Volume 7, No. 2 – June 2003
THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ:
UNDERSTANDING THE DEFENSE STRATEGY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
This article analyzes how the Iraqi regime
portrayed the war to its people and conducted it on both a military and
political level. Using earlier captured Iraqi documents it analyzes the regime’s
strategies and techniques for both controlling and mobilizing the population.
Saddam’s choice of a defensive strategy to force a lengthy war of attrition was
his best possible one, based on his hope that his enemies would lack the
patience or courage to continue the war and also that domestic and international
pressures would force his opponents to let his regime survive.
"Military training is the
central path that has no substitute, to make the soldier proficient in
militarism and able to serve the Iraqi nation, the people and Arab nation from
The President Leader
While there has been
massive coverage and analysis of the 2003 Anglo-American war with Iraq regarding
the Western perspective of the fighting, relatively little attention has been
paid to how the war was waged from the Iraqi side, tactically or conceptually.
For example, the Anglo-American operation’s official name was "Iraqi Freedom,"
and most Arab circles called it "al-Harb al-Khalijiyya al-Thalitha" (The Third
Gulf War) but what did the Saddam regime call it?
The Iran-Iraq War of
1980-1988 was not referred to as such in the official Iraqi discourse but rather
as Qadisiyat Saddam, coupling the leader’s name with the first battle ever
fought in history between the Persians and Arabs, in which the Arab Muslims
emerged victorious. The implication was that Saddam was fighting for all the
Arabs and that he would win a tremendous and total victory.
That earlier battle,
which took place in 637 AD, led by the Arab general Sa’d ibn Waqqas lasted for
three days, resulting in the death of both the Persian general Rustum as well as
the end of Persian Sassanian rule in Iraq.(2) The collapse of the Zoroastrian
Iranian forces at al-Qadisiyya allowed the Arabs to spread Islam eastward, thus
giving the battle a religious significance. As Ofra Bengio has written, "The
myths woven around al-Qadisiyya are a most instructive example of the Ba’thi
technique of using an event with a core historical truth that is deeply etched
into collective memory in order to further the party’s ideology of Arab
nationalism and to appeal to the public by means of a challenge of great
Thus, by invoking the
name of al-Qadisiyya, Saddam justified his war as a continuation of the struggle
between Persian and Arab. Saddam’s label of the Iran-Iraq war as al-Qadisiyya
revealed his vision of how the war should end: a decisive Arab victory over the
Persian masses, leading to the complete surrender of the Iranian nation.
The 1991 Gulf war was
termed "Operation Desert Storm" by the Coalition forces, while Saddam used the
term, "Umm Kul al-Ma’arik" or "the Mother of all Battles". This euphemistic
title for the 1991 war reveals Saddam’s emphasis on the scope and severity of
the impending war with the United States. Nevertheless, the regime believed it
would emerge victorious. In a military memo circulated among military units it
states, "We are guaranteed victory because we are standing up to 30 nations, and
that is a point of pride for us."(4) This statement infers that if the regime
survives the "mother of all battles" that would mean a victory no matter what
happened on the battlefield itself. And by this measure, the regime could well
claim to have won the 1991 war.
referred to Iraqi Operation Freedom as Ma’rakat Al-Hawasim, "The Defining
Battle," to mobilize the Iraqi masses against the impending American attack in
2003. Perhaps the rhetorical use of this title indicated that this was the
final, defining battle of the regime. Like almost everything that happened in
Iraq between around 1973 and 2003, that matter was highly dependent on the
mindset of Saddam Hussein.
Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University
points out that analysis of Saddam Hussein has vacillated between characterizing
him as a rational, logical actor, and
a fanatic, isolated from reality. "The most dangerous fanatics, however,
combine elements of both–they are shrewd operators with deranged views. Though
Hitler was obsessed by the preposterous theory of a Jewish plot for world
mastery, he was also remarkably astute–outwitting Western statesmen before the
Second World War and driving his generals to achieve a spectacular sequence of
rapid military victories."(5)
Saddam, too, can be said to have combined serious misperceptions of the world,
including a profound belief in conspiracies, with a shrewd sense of the
political behavior and strategies required by his position. Claims of
conspiracies also justified many of the regime’s policies and garnered loyalty
to them by the security apparatus and sometimes by the population at large.
