This article describes political changes within the Israeli Likud Party following its defeat in the 1992 elections and its 1996 victory. It explores whether electoral defeat or victory intensified internal power struggles. The findings revealed that defeat destroyed the dominant faction and led to the replacement of the failed leadership. A decrease in power struggles followed, as members rallied around a new leader with the aim of winning the following elections. However, the victory led to the development of a more decentralized and democratic party with greater power struggles, factional, and internal competition.
Internal power struggles are among the most important intra-organizational dynamic processes. Assuming that external factors in the general political sphere affect internal power relations, this study seeks to examine the following question: How did the electoral defeat of 1992 and the electoral victory of 1996 affect power struggles within the Likud party? Although the processes described in this article took place during the 1990s, they may also shed light on the Likud Party’s 2006 electoral defeat. In addition, analysis of this particular party promotes comprehension of internal factors that can be generalized to contribute to understanding the causes for the failure and collapse of any political party.
The Likud: Historical Background
The Israeli Likud party was formed in 1973, combining various liberal and right-wing parties. Herut, the longest-standing party, had its roots in the Revisionist Party founded in 1925 by the militant Ze’ev Jabotinsky. The other parties were founded at different periods–the Liberal Party was established in 1961, and the Independent Liberal Party in 1965.
In 1977, Menachem Begin, a member of the Revisionist Party, led the Likud to its first electoral victory and became prime minister. He was reelected in 1981. After Begin retired in 1983, Yitzhak Shamir was chosen as his successor and became the leader of the Likud
movement, serving as prime minister until 1992.
As party leader, Shamir was not supported by all party factions. David Levy and Ariel Sharon were among his opponents, and they orchestrated factional activity within the Likud. The party entered the 1992 elections with divided ranks and suffered a crushing defeat, losing eight mandates, down from 40 to 32.
Losing Versus Winning Elections: External Factors
Most party organization researchers agree that external, environmental stimuli are a key factor in party innovation and change. Panebianco, Janda, Appleton and Ward, Harmel and Tan all assert that political parties are essentially conservative organizations. Every political party consists of groups of people who benefit from the status quo, and who are keen to prevent change that may harm their position within the organization. However, in their view, organizational changes stem from electoral defeat.
Other researchers claim that an electoral victory can also create changes in political parties. Appleton and Ward found that parties can also respond to positive performance by organizational change. Examples are found in the works of Von Beyme and Kam, in which they describe bargaining processes within European and Canadian political parties following electoral victories. The leaders are unable to meet the desires of all members and consequently, some disappointed members resign from the party. The bargaining process thus causes power struggles within political parties.
The struggles within the party take place on three fronts: (1) the party on the ground–cardholding members in the various branches; (2) the party in public office–when a party wins the elections, its members are represented in the government; (3) the party in central office–the decisionmaking forum that determines the party’s policy. Power struggles exist within each component and their relations with one another, as, for example, with the British Labour and the Conservative parties..
This research is based on the qualitative method and uses the Likud party as a case study. The following three criteria were used to examine the intensity of the struggles:
- The issues at the heart of the power struggles: Are the issues on the party’s agenda of an ideological or of an interpersonal nature? In some cases, both may be relevant. This will support the claim that the power struggles within the party have increased.
- Spheres of struggle: The greater the number of entities involved in power struggles is, the more intense these struggles will be. In this case, the various entities are the party’s central committee, the convention, the branches, the secretariat, and the secretariat’s sub-committees.
- Power struggle strategies: It may be said that the more strategies are used, the stronger the power struggles will be, and vice versa–fewer strategies mean weaker power struggles.
These three criteria indicate the frequency of the power struggles. The more criteria that are present–pointing to the presence of power struggles–the higher the intensity of these struggles, and vice versa. The findings were analyzed using a method of data comparison, by examining the differences between electoral victory and defeat.
The research method was based on two methods of data collection: analyzing documents and interviews. Most documents were collected from the Jabotinsky Institute. They included party regulations, and minutes of the Likud Central Committee, the Secretariat, and party conventions. In addition, newspaper articles describing the events at the various conventions were also used.
Some of the interviews conducted were open, that is, the interviewees were asked some general questions, and a casual conversation ensued on the topic of the research. In most cases, however, the interview was planned, focused, and followed a structured questionnaire, adapted for each interviewee. A total of 30 people were interviewed, representing a wide variety of party members–Likud party leaders, ministers, Members of Knesset (Israeli parliament members, MKs), members of the party’s Central Committee, and spokesmen and assistants in Likud governments.
