This article uses a historical approach to identify the reasons Pakistan has turned to Islam as a means to deal with its security dilemma. It then examines the role of education especially that which is oriented toward Islam, in alleviating and/or exacerbating Pakistan’s sense of insecurity.
In 1984, while reflecting on Pakistan’s political history, Lawrence Ziring, a leading scholar on South Asia, noted how the country had changed from an Islamic Republic to an Islamic State. Ziring observed that under the former, Islam played a moderating role and encouraged liberal discourse and a separation of religion, while under the latter, Islam was a central, official, and pervasive feature within the state, affecting and dominating every facet of society. Since 1979, the relationship between Islam and the Pakistani state has become closer, as seen with the adoption of the Hudood Ordinance as well as the willingness of non-religious political parties and actors to work with the religious parties. Thus, the shift toward a more Islamic society has been supported, if not led, by consecutive Pakistani governments.
This heightened sense of religiosity has increasingly been viewed as a cause for concern in the international arena because of the type of intolerant and violent Islam that appears to be in the ascendency there. This concern is also a product of a neoliberal prejudice that is inherently uncomfortable with religious states, as in such societies authority is derived from the divine, as opposed from the people. Thus, it is argued that unless Pakistan ceases its close association with religion, which in effect means to move against Islamic education, the threat posed by radical Islamism to international peace and security will become even greater. Veteran U.S.-based expert on the Pakistani army Stephen Cohen expressed this concern, writing in 2003, “Unless steps are taken now to rebuild a moderate Pakistan, however, the rise of radical Islamists as a significant political force could be one of several unpalatable futures for this increasingly chaotic, nuclear-armed state.”
In the twenty-first century, Pakistan occupies a permanent feature in discussions relating to international relations and more specifically to international security. This stems from its involvement in the creation of the Taliban and the fact that Usama bin Ladin was able to find shelter in Pakistan. September 11 changed world history, as it not only introduced the world to transnational jihadi terrorism but necessitated a complete revision of international relations, as states have had to adopt new methods and techniques to challenge the threat that this brand of terrorism has come to pose. Following September 11, the United States made it clear to the Pakistani government that it had a simple choice: either join the campaign against al-Qa’ida and the Taliban (and by implication Islamist radicalism) or stand with the terrorists. President Musharraf chose the only option available and came out in support of the United States. This included attempts to rein in radical Islamist influences. Conversely, while preaching a need for “Enlightened Moderation,” Pakistani politicians (and Pervez Musharraf was no different from many other politicians) continued and enhanced their relations with Islamic actors as a means to cement authority and remain in power.
In order to understand why this relationship exists, the role that Islam plays in Pakistan and more specifically within Pakistani society and politics is examined through three lenses. First, is the nature and manner of Pakistan’s creation and the role that Islam played in that process. Second, is a ubiquitous sense of insecurity that pervades across Pakistan, stemming from endogenous and exogenous factors that encourage the promotion of conservative Islam as a means to identify the challenges and counter them. Third, is the ability of dogmatic Islamic movements to ingratiate themselves with Pakistan’s ruling elites.
A principal caveat faced by scholars researching Pakistan and particularly Islam’s role in Pakistan is that conflicting narratives and views are inherent, as the country attracts the attention of many scholars coming from diverse disciplines. In addition, Pakistan is a highly populous country with 170 million people who in many ways exist in different stages of evolution, with economic growth, which affects social development, being incredibly uneven in Pakistan. Thus, discussing Islam and Pakistan becomes highly challenging as, on the one hand, it is clear that Islam plays an important role in Pakistani society, but at the same time, degrees of observance and commitment vary, whether by class or region. The same is true when looking at Islam and the education sector. There is an assumption that religious education dominates in Pakistan, which is easy to dispel upon a closer look.
This article will explore some of the myths and truths regarding the role of Islam in Pakistan and Pakistani society by looking at how the state was created and how it has used Islam to combat its sense of insecurity. This entails recognizing the many challenges contemporary Pakistani society faces. Principally, two main interpretations exist regarding Islam in Pakistan. Some view Pakistan as having a religious purpose not only to protect Muslims, but also to exist as an Islamic state, which may also mean to help others achieve this. Others note that in 1947, the purpose behind the creation of Pakistan was to serve as a homeland to India’s Muslim community, which meant that it would exist as an Islamic state. These competing narratives help explain why Pakistan continuously grapples with defining its own identity, purpose, and direction. So long as these interpretations exist, it will be difficult to find a synergy between them. This also explains why the issue of education has become central, as education has the potential of encouraging harmony or fostering discord.
This article is divided into three main sections. It begins by looking at the challenges that affected Pakistan at the time of its creation, noting that the immediate partition period was so traumatic that the political elite at the time, which included the military, turned to Islam as a unifying tool. Islam was a way to bring Pakistanis together and remind them why the country was established. The second section explores Pakistan’s security perception. It is argued that due to the nature and manner of its creation, the Pakistani state is perpetually anxious about its security, which leads it to demand more from its inhabitants. The final section looks at the education issue in Pakistan, which is instrumental in helping to develop a national identity, though it is important to note that the sector has been undergoing continuous reforms, mainly because Pakistani governments recognize the importance of education and have sought reform.