one example of the regime’s use of this method, here are two statements
justifying Iraq’s possession and possible use of chemical weapons in an official
training manual.(6) These weapons were needed:
â?¦as a result of the
American-Zionist union against our country in order to steal the natural
resources of the Arab world, under an international umbrella and the decision of
the Security Council and the distortion of facts by some of the traitorous Arab
leaders like the [king of Saudi Arabia] and [President] Husni Mubarak [of
Egypt]. And as a result of the concentration of the hostile forcesâ?¦in
preparations for unleashing hostilities on our dear country:
[Intelligence] reports have indicated the possession of the
American-Zionist union of chemical weapons, and their ill intention to use them
against our country to increase our losses in persons, equipments, weapons and
Yet it would be a mistake
to overstate Saddam’s irrational side–noting that even the purveying of
conspiracy theories often served as a practical political measure for the
regime. Indeed, an examination of Saddam’s strategy in the 2003 war shows how it
parallels the strategy that he used in 1991. It is vital to make a distinction
between the mistakes Saddam made in blundering into a war under unfavorable
circumstances and his choice of the best possible–though limited and
difficult–option once faced with fighting such a conflict.
both wars, Saddam realized that he could not achieve a military victory against
vastly superior U.S. forces. His goal in both conflicts was to emerge with a
political victory by ensuring the survival of his regime, just as Nasser had
done in 1956 when a losing war guaranteed his place as champion of the Arab
The manner in which
Saddam organized the defense of Iraq in both wars demonstrated that his goal was
to ensure a protracted conflict, inflicting as many Allied casualties as
possible, in the hope that his opponents’ impatience, spiritual weakness or
internal conflicts forced them to give up.
A document dated January
14, 1991, two days before the commencement of Operation Desert Storm reveals
Saddam’s strategy and bears a striking resemblance to the strategy employed
during this conflict. Directives to commanders of the Iraqi army bluntly
indicate that Iraq is at a technological disadvantage: "The enemy has different
equipment. There is a difference between Iraqi soldiers and American soldiers
in methodology, size, etc." The following directive orders, "Try to cause many
casualties and have a long war. Wait underground for the end of the air attack.
Utilize propaganda. Do not leave Kuwait. Have self-confidence."(8)
Essentially, the document suggests that the Iraqi army, in the face of
overwhelming firepower, should engage "the enemy" in a protracted war but does
not command it to act in an offensive campaign.
Saddam’s end game was not a victory for the Iraqi nation, but a victory for the
regime itself. As one pre-war assessment put it, most Iraqi military leaders
knew "that Iraq cannot resist a U.S. assault, but could only hope to make the
U.S. entry as costly as possible as soon in the war as possible, and then to
draw out the fighting into Baghdad to the point where the U.S. media would make
continued U.S. engagement untenable."(9) Essentially, this comment echoes the
goals laid out for the Iraqi military in the January 14, 1991 directive to the
SADDAM’S DEFENSE STRATEGY
The military defense of Iraq was most likely coordinated by Saddam through
the Ba’th Party Military Bureau, the body which managed Iraqi defense and
security issues during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as selected high ranking
military officers.(10) The Bureau was subordinated to the party chairman,
Saddam Hussein, who was also its general secretary. Saddam, not the minister of
defense, was thus the highest military authority in Iraq. Given the nature of
the system he established, his active and direct control was absolutely
necessary for the morale and functioning of the Iraqi armed forces and to
Prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam had divided Iraq
into four military command zones. Yet it appeared that Saddam set the overall
strategy along a three-tiered approach. The first line of defense was the
regular Iraqi military. The Republican Guard would defend the capital from
outside it. The Special Republican Guard and the military units of Iraq’s
intelligence organizations would defend Baghdad from within.
The regular Iraqi Army
was organized into five corps which were stationed in the south of Iraq, as well
as the area to the north of Baghdad, bordering the Kurdish safe-haven. The
Iraqi Third and Fourth Corps were based in the south of Iraq, while the First
and Fifth Corps were based in the north of Iraq to guard against an attack from
the Kurdish zone. The Second Corps had been deployed to the east of Baghdad,
along the Iranian border.(11)
Iraq’s regular Army suffered neglect after the 1991 Gulf war and was the least
effective element of Saddam’s defense. Generally, it was deployed in the
furthest reaches to the north and south of Iraq on the front lines. Thus, they
served as a buffer between invading forces and the Republican Guard stationed in
the second tier. Ostensibly, it seemed that such deployments were designed to
stall the invading American and British forces, thus giving the Republican Guard
time to prepare to defend their positions on the outskirts of Baghdad.