The key figures in the party interviewed were former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and former Minister of Defense Moshe Arens. The MKs who participated in this study were Yossi Ahimeir, Reuven Rivlin, Meir Shitreet, David Reem, Michael Kleiner, Israel Katz, Yoram Aridor, and Uzi Landau.
The 1992 Electoral Defeat and Its Impact on Intra-Party Power Struggles
Following his defeat in the 1992 elections, Yitzhak Shamir resigned. Conflict immediately ensued over the choice of a new party leader, with David Levy, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Benny Begin each vying for the role. The interviewees stated that following the election defeat, branch members sought a candidate who could unite the Likud and lead it to victory. Ariel Sharon did not run for party leadership in 1993, and his supporters joined the various factions. Netanyahu campaigned tirelessly throughout the country, recruiting new party members and supporters for his candidacy. He was widely perceived as the winner, and many activists, previously associated with Levy’s camp, joined him. When the votes were counted the results were: Benjamin Netanyahu, 52 percent; David Levy, 26 percent; Benny Begin, 16 percent; and Moshe Katzav, 6 percent.
Power struggles within the Likud continued from 1988 until 1992 in the Central Committee, the Secretariat, the branches, and at the party’s 1993 convention. Following is a description of the power struggles played out at the convention, as most of the conflicts arose out of the constitutional changes approved during that assembly.
Power Struggles During the Assembly
After Netanyahu was appointed Likud chairman, he actively sought to change its charter. In the course of the convention, Netanyahu proposed that the chairperson be granted sweeping authority. He created two bodies that would operate under his direct supervision: the Administration, an executive body enjoying broad authority; and the Bureau, a body devoted to handling economic and social issues. In addition, he changed the internal electoral mechanism.
Disagreements voiced by Netanyahu’s opponents illustrate the power struggles within the party. Sharon said at the Likud Convention, “Within a democratic political party, there must be genuine democratic balance of power. It is inconceivable that the party chairperson should become the only decision maker in the Likud, and that all other bodies turn into empty vessels.” Moreover, some party members were angered by the creation of the Bureau, whose members were appointed rather than elected.
Nevertheless, and despite the objections, the convention ultimately approved Netanyahu’s proposals by an overwhelming majority. It was then that Netanyahu made fundamental changes in the system used to elect party candidates for general elections. The previous “septet system”was replaced by the primaries system, in which all members were entitled to vote. This gave rise to much opposition, mainly from Levy, Sharon, and Begin supporters. David Cohen, a member of the Central Committee, claimed that because of the expense incurred by the primaries system, “The party is turning into an aristocracy for the rich.” Some interviewees who attended the Convention accused Netanyahu of ignoring opposition by pushing for a speedy change of the constitution.
Power Struggles Within the Secretariat
Most of the Secretariat’s activity dealt with the actual implementation of the constitutional changes, from the election of chairperson and the updating of the electors’ list to requests to join the Central Committee and the work schedules of its sub-committees. A number of interviewees said that membership in the Secretariat was a by-product of loyalty to Netanyahu. However, even within this body, there is evidence of power struggles. For example, Benny Begin resigned over his inability to act independently within the committee. Begin had expressed views that displeased Netanyahu, such as strong opposition to the new primaries system. Despite the above, the minutes indicate that most of the Secretariat’s meetings from 1993-1995 dealt with rules and regulations, and that the general atmosphere was supportive of the chairman’s positions.
Power Struggles Within the Central Committee
During these years (1993-1995), power struggles within the Central Committee mainly centered on the rivalry between Netanyahu and Levy. Animosity between the two developed when Netanyahu served as Levy’s deputy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Yitzhak Regev, Levy never forgave Netanyahu for accusing him in what became known as the “Tape Affair.” Following the accusations against him, Levy boycotted the meetings of the Central Committee and threatened to resign from the party. Netanyahu proved a talented diplomat and spokesman abroad, with an excellent command of English, a fact that cast a shadow on Foreign Minister Levy, whose lack of English was the butt of many jokes. Finally, Levy resigned from the Likud after the Central Committee abandoned the “septet” system, and went on to set up the new Gesher (Bridge) Party.
Power Struggles Across the Branches
Some party members claimed that the branches fell into decay following Netanyahu’s election to Likud Chairman. According to MK Uzi Landau, those who did not support Netanyahu were replaced or simply stopped coming to the branches; branches identified with opposing factions, such as Levy, had their funds frozen. Once the focus of lively, factional activity, the branches began to atrophy under Netanyahu.