Pakistan was created through the efforts of Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League. They argued that the only way to ensure India’s Muslim community would not suffer discrimination by virtue of it being a minority group in British India was to give it a state. In its advocacy for a Muslim homeland, the Muslim League–led primarily by educated Muslims from North India–evoked claims of the right to self-determination and that India’s Muslim community was a nation. It is noteworthy that a decade before Pakistan’s establishment, support for the Muslim League mainly came from Bengal–the predominately Muslim province in British India, where it won 39 seats in the 1937 provincial elections (It won one seat in the Punjab and none in North-West Frontier Province and Sindh). When independence came in 1947, Pakistan found itself ill-prepared for the challenges that came, as not only did the country face many security issues, but it lacked an infrastructure and bureaucrats to manage the state. Mian Ata Rabbani, who served as Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s aide-de-camp for seven month beginning on August 7, 1947, had first-hand experience of the shortages affecting governance. While living at the home of the first governor-General of Pakistan, Rabbani recounted, “There was shortage, shortage and shortage everywhere, and of everything. Simple things like pens, paper, paper pins, typewriters, office furniture, and office accommodation are required to run an office or an organization, leaving aside the Government of a country. Pakistan was established, it had become a reality all right but it had been denied time to organise its meagre resources.”
What compounded the scarcity problem was that Pakistan was and remains incredibly diverse, as each province is composed of people of different ethnicities, orientations, and views. When looking at Pakistan, it is thus important to view it through three lenses: politics, ethnic diversity, and geography and colonial legacy. This may explain why Pakistani policymakers seek a national identity. Therefore, Hassan Abbas, for example, argues that three primary factors led Pakistan down the path of religious extremism and authoritarianism: a powerful military that operated independently, a mushrooming of religious militant groups, and the hydra-headed monster that is the intelligence services. Abbas refers to this as the three As (Allah, Army, America). On the first, Allah is used to refer to when things are incomprehensible. The Army is the most powerful force in Pakistani society and often directs the affairs and development of the country. America is the “enemy” the country that one can blame when things go wrong.
The first key challenge faced by independent Pakistan was that of a democratic tradition. Although Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the other founders of Pakistan understood the concept and the importance of democracy, the vehicle used to gain independence was far from democratic, as the Muslim League focused on attaining independence. This necessitated quieting any possibility of internal dissent within the Muslim League and the Muslim community. In addition, Jinnah managed the Muslim League in an authoritarian manner, allowing himself to be its voice and image. He transferred the system he used to manage the league to the newly formed Pakistani political system by serving as governor general, president of the constituent assembly, and president of the Muslim League. This led to the establishment of a centralized system, though the country was deeply divided along ethnic lines.
Consequently, Jinnah’s death a year after partition dealt a blow to the league and to the fledgling civilian political system. The system quickly became incapacitated once Jinnah’s successor Liaqaut Ali Khan was assassinated. Khan’s assassination was followed by years of political instability as Pakistani politicians vied for authority and power. These divisions encouraged Ayub Khan, chief of the army, to assume control of the government, claiming the incessant political fighting was undermining the security of the state. Khan also alleged that the army embodied the nation and its needs and thus could and should be responsible for governance. Ayub Khan, who represented the first generation of military officers, resisted pressure from Islamist movements, particularly from Abu al-Ala Mawdudi’s Jama’at-e-Islami (Islamic Party). However, the structural changes that Pakistan experienced during the 1960s coupled with the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 and the rise of Zulfikar Bhutto challenged Pakistan’s democratic aspirations, as by this point some non-democratic actors became more established, which in turn meant that they could no longer be ignored.
The oil boom of the 1970s and the global transportation revolution affected Pakistan by enabling, according to Omar Noman, 10 million Pakistanis to migrate and search for better economic opportunities. By travelling to the Gulf Region these individuals saw their wages increase eight-fold, but it also meant that these individuals became familiar with more strict interpretations of Islam, such as Wahhabism, which they brought back to Pakistan once their stint in the Gulf area had ended. Journalist and author Marie Anne Weaver, who has spent many years in South Asia, recounts a conversation with Major Ghulam Mohammed, who served in the Omani army for 20 years. Commenting on the poor laborers going to the Gulf, Ghulam Mohammed stated, “What are they [uneducated laborers] to do when they come back? They’ve been exposed to the most conservative Islam on earth. We in Makran [Baluchistan] have always been secular. But many of these returning workers are hard-core fundamentalists.”
Thus, from the 1970s, politicians and the military openly have courted Islamist movements as a way to win mass support and cement their own positions. In addition, the decision by the military to enhance its ties with militant groups, including the development of militant groups, as a means to counter and fight India has left an unsavory legacy. These groups have proven difficult to control, especially as longevity has helped them develop roots that their harbingers may not have intended. Hence, “…policies of State Islamization in the 1980s, combined with technological and education developments, have facilitated the increased visibility of religious debates in public life.”