The Republican Guard was stationed to defend the areas in the vicinity of the
capital. It had the best-equipped and trained units among Saddam’s forces and
received better pay and privileges than the regular Iraqi army.
The Republican Guard’s six divisions included an
armored division, three mechanized divisions and two infantry divisions, as well
as three Special Forces brigades. These were the al-Nida Division, Baghdad, the
Madina al-Munawarah, Nebuchadnezzar, Adnan, and Hammurabi divisions. Each had
approximately 8,000 to 10,000 men, with total manpower estimated at about
The Republican Guard was not under the control of
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, rather it was supervised by Qusay Hussein, head
of the Special Security Organization. However, even though the Guard and regular
Army were separate institutions, they fought effectively together in defensive
high-profile use of the Republican Guard, they were strategically deployed
outside Baghdad so as not to facilitate or allow any one of the Guard units to
act against the regime. The Special Republican Guard was the largest armed unit
allowed inside of Baghdad.
Saddam allowed his son, Qusay, to organize the defense of the capital using
elite forces that numbered up to 40,000 men who would fight inside the city
using terror and guerrilla tactics. One of the organizations tasked with
defending the capital was Jihaz al-Amn al-Khas (the Special Security
Organization),(13) with its brigade which served as a rapid response unit for
the organization, independent of the military establishment and of the Special
In addition, various
armed security forces were deployed inside the capital, such as Al-Amn al-‘Amm
(General Security), a political police force, with its paramilitary wing, known
as Quwat al-Tawari’ (The Emergency Forces). Another unit in Saddam’s security
apparatus, known as Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khasa (The Special Protection Apparatus)
was the only unit to have armed men in the direct proximity of the President and
served as his bodyguards.
Finally, al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas (The Special Republican Guard), which had
up to 26,000 men, was divided into four brigades, with three brigades guarding
the northern, southern and western routes into Baghdad.(14)
addition to this three-tiered defense, it was predicted that Saddam would
destroy the oil wells in the south and north of Iraq, destroy bridges at
critical junctions such as Nasiriyya, flood the approaches to Baghdad and bring
the Americans into a bloody urban battle for the capital where chemical weapons
would be unleashed. However, the course of the war demonstrated that only a few
elements of Saddam’s defense strategy were ever implemented to halt the
THE WAR FOR
The Battle For The South Of Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003 with an attempted decapitation
air strike against the regime, subsequent to which American and British ground
forces entered Iraq. As U.S. and UK forces were dispatched to the south of
Iraq to seize the port of Um Qasr as well as the oil fields in the south, Iraq
launched a variety of missiles toward the invading forces bases in Kuwait,
perhaps the only offensive aspect of Saddam’s strategy.
Coalition forces advanced through the south, most assessments failed to account
for the prominent role of Saddam’s Fidayin. Saddam’s Fidayin (also spelled
Fedayeen) can be roughly translated as "those who sacrifice themselves for
Saddam." A paramilitary militia with the strength of about 30,000 to 40,000 men,
it was established in 1995 by Saddam’s oldest son Uday to maintain internal
security in Iraq. By no means a professional fighting force, nor were its
member recruited for suicide missions, members were induced to join with higher
salaries than regular Iraqi soldiers.(15) It has been erroneously referred to
as an "elite" fighting force, when in reality it is known for its brute force,
rather than its fighting prowess.(16) Many of the fighters were youths in their
teens from Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit or from his al-Bu Nasir tribe, with no
prior combat experience.
Assessments of Iraq’s strategy prior to the conflict indicated that this unit
would be engaged in a battle for Baghdad, and that these forces, along with the
Special Republican Guard, would most likely defend the city in earnest. Iraq’s
defense strategy would prove these assessments wrong as the Fidayin were
dispatched to the south, where they provided stiff resistance, particularly in
defending the southern cities of Basra, Um Qasr, Najaf, and Nasiriyya, and
targeting Coalition supply lines. The Fidayin employed guerrilla tactics against
these forces in units of 10 to 15 fighters. It seemed, though, that they fought
without coordination, instead fighting a war of attrition, attempting to inflict
as many casualties as possible.