Formation of Factions: The Netanyahu Camp
The formation of factions also encouraged power struggles within the Likud. Candidates for party leader, Netanyahu, Begin, Katzav, and Levy, gathered supporters in preparation for the party elections. Three weeks after the landslide defeat in the 1992 elections, Netanyahu gathered all his supporters at the Tel Aviv Exhibition Gardens, with the aim of becoming party leader. Avigdor Lieberman, became the builder of the Netanyahu faction in the Likud and led him to victory, garnering support from wealthy businessmen outside the party and various young activists within it.
After Netanyahu’s victory in the internal elections, he worked ruthlessly to eliminate rival factions, excluding from party institutions anyone who questioned his leadership. Other leadership contenders preferred to leave the party rather than be pushed aside. Thus, Netanyahu managed to fragment the rival factions, reducing factional rivalry and making his faction dominant in all Likud institutions.
Changing the Party Electoral System
Changing rules and regulations can either help or hurt candidates as they run for leadership positions within a party, and the Likud is no exception. A senior party legal advisor interviewed said, “Power struggles between the factions… led to party paralysis. The constitutional structure of 1979 enabled the factional system to flourish… [with] no regulation limiting the factional activity.” Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked MK Uzi Landau for his assistance in drafting a new constitution that would enable the party to function freely. Thus, during the Central Committee meeting of November 15, 1992, members supported the formulation of a new constitution, assuming that it was factionalization that had contributed to the party’s defeat in 1992. Netanyahu exploited this proposal aiming to eliminate the factional system and expand his power base in the Likud, thus weakening internal power struggles.
1996 Electoral Victory and Its Impact on Intra-Party Power Struggles
The Likud party founded the new government, although they had only 32 mandates and the Labor party 34. The Likud succeeded in establishing the government by creating a coalition with the religious and right-wing parties. Subsequently, one can see that power struggles within the party increased mainly over appointments within the government, but also, later, at the 1997 Party Convention.
Struggles over Appointments
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was the first holder of this office to be elected by direct ballot. Following his election, Netanyahu aimed to set up a “government of excellence,” recruiting members of the government not only from the Likud but also from outside the party. He appointed attorney Ya’akov Ne’eman as minister of justice, in place of Dan Meridor who had desired the position and was one of the promising leaders in the party. However, under pressure of resignation from Benny Begin, Meridor was appointed minister of finance, which caused problems with Ariel Sharon, who had expected to receive that post.
Subsequently, evidence of more factional activity in opposition to Netanyahu was seen in the internal cooperation between Levy and Sharon, where the former threatened resignation in order to secure a significant government position for the latter. Netanyahu appointed Sharon as minister of infrastructure, a post wielding enormous authority. Thus, Netanyahu realized that he had to consider the demands of these senior members in order to be able to form a government.
Once the government was formed, Netanyahu’s relations with many of his ministers were far from peaceful. From 1996 to 1997, Netanyahu clashed openly with Minister of Foreign Affairs Levy. He constantly bypassed Levy’s authority by sending others (e.g., Dore Gold) on missions abroad, or even going himself in August 1997 to visit King Hussein, without consulting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This led to Levy officially cutting himself off from Netanyahu, and it was only after Netanyahu made a formal commitment to inform Levy on relevant issues that Levy returned to the government, albeit not for long.
During the first year of his leadership, Netanyahu worked alone, with government ministers complaining that Netanyahu withheld information. Gradually, political rivals found themselves outside the government–Levy resigned, as did Benny Begin, soon to be followed by Meridor. The power struggles between Netanyahu and senior members of his government illustrate his inability to compromise with political rivals. He chose to push his rivals aside, which only enhanced the struggles within the party.
After the 1996 electoral victory, Netanyahu continued to use the strong-arm tactics that had proven so successful in defeating opposition after the 1992 election. However, once in government, after 1996, the other ministers also strove to gather their own supporters from the Central Committee. As they gained strength, Netanyahu’s measures no longer enjoyed the broad support of party members. His intransigent position had a boomerang effect–instead of weakening his opponents, it weakened him.