Pakistan’s diversity has undermined its ability to develop a true national identity and has led to a weak political system. The divisions ensure that the Pakistani umma struggled to speak in a single voice, as conflicting images, ideas, and values have surfaced; and in lieu of a weak political system, these differences often help strengthen minority groups. The situation was made more difficult by the fragility of the political system–mainly the caliber of politicians whose continuous wrangling paralyzed much of the government’s ability to function. These challenges led to a unique alliance between the bureaucracy and the military based on a dual-prong approach: Politically, it accepted the overthrow of civilian government (initially President Iskander Mirza dismissed Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon before General Ayub Khan deposed President Mirza), and, second, a call to Islam. This required an emphasis on a theocratic ideology–Pakistan as an Islamic state. Thus, when looking at Pakistan’s political history, one is confronted with mediocre politicians, and populist leaders who must form various alliances with much smaller powerbrokers in order to retain their positions. These individuals often fail to see the long-term ramifications of their policies, statements, and programs.
One need only observe the tenure of Zulfikar Bhutto, whose populism led to many political changes, including Pakistan’s constitution and the introduction of an Islamist party (Jama’at-e-Islami) into the mainstream political process. In addition, wishing to pacify the Islamists, Bhutto also designated the Ahmadiyya sect as non-Muslims. When Zia al-Haq replaced Bhutto, Zia continued to embed Islamic values in Pakistan. As Ziring points out, “Zia’s decision to erect a chaste Islamic state in Pakistan implied a frontal assault on anything and everything that detracted from that goal. The Islamic state was judged incompatible with secular institutions and practices. Secular forces were judged a mortal threat to the Islamic state, and in the zero-sum game of state-building, the one necessarily conquered the other.”
The third challenge was Pakistan’s geography and history. By advocating that India’s Muslim community needed a state, the Muslim League encouraged the establishment of a unique state composed of two wings (East Pakistan and West Pakistan) with an independent state (India), which some view as hostile, in the middle. In addition, during the time they governed the subcontinent, the British had not invested very much in the areas that became Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan lacked many economic resources, which have undermined its development and growth especially when one compares it to India (At partition, Pakistan had raw resources but not the means to turn them into useable products. For example, East Pakistan produced raw jute but India had the jute-processing facilities; West Pakistan produced raw cotton, whereas India had most of the textile mills.). In addition, as part of the geographical division, Pakistan had to address the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, an Indian principality with a Muslim majority that remained outside of the newly formed Pakistani state, mainly because what Pakistan claims was Indian perfidy. The legacy of the partition was such that Stephen Cohen argues that once the second generation of India and Pakistan emerged, they simply lacked the ability to solve the problems that partition had caused. They thus adopted a policy of simply opposing anything that the other offered or suggested. Once Pakistan had adopted the ideological mantra of an Islamic State, the commitment to Kashmir increased, since the Pakistani government could not allow Muslims to live under the rule of Hindus.
PAKISTAN’S SENSE OF SECURITY
A close look at Pakistan shows that paranoia and fear are prevalent and have existed since Pakistan’s inception. From an endogenous perceptive, Pakistan has to contend with conflicting internal forces that play an important part in enhancing its insecurity. This is due to the way that they affect the political system and the willingness of certain groups to engage in violence when the political route is unlikely to provide the expected results. Jacob Shapiro and Christine Fair persuasively argue that urban Pakistanis support militant organizations if the organization reflects the political goals that the individual cares about. They also assert that support for the violence stems from strategic considerations. For this reason, they are against analysts taking a broad-brush approach. Inter-group violence stems from the fact that Pakistan is not a homogenous state and because since its inception, this aspect has been allowed to grow and develop. Thus, Pakistan has a number of different ethnic groups, each with its own unique history, coupled with religious and cultural disparities. These differences greatly undermine the Pakistani sense of national identity, which may explain why Pakistan is constantly striving to find something or someone to unite it, as with Jinnah.
From an exogenous perspective, Pakistan has an inherent fear of India, seen as harboring aggressive tendencies toward it. These fears have become part of the national psyche, ensuring tremendous suspicion if not hatred toward India and Hinduism. This stems from history, whereby in 1947, it was India–at least in the eyes of Pakistan–that undermined the peaceful process of partition and sought to abuse its position of strength to the detriment of Pakistan. This sense of insecurity is due in part to having insecure borders and is made worse by a sense of inferiority–especially in comparison to India and China, with both of whom Pakistan shares a border.
A second narrative identifies India, although constitutionally a secular state, as a Hindu state that is fundamentally hostile to Islam and Pakistan, turning the conflict with India into a religious one. The benefit of altering the conflict from geopolitical to religious stems from the need to encourage martyrdom; by facing a larger, more powerful, and technologically advanced enemy, the need for sacrifice becomes greater. These perceptions coalesce into a single view that identifies India as an aggressive state that wants to conquer Pakistan.
Moving beyond India, Pakistan’s sense of insecurity relates to the Durand Line and Afghanistan’s reluctance to recognize it as a legal boundary between the two. Islamabad has historically sought to ensure that a pro-Pakistani government reside in Kabul due to concerns that Afghanistan would seek to establish a Pashtunistan–a Pashtun homeland. The border affects both countries, leading to legal, ethnic, military, geopolitical, and religious problems. It also involves an array of actors ranging from the policymakers, military and security services personnel to local tribes people, in addition to smugglers and businesspeople.
