This article demonstrates “circuitous but intended outcomes”–or the desirable consequences accurately anticipated and predicted by the actors involved at the moment the act is carried out–in the case of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt. This case provides a strong illustration of how an actor who wages war can circuitously achieve political goals despite suffering military defeat on the battleground. Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat astonishingly predicted the indirect results of the war he initiated. Sadat forecast that Egypt needed a spark–“crossing the canal and capturing just ten centimeters of Sinai”–which would trigger the involvement of much more powerful forces, such as the superpowers–and the United States in particular–leading them to successfully compel Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt’s desired goal.
At the core of the power struggle among states key to Middle Eastern stability and global balance is the question of who controls whose natural gas flow via whose territories. The United States, Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran are analyzed in this context to present how changing alliances have disrupted the regional balance in the Syria conflict. Given the stable hostility between the United States and Russia as well as the steady friendship between Russia and Syria, Turkey’s alliances and enmities are central in the formation of balances. Competition or disagreement between the United States and Russia over Kurdish independence in Syria could lead to a protracted conflict for years to come in the Middle East.
Since early 2016, China has increased its mediation efforts to help Syria achieve peace and stability. This study evaluates Chinese mediation efforts in the Syrian conflict by examining its motivations for becoming more involved in the peace process, as well as the implications of China’s longstanding non-interference policy …
Click here for PDF The Russian military intervention in Syria since September 2015 has sparked spirited debates in Western policymaking and intellectual circles about the genuine motives behind the Kremlin’s unexpected decision. Various monocausal explanations have been propounded, which, however, do not interpret this intervention in either an objective or systematic way. This article aspires […]
Click here for PDF In light of the July 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 powers, as well as Russian involvement in Syria, Russian-Iranian relations deserve special attention. This article argues that Russia and Iran have both common interests and cultural similarities that simultaneously foster their bilateral relationship and complicate these ties. This […]
PDF version available here Since 2009, under President Barack Obama, the U.S. has pursued a “Russian reset” policy, promising a fresh start to previously tense relations. Yet this policy has failed to improve American interests, particularly in the South Caucasus region, which is strategically important for both Israeli and U.S. policy towards the greater Middle […]