The Likud Convention
The October 1997 Likud Convention was the scene of an open breach within the leadership, between the prime minister and ministers, and between the ministers and grassroots party members. Netanyahu had decided to cancel the primaries, and did so with the assistance of Director General Avigdor Lieberman. Netanyahu’s support for changing the party’s electoral system was aimed at controlling MKs. In his opinion, the MKs were too independent, especially those government ministers who acted contrary to Netanyahu’s wishes. By weakening the Central Committee’s control over the 1993 party elections through the institution of a primaries system, Netanyahu was able to neutralize Levy’s opposing faction there. Then, in 1997, Netanyahu wished to revert to the previous system, having staffed the Committee with his loyal supporters.
This move incited opposition from many government ministers, including Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Mordechai, and Limor Livnat, who formed an opposition front at the Convention. Eli Landau, then mayor of Herzliya, explained the unwillingness of the ministers to support the proposed change: “Those who cut themselves off completely from the Central Committee know that they will have to pay the price, that they will be erased from the political scene. This is the great fear of ministers and MKs.” Yet Ariel Sharon, one of the government ministers opposed to the change, claimed that in order for the Likud to gain broad support, it was important to maintain the primaries system so that many people would join the party.
However, a large number of Central Committee members were in favor of Netanyahu’s proposal to cancel the primaries, having lost the power and influence that they wielded under the previous “septet system.” They claimed that ministers no longer showed any interest in the Committee or local branch members being elected directly by the members of the Likud party. According to Uzi Cohen, a Central Committee member, “As long as we followed the ‘septet system’ the doors to the ministers and MKs were always open. Today, you may talk, but no one answers.” The Committee members wished to return to the previous system, under which they wrote the list of the party’s candidates for the Knesset.
Two main groups were active at the Convention–the first was led by Israel Dolgin, the other by Uzi Landau. Dolgin, a member of the Central Committee who was close to Lieberman, was actively engaged in getting the primaries cancelled. Uzi Landau, however, strove to limit Netanyahu’s power by weakening the party’s administration, which was totally dominated by Netanyahu’s faction, stating that it was unacceptable for the chairman of a democratic party to have unlimited authority.
Tempers became heated as delegates learned of shady dealings, such as the distribution of marked voter’s forms by those working for Netanyahu. The resulting backlash against Netanyahu led to the curbing of the party chairman’s powers. Of the 1,087 members of the Central Committee, 63 percent voted for Uzi Landau’s proposal, whereby the party Secretariat would have to approve policy decisions and appointments made by the Likud party administration. Later, after the Central Committee accepted Uzi Landau proposal, in an interview, both he and Michael Eitan doubted that this decision had ever been implemented.
Moreover, the Central Committee members led by Israel Katz, finally succeeded to pass the resolution to cancel the primaries system. Thus, Netanyahu maintained his strength and independence as a directly elected leader, and the choice of party candidates would depend entirely upon him. This was a perfect arrangement for Netanyahu–the MKs lost their independence while he gained strength. The cooperation between Netanyahu and the members of the Central Committee suited the needs and interests of both parties involved.
Strategies of Power Struggles
The strategy used by the Likud leaders was to create factions, which they headed. Limor Livnat, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Silvan Shalom all gathered supporters around them and following the 1996 victory, the Likud returned to its faction-like structure. The renewed appearance of factions within the Likud was evidence of the power struggles and also fueled them. Following the 1992 electoral defeat, Netanyahu dismantled the Likud’s factional structure and after it had formed the government in 1996, reverted to its former faction-dominated model.
Attempts to Oust the Leader
Increasing power struggles following the 1996 electoral victory were also evident in attempts on the part of government ministers and some MKs to expel Netanyahu from leadership. Following the cancellation of the primaries, ministers and MKs opposed to the move began to organize with the aim of ousting Netanyahu. According to Yitzhak Regev, a member of the Central Committee:
My friends and I recognized the attempt at a political coup against Netanyahu. Those involved included Roni Milo, Ehud Olmert, Limor Livnat, Michael Eitan, Benny Begin, and Dan Meridor. The plot was to form an independent electoral power in the Knesset, comprising 17 MKs, a sort of Koakh 17 [named after Yasir Arafat’s presidential guard], which would call itself “The Likud would promote the removal of Netanyahu.”
Regev claimed that he and other activists convened and decided to return the constitution to its earlier form, so that, once again, elections would be held in the Central Committee. The aim of this move was to prevent a political coup by the rebel MKs. Regev said that Netanyahu found it hard to believe that a coup could be mounted against him and tried to create a front whereby he appeared to promote annulling the cancellation of the primaries. In talks between Regev and Netanyahu, the latter feared that canceling the primaries would lead to a rift in the party, that some MKs would resign, and that the Convention would be a fiasco.