They proved to be the
crucial element in Iraq’s guerrilla war tactics, capturing several Americans as
well. It is most likely that part of Iraq’s strategy in this regard was to
offer financial incentives to every Iraqi combatant who captured a POW. A
document dated February 8, 1991 details financial rewards for the apprehension
of American and British prisoners of war. It states, "Carrying out the orders of
the President Leader (May God bless him) that were issued in a meeting of the
leadership of the armed forces on the 8th of December 1990, regarding
rewarding the fighters who are able to bring in an English or American POW with
10,000 dinars on average for every POW."(17)
Again, though, these resistance efforts were uncoordinated. The reported death
of Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam’s paternal cousin, in Basra on April 6, 2003 in
an airstrike against his residence seems to have damaged Iraq’s effort in the
south. As commander of the southern military zone, al-Majid would have put up a
more effective effort at mounting an attrition defense. His loss also undermined
Iraqi morale there.
Battle For the Center
While the Iraqi defense strategy involved using the Fidayin to
defend the southernmost areas in Iraq, the Republican Guard was deployed in the
vicinity of Baghdad to provide a second tier of resistance to the Allied
forces. When the military conflict commenced, U.S.
air strikes concentrated on the three Republican Guard divisions–the Madina,
al-Nida, and Baghdad–defending the outskirts of Baghdad.
An unanswered question
still remains as to the fate of Iraq’s Republican Guard. All Republican Guard
troops were volunteers rather than conscripted and the majority were Sunni Arab
Muslims.(18) When Shia and Kurds revolted against the regime after the 1991
Gulf War, the weakened Republican Guard rallied behind Saddam Hussein and
brutally suppressed the insurrection. This uprising took on an ethnic and
sectarian nature, and it appeared as if the predominantly Arab Sunni Republican
Guards were defending their privileged status in the Iraqi state.
Understandably, they expected that Saddam’s fall would be a tremendous personal
loss of status and power in Iraq.
In later years, though,
the Guard’s loyalty appears to have been shaken. Important Guard elements
attempted to overthrow Saddam on various occasions.
Executions and purges of suspect officers was a common phenomenon. The Fidayin
and the Iraqi security apparatuses were deployed against the Guard during times
After Operation Desert Fox in 1998, Saddam promoted a large number of officers
from his hometown of Tikrit to senior positions in the Guard, upsetting many
senior officers. Based on these past precedents, some analysts had
predicted that the Republican Guard deployed on the outskirts of the capital
would not serve as an enthusiastic fighting force, nor put up much resistance to
an American attack.
The Guard’s poor
performance in the 2003 war could be attributed to this reduced loyalty and the
disabling of Saddam as military commander. Whether or not he was killed,
wounded, or merely forced into hiding, Saddam was not visibly directing these
forces and this fact led to a demoralizing confusion, paralysis, and a belief
that defeat was inevitable.
As U.S. forces approached
the outskirts of Baghdad, the Pentagon asserted that Republican Guard Units had
been given the authority to deploy chemical weapons when the Americans
approached Baghdad. Such assessments indicate that some of the Coalition war
planners did not have a full understanding of the command and control structure
of Iraq’s chemical weapons arsenal. In fact, the only Iraqi unit that had the
authority to deploy chemical munitions was the Chemical Corps of the elite
Special Security Organization, managed by Saddam’s son, Qusay.(19) One reason
Saddam entrusted a security/intelligence agency to deploy these weapons was out
of fear that the military would disobey his orders to use them.(20)
As the Republican Guard
forces defending the outskirts Baghdad collapsed, American forces conducted
forays into the capital. Besides Saddam’s Fidayin, there were a myriad of
groups charged with defending the capital. It was at this juncture that many
analysts predicted that bloody street battles would begin. But chemical weapons
were never deployed and, contrary to Saddam’s intentions, neither the Special
Republican Guard nor the Emergency Forces provided serious resistance within
The Absence of Any "Oil
While a few oil fields in the south of Iraq were set ablaze, Iraq’s oil
fields in the north of Iraq remained undamaged. Given Iraq’s past motives for
destroying Kuwait’s oil fields, it seemed likely that Saddam would have given
the order to destroy the oil fields around Kirkuk and Mosul in the event of an
American attack. The fact that the oil fields were not set ablaze is surprising
given that Saddam used the destruction of the oil wells in 1991 as part of his
While Saddam destroyed
the Kuwaiti oil fields in the last days of February 1991 to thwart the American
abilities to conduct air raids, the ensuing smoke clouds limited visibility,
documents illustrate that Saddam had ordered the oil wells to be prepared for
destruction as early as August 1990, well before the Gulf War had started. For
example, a document known as a "signed release for the detonation of the oil
wells," states, "I guarantee that all 16 wells in the group location 21 are
ready to be destroyed."(21) An Iraqi officer signed the document on August 26,
1990. Based on this pattern, Saddam most likely rigged the oil wells near Basra
and Kirkuk with explosives as well.
