The Islamic State having lost its entire caliphate, save for a few strips of land in southern and eastern Syria, does not mean it is on the verge of defeat. Instead, it has learned the lesson from its predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq. In 2010, the latter found itself all but defeated and thus […]
The United States has engaged in several years of war in Iraq against the Islamic State (IS) since launching Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in October 2014. The United States estimates that they have killed more than 60,000 IS members, conducted more than 22,000 airstrikes and trained more than 100,000 security forces throughout Iraq. The successful U.S. campaign is in contrast to past operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and is best encapsulated in the “by, with, and through” approach of letting Iraqis lead operations. This bottom-up approach is tactically successful but is short on strategy, opening the door for Iranian influence in Iraq. The United States is modeling other counterterror operations throughout the world on its Iraq success with other “build partner capacity” programs. Based on two years of fieldwork and interviews, this article examines both the tactical successes and policy implications of the U.S. successes against IS in Iraq.
In 1400 AH (1979/80 CE), a new Muslim apocalyptic millennial movement began and has since gained great momentum. Caliphaters are defined by their millennial goal–world conquest–and the apocalyptic timetable–in this generation; they operate on two major registers: kinetic war (jihad) and cognitive war (da’wa). The movement expanded greatly at the turn of the Western millennium (2000 CE), with the Western news media’s coverage of the “second intifada” (opening round of jihadi war on Western democracies), the U.S. response to September 11. These empowered da’wa campaigns designed to pressure Western infidels into the posture of dhimmi.
Click here for PDF Editor’s Note: A number of articles have been published in recent weeks on the subject of Israel’s relations with the Syrian Arab rebels in the area east of Quneitra Crossing. Some of these articles have suffered from an absence of on the ground knowledge and sourcing. The Rubin Center is therefore […]
Click here for PDF This paper is based on reporting trips undertaken by the author in March and April 2017 to Mosul city in Iraq and some surrounding areas, in particular on the left bank of the Tigris River (i.e. east Mosul). These trips focused on the current situation in general as well as comparisons […]
The mortar shells came early in the morning. At about 5. At regular intervals. Solemn and sinister. They were a reminder of how close it all was. We were in the Damascus Old City. There was still fighting in Jobar, about two kilometers away. The rebels had also counter-attacked from the east, from the suburbs in eastern Ghouta, in the previous week. A shell had landed in the precinct of the Umayyad Mosque. This was not in accordance with the line being promoted by the regime, according to which the rebellion was on the verge of defeat. But there it was…