This article demonstrates “circuitous but intended outcomes”–or the desirable consequences accurately anticipated and predicted by the actors involved at the moment the act is carried out–in the case of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt. This case provides a strong illustration of how an actor who wages war can circuitously achieve political goals despite suffering military defeat on the battleground. Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat astonishingly predicted the indirect results of the war he initiated. Sadat forecast that Egypt needed a spark–“crossing the canal and capturing just ten centimeters of Sinai”–which would trigger the involvement of much more powerful forces, such as the superpowers–and the United States in particular–leading them to successfully compel Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt’s desired goal.
Assuming that Iran does indeed obtain nuclear weapons and Israel doesn’t launch an attack on its facilities, what is Israel’s “plan B” to deal with the new situation? This article analyzes the issue. Click here to download the PDF version of this article. INTRODUCTION Despite substantial sanctions designed to curb its nuclear program, Iran has […]