Another document suggests that the Iraqis also ordered the destruction of
the wells simply so the Americans would not gain access to them. One captured
document reads, "Because the oil fields are important to the enemy we need to
protect the explosives that are positioned at the oil fields."(22) Since the
United States coveted Kuwaiti oil, the Iraqis had to make sure the wells were
destroyed, in a vengeful act of spite. Finally, the regime believed that the
destruction of the wells had an important psychological effect on its forces.
"The importance of the execution of the destruction of the oil wells plays a
significant role in lifting morale. The terminology, delayed destruction will
be used for destruction at the last moment in front of the enemy."(23)
Given the importance of the destruction of the oil wells in the eyes of the
regime, it was surprising that most of Iraq’s oil infrastructure remained intact
in 2003. Perhaps Iraqi engineers were less willing to destroy their own
national resources, as opposed to those in Kuwait. This issue will require
ASSESSMENT OF SADDAM’S DEFENSE STRATEGY
Some have argued that
Saddam had no concept of reality and was insulated from those around him about
the nature of the American threats in 1991 and 2003. Nevertheless, in 1990,
Iraqi intelligence services often delivered candid reports on Iraq’s inability
to defend itself. It would seem likely that Saddam’s plan in 2003 was also a
result of reasonable–if mistaken–assessments of Coalition capabilities and
For example, a report
issued from Mudiriyyat al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya, (The Directorate of Military
Intelligence) on August 20, 1990, reported on the movements of the American
aircraft carrier, the USS Kennedy, as well as the American fighters deployed in
Saudi Arabia, along with Egyptian and Pakistani ground forces.(24) The report
defines "Possible Scenarios of an American attack" involving the following
steps: "The air forces will be used to strike in the rear areas of Kuwait to cut
off transportation to [Iraq], as well as strikes from the Gulf. Then the land
forces will attack our army in Kuwait, after the military air strikes have
succeeded in paralyzing our military and produced heavy losses for the
Iraqis."(25) In addition, "The enemy will use electronic warfare to affect our
wire communications and paralyze our defense."(26) This document is in stark
contrast to Saddam’s rhetoric then about a quick and easy victory over the
Other reports from the
Iraq military offered candid assessments of low troop morale. On December 30,
1990 a report states, "Soldiers are afraid that if they retreat they will be
killed by their own forces. Soldiers have had little to no training. Most were
pulled off the street and shipped to the front lines without training. This has
had a great effect on morale. In order to increase morale the officers are
trying to arrange training for the soldiers. There are complaints about not
having night binoculars. They cannot see what is happening around them and
cannot tell if they are about to be attacked at night."(27)
One could argue that such
assessments never reached Saddam himself. However, Saddam’s control of the
military and the way he organized the defense of Iraq in 1991 and 2003 indicated
that in fact he was aware of the woeful state of his forces and that his
survival depended on a political victory through a protracted conflict. In
1991, the aim of regime survival was fulfilled. In 2003, however, his enemies
did not give up due to their own demoralization or to domestic or international
Of course, when Saddam
heard that his soldiers were largely motivated by fear of him this was not a
disappointment but an essential part of his strategy. In 1992, Saddam
established al-Amn al-‘Askari (Military Security), which grew out of the Special
Bureau of Military Intelligence, after Saddam believed the latter had failed to
detect disturbances in the military. It was designed to put agents into every
branch of the military, serving as the regime’s eyes and ears to ensure loyalty
Distrust of the fighting
capability of the military manifested itself in reports emerging from the 1991
conflict. Officers were forced to sign statements along the following lines,
"The Mission: Defending Great Iraq within the brigade and division and prevent
the Americans and their coalition from taking any part from the homeland and
never give up my place whatever happens. I am staying in my position until the
last moment."(29) In the context of Iraqi life, such statements indicated the
signers were acknowledging the fact that they would be executed if these
promises were not fulfilled.