Netanyahu made sure his supporters were appointed to various ministries and as staff members in party organizations. Such was the case with Avraham Kaddosh, director general of the Prime Minister’s Office under Shamir, who was replaced with Lieberman, who was later replaced by Rami Navon. This was also the case with the heads of the party’s sub-committees–whoever was suspected of not being trustworthy was replaced by Lieberman.
Danny Naveh was appointed government secretary, and Dore Gold his assistant on foreign affairs. Shai Bazak, spokesman for the Prime Minister’s Office, was also a close supporter. In other words, Netanyahu worked by surrounding himself with people whom he could trust.
The findings show that the Likud’s electoral victory led to an increase in the power struggles, whereas the defeat weakened them. How can these findings be explained? It would seem that these struggles were very much a clash of personalities, not ideologies. Following the 1996 victory, Likud intra-party struggles revolved around the distribution of ministerial portfolios and for posts within those ministries that were headed by Likud ministers. Following this victory, there was an attempt to oust Netanyahu, and this also increased the power struggles within the party bodies. Sitting in the government meant that the ministers created independent factions, each of which further generated power struggles, as each minister strived to increase his power. However, sitting on the opposition benches following the electoral defeat prevented and practically eliminated bargaining and power struggles.
The internal power struggles were an outcome of the conflicts between the three components of the Likud party. After Netanyahu was elected chairman, he changed the electoral system from the “septet” system to a primaries system. In doing so, he reduced the power of the members of the Central Committee, who had approved the system because they believed that Netanyahu would bring them back to power. Yet after they won the election, the members of the Central Committee (party in central office) wanted to reverse the electoral system and fought the ministers and MKs (party in public office). Netanyahu and members had a mutual interest–to weaken the position of the ministers and MKs by enhancing their own status and power.
This case study demonstrates the role of factionalism in increasing power struggles within the Likud party. After the 1992 electoral defeat, Netanyahu succeeded in destroying the factional structure of his party, forcing his rivals to leave the party. The Likud members blamed the party’s factional system for the painful defeat, legitimizing Netanyahu’s fight against the faction heads by changing the party constitution. However, after the 1996 victory, the factional system was revised–each leader nominated his supporters and gave them benefits, thus entrenching the competition between the ministers and reinforcing the power struggles.
To conclude, the factors behind the increase in power struggles following electoral victory and their decline following electoral defeat are as follows:
First, an electoral victory leads to a process of bargaining regarding the division of the “plunder,” namely appointments within the government and the party. The various factions are interested in increasing their influence and getting favors in the form of positions and honors. A victory enables such favors to be delivered, while sitting in opposition strongly reduces the party’s resources, thereby minimizing this type of struggle.
Second, the formation of a government increases power struggles within the party–the ministers strive to obtain senior and prestigious portfolios. This leads to conflicts of interest between them, which, in turn, lead to competition and direct conflicts. At times, conflicts of interest also appear between the prime minister and his ministers–he wishes to give them a marginal portfolio, while they have their eyes set on a more prestigious one, in order to be part of the party’s elite. These types of conflicts of interest become irrelevant when the party loses the elections.
Last, the formation of the government can lead to the formation of new factions, as the ministers are interested in increasing their political strength. The more political appointments a minister makes, the more potential supporters he gains. By compensating his associates, a minister creates a faction within the party. A factional structure within a party increases the conflicts of interest between them–It increases bargaining, competition, rivalry, and conflicts between factions, although cases of ad hoc cooperation between factions do arise, such as in a coalition. This option is practically nonexistent following electoral defeat.
Following the defeat, the structure of the dominant factions changed, and a new faction ran for leadership. The electoral defeat of the Likud led to the disintegration of the existing factions, and a new faction, headed by Netanyahu, took over party leadership. Following the appointment of a new party chairman, the power struggles slowly subsided.
The question remains as to why these power struggles gradually subsided. The desire to win the elections leads all the factions to rally around the leader. Factional activity drops, and the opposition activity within the party is perceived as being unacceptable, having the potential to jeopardize the party’s chances of winning the elections. A united party is one that can “provide the goods.” The party members watch for those who deviate from this path and push them out of the party. When factional activity ceases, it is followed by a significant drop in power struggles.
