the mass support for the most radical elements in the Arab world. In addition, there has been an increase in conspiracy theories that it was not Arabs or Muslims but “evil Westerners” who carried out or engineered these international terror attacks. According to the Pew Institute, “When asked whether they think groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., most Muslims in the nations surveyed say they do not believe this. There is no Muslim public in which even 30% accept that Arabs conducted the attacks. Indeed, Muslims in Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey are less likely to accept this today than in 2006.”

This replicates a finding of a 2006 Pew study:

In one of the survey’s most striking findings, majorities in Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan say that they do not believe groups of Arabs carried out the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The percentage of Turks expressing disbelief that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks has increased from 43% in a 2002 Gallup survey to 59% currently. And this attitude is not limited to Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries – 56% of British Muslims say they do not believe Arabs carried out the terror attacks against the U.S., compared with just 17% who do.

In addition, 46 percent of French Muslims, 44 percent of German Muslims, and 35 percent of Spanish Muslims flatly rejected in that survey that Arabs carried out the September 11 attacks.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PARIS AND COPENHAGEN ATTACKS

In view of the January and February 2015 Paris and Copenhagen attacks, two additional studies should be noted. A study conducted by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence together with the BBC World Service pointed to 5,042 deaths every month as a result of Islamist political violence in 2014 on a global level. The Global Terrorism Index, published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, draws more long-term conclusions. As of the writing of this article, global Islamist terror death rates are 5,042 deaths per month, which would imply 60,504 deaths per year.

CONCLUSION

Standard and reliable Pew public opinion survey data available on 42 percent of the global Muslim population already come to the implicit conclusion that, on average, 17.38 percent of global Muslims openly express terror sympathies, measured by five different terror indicators. In this article, terror support rates were estimated indirectly for a number of additional countries, based on European Social Survey (ESS) data and the relationships that could be established between these ESS indicators and the aforementioned Pew studies. The implications and the cross-national correlations of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies survey on Islamic State support in eight Arab countries and territories were tested as well.

The Western world urgently needs to address not only the Islamist military challenge, but also to provide support to those forces and currents in the Arab and the Muslim world that are fighting this radicalism.
Estimates on the Global Threat of Islamic State Terrorism

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NOTES

6 To date, the only credible direct survey of ISIL support was provided by the Qatar-based Arab think tank, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). See “Poll: ISIS Viewed Positively by 24 Percent of Palestinians,” Haaretz, November 13, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east-1.626318#! and “A Majority of Arabs Oppose ISIL, Support Air Strikes on the Group,” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, November 11, 2014, http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/6a355a64-5237-4d7a-b957-87f6b1ceba9b. These data cover Lebanon, Egypt, Syrian refugees, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq.  
11 Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East. Negative Opinions of al


19 The Pew surveys only include persons above 18 years of age.


21 Differences due to rounding.


24 Pew Research Center, “Concerns About Islamic Extremism on the Rise in the Middle East. Negative Opinions of al Qaeda, Hamas

http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/?qid=950&cntIDs=&stdIDs=


11 See Arno Tausch, “A Look at International Survey Data About Arab Opinion,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 2014),


Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database,

http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/?qid=950&cntIDs=&stdIDs=


12 Pew Research Center, “A Look at International Survey Data About Arab Opinion,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 2014),


Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database,


27 https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles

28 For a list of country performance of article publishing in peer-reviewed journals in the social sciences contained in the world’s most comprehensive indexing system, SCOPUS, see: SCImago Journal and Country Rank, http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php?area=3300&category=0&region=all&year=all&order=it&min=0&min_type=it. For the ranking of Arab Universities by international comparison, see: SCImago Institutions Rankings, http://www.scimagoir.com/research.php?rankingtype=research&indicator=Output&amp;sector=&amp;country=&amp;display=table&page=2&amp;year=2014

29 “A Majority of Arabs Oppose ISIL.”


31 See Tausch, “A Look at International Survey Data About Arab Opinion,” pp. 57-74; Tausch, “Further Insights into Global and Arab Muslim Opinion Structures”; and Tausch, “The New Global Antisemitism.” The formula used to calculate global Muslim support rates for the Islamic State was based on the linear regression between the known Muslim Islamic State acceptance data from the ACPSR and the known suicide bombing support rates. The equation is: IS support = 0.2317 x suicide bombing support + 5.3948. Where there was no ACPSR data available, the known suicide bombing support rates from many countries were used to arrive at the estimates in Map 3; see also the available electronic appendix data, “Arno Tausch: Documentation for Books and Articles,” Academia.edu, https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles.


33 Pew Research Center, “The Great Divide.”

34 Peter R. Neummann, BBC World Service, and BBC World Monitoring, The New Jihadism: A