Enormous cross-border interest and cross-border activity due to the history and nature of the Afghan-Pakistan border has made the Pakistani government increasingly wary of what occurs on the Afghan side and how it impacts the Pakistani side of the border. For this reason, in addition to concerns regarding the Durand Line, another major worry is Baluchistan. This key province is located in southwest Pakistan, which is poorly inhabited but is of major economic and strategic importance for Pakistan. When military campaigns were launched to subdue a Baluchi uprising, the Baluchis retreated to neighboring Afghanistan and continued fighting. Once Zia al-Haq decided to support the Afghan mujahidin, many of them used Baluchistan and to conduct the jihad against the Soviet Union and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
PAKISTANI EDUCATION AND ISLAM: IS IT A THREAT?
Two common perceptions exist with respect to education in Pakistan. The first views Pakistani education as limited, anti-Western, madrasa-dominated, and perpetually broken. From this, there is the assumption that the education is anti-Western, anti-India, anti-Hindu, and pro-jihad. A second assumption is that there is tremendous under-investment in the education sector, with private vendors–mainly of the Islamic-orientation–filling the gap. This position raises the notion that with more investment, Pakistan could have a non-Islamic education system, which would end the rise of Islamist radicalism.
These perceptions are given voice in the popular media, which often make assumptions that are not quantifiable and also do not really portray how Pakistanis generally relate to Islam and to education. That is, in Pakistan one can be religious without being militant, especially as evidence suggests that Pakistani parents send their children to receive religious education but not to receive militant education. Paul Rollier’s ethnographic study on Islam and mobile phone text messages is important because it shows how texting helps promote Islam without seeking to advance militant or radical Islam. Rollier states, “Read at home, in workshops or in the street and sometimes discussed amongst friends, texting divine and wise words is perceived as being simultaneously a fashionable pastime and a virtuous, spiritually rewarding endeavour with salutary effects for society at large.” Thus, in reality parents seek religious education because they want their children to know Islam since Islam is part of Pakistani society.
Second, since the 1990s and certainly following September 11, consecutive Pakistani governments have arguably worked hard to reform the curriculum and discourage such radical Islamist sentiments. Ultimately, the relationship between the state, the education system, and Islam exists in various forms, and the relationship is constantly changing because Pakistani society changes as a reaction to what takes place in Pakistan, South Asia, and the world. The government’s commitment to education is either because the government feels the need to improve the level and quality of education and to make sure Pakistan can compete in the world or because greater international attention is placed on this sector. Alternatively, greater emphasis has been placed on education because Pakistanis increasingly recognize the value of a good education. Ultimately, it is increasingly argued the reason many Pakistani children are not in school is because of poor school facilities (Things such as a lack of toilets would discourage parents from sending their children to school, especially girls.), bad locations (Parents are reluctant for their children, particularly girls, to walk a long way to get to a school); and poor education experiences, such as no teachers in the school.
Since September 11, it is clear that investment in education in Pakistan has increased, as the state and people seek to address the different demands and needs of the population. Concomitantly, the discourse between Pakistan and the international community regarding education has also changed. Initially, intolerant religious education in Pakistan was viewed as the norm. This view has become increasingly less pervasive due to research on the subject. Yet it is also important to recognize that the Pakistani education system is very complex and intricate, which is why the approach is largely descriptive.
Education in Pakistan is federal and provincial coupled with private vendors who also provide educational services, in order to address Pakistan’s literacy levels. The structure of the Pakistani education system mirrors a number of Western models, in that Pakistan has a pre-school level designed for children between the ages of three to five. The next level of education is primary, which is normally five years (grades 1 to 5). Secondary education is also five years long (grades 6-10). Upon completing secondary school, children enter what is referred to as intermediate or higher secondary education (grades 11-12). Some students receive both a state (government schools) and private (religious instruction) education. This may explain why increasingly “…efforts have been made to mould the subject curriculum in accordance with our [Pakistan’s] ideological, moral and cultural values as well as our national requirements in the fields of science, technology, medicine, engineering and agriculture, etc.”
At the top of the public education system, meaning government-run schools, is the Ministry of Education. Its mandate is to formulate the national education system, though the provinces also develop their own education plans, which are carried out according to the province’s resources. State education begins with elementary (grades 1-8). The next level is secondary education, which is four years long (grades 9-12), followed by tertiary education (higher education, which is available after 12 years of schooling). When dealing with government schools, the curriculum is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, though each province has a curriculum bureau or center.
In theory, there is consultation between the provinces and the ministry, with the curriculum being issued by the National Curriculum Review Committee, which should mean a uniform curriculum for each subject. In reality, due to different textbooks and resources, subjects may vary across Provincial Textbook Boards (PTB). Beyond regional variations, government schools are run by the district government and follow the federal government’s prescribed curriculum. In these schools, the primary language of instruction is Urdu, though in rare cases a local language may be included. All schools tend to include Islamic studies as part of their regular course of studies.
When it comes to private schools, many are not registered with the state nor do they receive support from the government. During the first two decades following its establishment, Pakistan had a vibrant private education sector–a legacy of British colonialism. In 1962, Ayub Khan, as part of his reform program, provincialized the education system, entrusting the provincial governments with the management and the financing of schools. In 1972, Bhutto oversaw the nationalization of private schools, which Zia al-Haq reversed in the early 1980s. This inspired a growth in the private education sector, with enrolment in private primary schools reaching around 28 percent by 2009.