This article supports the claim that electoral victory leads to greater bargaining and power struggles within a party. In addition, electoral victory–when certain conditions within the party are fulfilled–increases the chances of a future electoral defeat, as was the case with the Likud in 1999 and 2003. Following these victories, power struggles intensified, restoring the factional structure and subsequently causing a great deal of damage to the party. Internal rivalries created an atmosphere of animosity and hatred. After the 1999 elections, the party split with members supporting one of the leading figures. Instead of focusing on winning the election, faction heads fought each other. This projected a negative image of the party to the public, leading to the Likud’s electoral defeat.
In the case of the Likud, the party was torn apart and divided, leading to the formation of the Kadima Party in 2006. The Likud split into two parties was the key factor behind its electoral defeat. The main conclusion is that there is a need for a system of supervision and regulations for conflict resolution and for preserving a low level of power struggles, without which the party is likely to disintegrate and cease to exist.
*Yaffa Moshkovich is Senior Lecturer and Head of the Sociology Department at the Kinneret College on the Sea of Galilee, Israel.
 Movement refers to a group that enjoys broad public support, not necessarily only from party members.
 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kenneth Janda, “Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties,” Paper presented at the 12th World Congress of the International Sociological Association: Modeling Party Change, Madrid, Spain, 1990; Andrew M. Appleton and Daniel S. Ward, “Party Response to Environmental Change, A Model of Organizational Innovation,” Party Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 341-62; Robert Harmel and Alexander C. Tan, “Party Actors and Party Change: Does Factional Dominance Matter?” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42 (2003), pp. 409-24.
 Appleton and Ward, “Party Response to Environmental Change.”
 Klaus Von Beyme, “Party Leadership and Change in Party System: Toward a Postmodern Party State?” Government and Opposition, Vol. 31 (1996), pp. 59-135.
 Christopher Kam, “Demotion and Dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36 (2006), pp. 561-74.
 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, Three Faces of Party Organization: Adaptation and Change. University of Manchester, Working Paper of the European Policy Research Unit, April 1990.
 Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, The Presidentialization of Democracy: A Study in Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Paul Webb, “Party Responses to the Changing Electoral Market in Britain,” in Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Muller, and Fritz Plasser (eds.), Political Parties and Electoral Change (London: Sage Publication, 2004), pp. 20- 48.
 Likud–National Liberal Movement, Secretariat Minutes, January 16, 23, February 6, 10, 1992, May 12, 1994, June 15, 1995, Tel Aviv, Record (Hebrew); Likud–National Liberal Movement, Convention Minutes, May 17-18, 1993, Tel Aviv, Record (in Hebrew).
 The key figures in the party interviewed were former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and former Minister of Defense Moshe Arens. The MKs who participated in this study were Yossi Ahimeir, who belonged to the dominant Shamir-Arens camp; Reuven Rivlin of Levy’s camp; Meir Shitreet, former mayor of Yavne and a minister in Shamir and Netanyahu’s governments; David Reem, former mayor of Kiryat Ata; Michael Kleiner, who belonged to Levy’s camp; Israel Katz, who built the Sharon camp but later became identified with Netanyahu’s faction; Yoram Aridor, minister of finance during Shamir’s government; and Uzi Landau, who belonged to the Shamir-Arens faction.
 Defeat or victory in the Israeli system is determined by the elected person’s ability to establish a government. The 1992 election brought the Likud party to the opposition. After the 1996 election, although the Labor party gained more mandates in the election, it was the Likud that established the government, with Netanyahu as prime minister.
 Members of the party, MKs, ministers and party activists.
 Likud Constitution, 1993.
 Likud Convention, May 17, 1993.
 This system was initiated by the 3,000 members of the Likud Convention. The members chose a list of 50 candidates for the Knesset and grouped them into seven lists of seven names each, with those on the first list having the greatest chance of being elected.
 A party activist.
 Prior to the Likud leadership elections, rumors were spread about a “sensational tape” incriminating Netanyahu. Netanyahu, without ever mentioning David Levy’s name, accused Levy of publicizing the tape. Levy, deeply hurt by the accusation, refuted it.
 Including students led by MK Joshua Matza and Tzahi Hanegbi and members of the Matza Youngsters’ Jerusalem branch, among them Danny Naveh.
 In the Likud, the Central Committee and the Convention are the same body.
 The primaries system allows all party members to elect the party leaders, granting the party greater appeal than with the old electoral system.
Ma’ariv, November 11, 1997, p. 2.
 Katz and Mair, Three Faces of Party Organization.