Private schools in Pakistan can refer to schools in which English is the language of instruction or to religious schools. Religious schools include the madaris, a small room or two affiliated with a particular mosque or to madrasa schools, large established institutions with possible boarders. The latter adhere to a more general syllabus, which include religious subjects, whereas the former is solely concerned with religious instruction. Children may attend these either as full-time students or on a part-time basis to learn the Koran. Madrasa schools are associated with one of the five religious education boards and are therefore sectarian in orientation. The texts tend to reflect a specific Islamic tradition. Reliable data regarding the number of such schools and the sources of their funding (especially the madaris) is difficult to find. Some believe madrasas receive substantial funding from foreign powers, a legacy of the Zia al-Haq administration and the Afghan jihad. The language of instruction in madrasas is usually Urdu, though those located along the Afghan border also use Pashto. There is a special emphasis on learning Arabic and Persian as well.
The Pakistani government has sought to address the overall madrasa phenomenon through registration and reform. In 2003, the government initiated a three-year program costing $220 million to introduce secular subjects in madrasas. The plan included financial incentives to the madrasas’ management, including money for teachers’ salaries, textbooks, stationery, computers, and furniture. To that end, the madrasa challenge refers to the way the international community has come to view these institutions, often identifying them as hotbed of militancy, radicalism, and jihad as well as a part of a larger network of Islamic conservative movements that rejects Western values, seeks to encourage more mujahidin, and preys on the poor. However, studies on Pakistani education seem to reject this view. They assert that overall, mainstream madrasas are very unlikely to promote “ideological extremism and hatred.” A study by Anna Cockcroft et al. of madrasa enrollment among 53,960 representative households helped dispel some of the myths surrounding this type of education, though the study recognized that enrollment in these institutions has increased. The researchers argued that among those parents sending their children to madrasas, the issue of poverty was subservient, as many government schools provide incentives such as free oil, flour, uniforms, and a stipend for girls to attend government schools. The key issue is that parents want their children–boys and girls–to receive an Islamic education. Ensuring their children know Islam and be good Muslims is seen as part of a parental obligation.
In sum, the Pakistani education system continues to mystify and confound, as it is clear that without an effective system, Pakistan could not escape the quicksand of its history and poor political leadership. Attempts at addressing the shortcomings of the education system have begun by recognizing the levels of illiteracy, gender inequality, and the poor quality of teachers in the public education system.
There are concerns that Pakistan will succumb to a radical Islamist coup d’état, thus giving these extremists access to military weapons. For this reason, education and demand for education reforms affect much of the discourse between Pakistan and the international community. Many studies, whether focusing on government schools or private religious schools, indicate the concern that Pakistan’s education sector is a breeding ground for Islamist radicalism is exaggerated.
The public education system appears to be changing as governments seeks to address decades of neglect and abuse. More money and effort is being direct toward this sector. However, in a country where corruption is rife and standards are difficult to enforce, this is a herculean task. This may explain why parents choose to send their children to private schools or seek to augment their children’s education.
Themselves highly religious, Pakistanis generally want their children to receive a religious education. The trick, of course, is what kind of Islam is being taught. If it is revolutionary Islamism, as is so often true, this becomes a factor radicalizing the country. The international community, a major proponent for educational reform in Pakistan is slowly realizing that Islam and Pakistan have a unique relationship. The reality is that Pakistan has several major security concerns, many of which may not be rational and which unscrupulous individuals manipulate in their quest to power (whether on a national, provincial, or local level). If Pakistan is to address these issues, it must continue to invest in its education system as a means to promote domestic harmony.
*Dr. Isaac Kfir is a Visiting Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and the College of Law, Syracuse University. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT).
 Lawrence Ziring, “From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 9 (1984), pp. 931-46.
 A good example of this was Pervez Musharraf’s decision to work with the Mutahhidah Majlis Amal (MMA, United Action Front). See also, Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004), pp. 195-209.
 In 1979, Zia al-Haq began the process of Islamization of Pakistani society with the introduction of the Hudood Ordinance. This affected the lives of many Pakistanis, whether through the application of extramarital sexual relations (Offence of Zina) or restrictions on economic development that stemmed from the decision to make interest illegal. For a further discussion in respect to these issues, see Feisal Khan, “Islamic Banking by Judiciary: The ‘Backdoor’ for Islamism in Pakistan?” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2008), pp. 535-55; Moeen H. Cheema, “Cases and Controversies: Pregnancy as Proof of Guilt Under Pakistan’s Hudood Laws,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2006-2007), pp. 121-60; Riaz Hassan, “Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1985), pp. 263-84. Salman Taseer was the governor of the Punjab. Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, an elite-force security guard, assassinated Taseer, because according to Qadri, Taseer sought to reform Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Salman Masood and Carlotta Gail, “Killing of Governor Deepens Crisis in Pakistan,” New York Times, January 5, 2011, p. A1.
 See for example, Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6 (2000), pp. 115-26.
 Stephen P. Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2003), p. 7.
 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords (London: Pan, 2001).
 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
 Giles Kepel, “The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement: From Anti-Communism to Terrorism,” Asian Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2003), pp. 91-108.
 The U.S. embassy in London is a good example of the change. Following September 11, it adopted many new security measures, leading one commentator to write, “The US embassy looks like Checkpoint Charlie and there are armed police at every corner.” Shaun Hill, Maze, “Grosvenor Square, London W1,” The Guardian, August 12, 2005, at p. 63; Hugh Muir, “Lack of Funds Hampers ‘Dirty Bomb’ Response Say Met Chiefs,” The Guardian, February 26, 2006, p. 10; Jon Coaffee, “Protecting Vulnerable Cities: The UK’s Resilience Response to Defending Everyday Urban Infrastructure,” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (2010), pp. 939-54.
 Pervez Musharraf in his autobiography notes that when Secretary of State Colin Powell called him right after the September 11 attacks, Powell candidly stated to Musharraf that Pakistan had the choice of either siding with the United States or the United States would see Pakistan as the enemy. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 200-01. Powell’s deputy, Richard Armitage, when speaking to the head of ISI Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed following September 11 told him that not only did Pakistan need to change its policy vis-à-vis the Taliban, but that it must work with the Americans. Bruce Reidel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618, No. 1 (2008), p. 37.
 Pervez Musharraf, for example, introduced legislation to regulate the visits of foreign students, the hawala sector, and many other areas. “Madrassa Foreigners ‘Must Leave’,” BBC NewsOnLine, July 29, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4728643.stm.
 Enlightened Moderation calls on the Muslim World to reject militancy and extremism as well as to emphasize the need for social and economic improvement. The second part of Enlightened Moderation calls on the West and the United States to resolve political disputes through a justice mechanism while also aiding the Muslim World to attain social and economic betterment. Pervez Musharraf declares, “We need to understand that the root cause of extremism and militancy lies in political injustice, denial and deprivation. Political injustice to a nation or a people, when combined with stark poverty and illiteracy, makes for an explosive mix. It produces an acute sense of hopelessness and powerlessness. A nation suffering from these lethal ills is easily available for the propagation of militancy and the perpetration of extremist, terrorist acts. It is cannon fodder in a war of terrorism.” Pervez Musharraf, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,” The Washington Post, June 1, 2004, p. A23.
 Hussain Haqqani, “The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2004), pp. 85-96; Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004), pp. 195-209; Ashutosh Misra, “Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 2, (2003), pp. 186-215.
 See, for example, Magnus Marsden, Living Islam: Muslim Religious Experience in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulema in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 2005); Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
 A good glimpse into the unevenness of Pakistan’s social and economic situation is offered by Daniyal Mueenuddin’s novel, which highlights how the different classes in Pakistan exist and interact. Daniyal Mueenuddin, In Other Rooms, Other Wonders (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009).
 Article 1(1) of Pakistan’s constitution declares, “Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” This is followed by Article 2, which states that is Islam is the “State Religion.”
 This is made very clear by Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz’s study of the Pakistani officer corps. It shows that officers increasingly come from more liberal communities. This raises serious questions as to how “religious” the army truly is. C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, “The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2011), pp. 63-94.
Kevin R. McClure, “Madrasas and Pakistan’s Education Agenda: Western Media Misrepresentation and Policy Recommendations,” International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2009), pp. 334-41; Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Dad, Asim Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc, “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data,” World Bank, July 2005, http://economics-files.pomona.edu/Andrabi/Research/madrassa_CER_final.pdf (accessed April 2012).
 This raises a typical security dilemma in that Pakistan perceives India as the strong state that seeks to take it over, which requires Pakistan to devote more of its resources to dealing with the Indian threat. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214.
 Hamza Alavi, “Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 51 (December 21-27, 2002), pp. 5119-124.
 It is this evolution that led Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr to declare, “Regardless of where Jami’at alumni and sympathizers go following their graduation, whether they stay close to Jama’at-i Islami or veer in other directions, they carry with them the mark of Jama’at-i Islami–its reading of Islam and its social ethos. They have become the vehicles for a gradual, yet fundamental, process of cultural engineering–the crux of Mawdudi’s original program–which has far greater social and ultimately political ramifications than the immediate gains of Jami’at.” Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami Jami’at-I Tulaba in Pakistan,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), p. 76.
 Naureen Durrani and Máiréad Dunne, “Curriculum and National Identity: Exploring the Links Between Religion and Nation in Pakistan,” Journal of Curriculum Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2010), p. 215; Harold Alderman, et al., “Decomposing the Regional Gap in Cognitive Skills in Rural Pakistan,” Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1996), pp. 49-76; G.R. Memon et al., “Education in Pakistan: The Key Issues, Problems and the New Challenges,” Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, Vol. 6, No. 6 (2010), pp. 672-77.
 The classic example of this was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s declaration that Pakistanis would eat grass in order to achieve nuclear capability.
See for example, Samina Malik and Kathy Courtney “Higher Education and Women’s Empowerment in Pakistan,” Gender and Education, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2011), pp. 29-45.
 Adeel Khan, “Ethnicity, Islam and National Identity in Pakistan,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1999), p. 168.
 See for example, Mian Ata Rabbani, I Was the Quaid’s Aide-de-Camp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Ian Talbot, Freedom’s Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); S. Shahid Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan: Including the Period from August 1947 to 1959 (Lahore: Ferozsons Publishers, 1993); Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan (The Last Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
 Mian Ata Rabbani, I Was the Quaid’s Aide-de-Camp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 139; Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2003), pp. 40-55.
 Hassan Abbas, “Pakistan Through the Lens of the “Triple A” Theory,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 181-82.
 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Mohammed Ayub Khan, “A New Experiment in Democracy in Pakistan,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 358, No. 1 (1965), pp. 109-13.
 Stephen Cohen identifies three generations: British (1947 to mid- and late 1950s); an American generation, which ended in 1972, as a Pakistani generation arose. The nature of the American generation was the influence of American military doctrines and teachings. The Pakistani generation was more religiously aware. Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2004), pp. 97-109. Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
 The most visible was the Jama’at-e-Islami. S. V.R Nasr, “Democracy and Islamic Revivalism,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, No. 2 (1995), pp. 261-85.
 Omar Noman, “Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1989), pp. 44-45. On the migration in the 1970s and 1980s, see Jonathan Addleton, “Impact of International Migration on Economic Development in Pakistan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 5 (1984), pp. 574-96; Shahid Javed Burki, “International Migration: Implications for Labor Exporting Countries,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1984), pp. 668-84.
 Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrer, Straus and Giroux, 2002), p. 117.
 Lawrence Ziring argues that in striving to survive Pakistan’s turbulent political culture, Zia sought themes that would unify the various forces that make up Pakistan. Yet instead of using eclecticism, Zia opted for Islamism. Lawrence Ziring, “Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan’s Nationality Problem: The Legacy of Zia ul-Haq,” Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 8 (1988), p. 799.
 Jessica Stern, “Meeting with the Muj,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2001), pp. 42-51; Jaideep Saikia, “The ISI Reaches East: Anatomy of Conspiracy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2002), pp. 185-97.
 Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” pp. 115-26.
 Paul Rollier, “Texting Islam: Text Messages and Religiosity Among Young Pakistanis,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2010), 414.
 See for example, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami Jami’at-I Tulaba in Pakistan,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), pp. 59-76.
 Hamza Alavi, “Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 51 (December 21-27, 2002), pp. 5119-124.
 Lawrence Ziring, “Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan’s Nationality Problem: The Legacy of Zia ul-Haq,” Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 8 (1988), p. 798; Omar Noman, “Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1989), pp. 28-54.
 Jerome B. Cohen, “Economic Development in Pakistan,” Land Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1953), p. 1.
 O.H.K Spate, “The Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan,” The Geographical Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1948), pp. 5-29; Sumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1996), pp. 76-107.
 Stephen P. Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2002), pp. 32-60.
 Alexander Evans, “Why Peace Won’t Come to Kashmir,” Current History, Vol. 100, No. 645 (2001), pp. 170-75.
 Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2009/2010), p. 83.
 Pakistan has six different provinces/territories, none of which are truly homogenous. This has ensured hatred and tensions. One need only look at the violence that plagues Karachi on a regular basis to see how ethnic tensions often boil over into violence. Steve Inskeep’s study of Karachi addresses many of these issues. Steve Inskeep, Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011).
 See for example some of the research on educational materials in the NWFP. Durrani and Dunne, “Curriculum and National Identity,” pp. 215-40; Stephen P. Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2002), pp. 32-60.
 For more on the border issue in 1947, see, for example, Patrick French, Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division (London: Flamingo, 1998).
 See, for example, the way India is portrayed in Pakistan’s national education curriculum. Durrani and Dunne, “Curriculum and National Identity,” pp. 215-40; Jessica Stern, “Meeting with the Muj,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2001), pp. 42-51.
 C. Christine Fair, “Policing Pakistan,” The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2009, p. 13. Seth Jones and Christine Fair note that General Kayani has repeatedly stated that the army cannot become a counterinsurgency force because its principal aim is to protect Pakistan from India. This explains why the majority of the army is located along the Indo-Pakistan border. Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica: RAND Cooperation, 2010), pp. 34-38.
 Bijan Omrani, “The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border,” Asian Affairs, Vol. 40, 2 (2009), pp. 177-95.
 Baluchistan, which borders Afghanistan and Iran, makes up 43 percent of Pakistan. A large section of Pakistan’s coastline is located in Baluchistan (almost 800 miles) and two of Pakistan’s naval bases are in the province. In addition, 40 percent of Pakistan’s energy comes from the province, including almost half of the country’s total gas production. In terms of mineral production, of the 50 different types of minerals that Pakistan mines, 40 are mined in Baluchistan. Rabia Aslam, “Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2011), p. 193.
 Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica: RAND Cooperation, 2010), p. 19; Durrani and Dunne, “Curriculum and National Identity,” pp. 215-40; Iftikhar Ahmed, “Islam, Democracy and Citizenship Education: An Examination of the Social Studies Curriculum in Pakistan,” Current Issues in Comparative Education, Vol. 7, No. 1 (December 15, 2004).
 “Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism, and the Military,” International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report, No. 36 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002); Peter Singer, Pakistan’s Madrasas: Ensuring a System of Education Not Jihad, Brookings Institution Analysis Paper 41 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001).
 Anne Cockcroft et al., “Challenging the Myths About Madaris in Pakistan” A National Household Survey of Enrolment and Reasons for Choosing Religious Schools,” International Journal of Education Development, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2009), pp. 342-49.
 Paul Rollier, “Texting Islam: Text Messages and Religiosity among Young Pakistanis,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2010), p. 414.
 Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Dad, Asim Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc, “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data,” World Bank, July 2005, http://economics-files.pomona.edu/Andrabi/Research/madrassa_CER_final.pdf (accessed April 2012).
 Personal communication with former employee of the Education Ministry, April 2012.
 Rina Saeed Khan recalls touring the town of Batal that had been devastated by the earthquake. A community leader, Ghulam Jan, had donated his land for the building of a school, because, as he stated to Khan, “Our time is over … We want our children to study so that they can become something when they grow up.” Khan adds that this sentiment was not unique. She writes “Wherever I have gone to cover stories from sea intrusion to glacier melt, I have heard the same demand–we want schools for our children; we want them to have better lives.” Rina Saeed Khan, “Education should be Pakistan’s Top Priority,” The Guardian, April 6, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/apr/06/education-should-be-pakistan-top-priority (accessed April 20, 2012).
 The 2002 report by the International Crisis Group, for example, alleged that a third of all full-time Pakistani students were enrolled in madrasas. “Madrassas, Extremism, and the Military,” International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report, No. 36, rev. ed. (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005); Rebecca Winthrop Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” Center for Universal Education at Brookings, Working Paper No. 2, June 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/06_pakistan_education_winthrop/06_pakistan_education_winthrop.pdf, p. 16.
 See for example, Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Scapegoat,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2006), pp. 117-25; C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008).
 Article 37(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan declares that the Pakistani state shall “promote, with special care, the educational and economic interests of backward classes or areas;” Article 37(b) states that the State shall “remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education within minimum possible period;” while article 37(c) writes to “make technical and professional education generally available and higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.”
 Samina Malik and Kathy Courtney, “Higher Education and Women’s Empowerment in Pakistan,” Gender and Education, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2011), p. 31.
 G.R. Memon et al., “Education in Pakistan: The Key Issues, Problems and the New Challenges,” Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, Vol. 6, No. 6 (2010), p. 673.
 The Federal Supervision of Curricula and Textbooks and Maintenance of Standards of Education Act, 1976, empowers the Curriculum Wing of the Federal Ministry of Education to review all textbooks. It also gives it the authority to change, delete, or reject part of a textbook or the entire textbook. This is arguably why the content of textbooks across Pakistan’s provinces is uniform. Durrani and Dunne, “Curriculum and National Identity,” p. 217. Safdar Rehman Ghazi, et al. “Content Analysis of Textbooks of Social and Pakistan Studies for Religious Tolerance in Pakistan,” Asian Social Science, Vol. 7, No. 5 (2011), pp. 145-50.
 Muhammad Saeed, “Education System of Pakistan and the UK: Comparisons in Context to Inter-provincial and Inter-countries Reflections,” Bulletin of Education & Research, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2007), pp. 45-46.
 Ibid, pp. 46-47.
 Graff, “Beyond Madrasas.”
 M. Niaz Asadullah, “Returns to Private and Public Education in Bangladesh: A Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2009), p. 79.
 Cockcroft et al., “Challenging the Myths about Madaris in Pakistan,” p. 342.
 Graff, “Beyond Madrasas.”
 Masooda Bano, “Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan,” Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2007), pp. 43-68.
 See for example, Jessica Stern’s now famous visit to Jamia Manzoor al-Islamiyya in Lahore in 2001. Stern notes that at Jamia Manzoor she met the principal, Pir Said Khalid, who helped portray the image of an intolerant, pro-jihad, anti-modern individual determined to help more young men become mujahidin. Stern, “Meeting with the Muj,” pp. 42-51.
 Adeline Delavande and Basit Zafar, “Stereotypes and Madrassas Experimental Evidence from Pakistan,” RAND Working Papers, WR-859 (May 2011), pp. 25-26. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2011/RAND_WR859.pdf.
 Cockcroft et al, “Challenging the Myths,” pp. 343-48.
 “Education Emergency Pakistan, 2011,” The Pakistan Education Task Force, 2011, http://pakistaneducationtaskforce.com/EE_Report.pdf (accessed April 21, 2012).
 The reality of this is very unlikely, but it continues to occupy the minds of many. Zahid Hussain, The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan-And How It Threatens America (New York: The Free Press, 2010); Charles P. Blair, “Fatwas for Fission: Assessing the Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 6 (2011), pp. 19-33.
 Muhammad Nazir’s study, however, indicates that there are many barriers within the educational system. Nazir only examines educational practices from policymaking to level of implementation in relation to democratic approaches in education. Muhammad Nazir, “Democracy and Education in Pakistan,” Education Review, Vol. 62, No. 3, (2010), 329–42.
 In their ethnographic study of primary schools, Durrani and Dunne indicate that the instruction has led the children to come to identify themselves through Islam first and then as ethnic Pashtun. They write, “…the school has the potential to contribute positively to the development of a more peaceful and tolerant Pakistan. This becomes increasingly important in contemporary Pakistan where the growing internal conflict, especially in relation to the role of state and Islamization, demands a critical understanding of the ways polarized identities produce divisions and conflict despite the cohesive potential of Islam. The crucial issue is how to build on the potential of Islam for providing unity in a way that allows room for the diversity of languages, customs, cultures, ethnicities, sects, and faiths that comprise the Pakistani nation. Durrani and Dunne, “Curriculum and National Identity,” pp. 215-40, quote p. 235.