Most combatants in the
Iraqi military had other reasons to fight to the very end for the defense of the
regime; at least as long as they believed the regime might survive. In most
cases, their families were under threat of retaliation in the event of treason
or desertion. The military intelligence unit of the 29th Division
reported that two men had escaped to Saudi Arabia in 1990. It requested from
the Corps command, "their home addressesâ?¦within 24 hours."(30)
A list of directives
circulated to military units on February 17, 1991, demonstrates how fear was
instilled into the Iraqi military in ways that still applied in 2003. The
document warns that if there is a single deserter in any unit "the entire unit
will be punished. Those who escape are to be executed by the Popular Army.
Those who escape to Saudi Arabia will bring shame on them and their
families."(31) Every soldier understood the direct threat to his loved ones. The
document concludes, "Executions should be held in public and without any mercy
on every deserter. At the battle, any soldier that is out of line is to be
executed. Those who escape and return should be sent to the front line. Iraq is
more dear than everyone."(32)
But once the security
organizations and the fear that the regime would survive to exact retribution
collapsed toward the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom, so did the instruments of
fear within the military. And with that, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi
soldiers refused to fight to save Saddam.
It is possible to obtain a good sense of how Saddam viewed his adversaries.
He was highly influenced by his perception that America had been defeated in
Vietnam by a lack of courage and will power, a limit on its patience, and an
inability to sustain casualties. This view was reinforced by his reading of
American behavior after Vietnam, leaving Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993,
among other events. Even in Afghanistan in 2001, where the United States won a
quick victory, Saddam noted that the United States preferred to use local forces
rather than risking its own troops.
Since U.S. forces would have to do the fighting in Iraq, his best–and perhaps
only–hope was a protracted ground war in which America would tire of losing
soldiers, which would occasion domestic demands to end the war. He also hoped
that international public opinion in other countries, as well as Arab protests,
would demand that the war be ended. In this context, using weapons of mass
destruction would have been counterproductive since it would have destroyed the
pretext that Iraq was a victim that needed to be saved by the world and by the
Saddam also knew that this basic strategy had worked in 1991 to save him. He
thus, understandably, believed that this defensive strategy was his best bet for
the regime’s survival, and he was willing to pay the cost, Iraq’s utter
destruction, to serve that end.
1. KDS folder CD 8 file
064-1-013a p. 4.
2. See Qadissiyat Saddam,
Al-Tabaâ??ah Al-Ulah, (Al-Sahafah wa Tabaâ??ah wa al-Nashir: Kuwait, 1980)
3. Ofra Bengio, Saddamâ??s
Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 173.
4. KDS Folder 90809 file
681-1-3 pp. 4-7.
Christopher Andrew, â??We Must Know What Makes Them
Tick,â?ť London Times,
December 5, 2002.
6. These files form the Iraq
Research and Documentation Projectâ??s Kuwait Data Set and can be accessed at
7. KDS folder CD 9 file
104-6-015 p. 6.
8. KDS Folder CD004 File
084-2-002 p. 5 and File 084-2-002a pp. 2-17.
9. Gregory R. Copley,
â??Preparations Indicate US Readiness for Conflict With Iraq, Initiated by Air
War, Starting Late November 2002â?ť, November 4, 2002.
10. Jeremy Binnie, ed.,
Janeâ??s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States (London: Janeâ??s
Information Group, 2001), p. 188.
11. Binnie, pp. 188-192.
12. Binnie, pp. 194-5.
13. Dilip Hiro, Neighbors,
Not Friends, Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars (London and New York:
Routledge, 2001), p. 49.
14. For more detailed
information on the Iraqi intelligence agencies see Ibrahim Al-Marashi, â??Iraqâ??s
Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysisâ?ť, Middle East Review
of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3, September 2002.
15. Binnie, p. 217.
16. Global Security, â??Saddamâ??s
17. KDS folder CD 6 file
096-17-024 p. 07.
18. Global Security,
â??Republican Guard,â?ť <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/rg.htm>
19. For more information, see
Ibrahim Al-Marashi, â??How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its Weapons of Mass
Destruction,â?ť Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1,
20. Timothy V. McCarthy and
Jonathan B. Tucker, â??Saddamâ??s Toxic Arsenal,â?ť in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan
and James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon (Ithaca NY: Cornell
University Press, 2000). p. 48.
21. KDS Folder Iraq Docs File
559-034 pp. 10,11,12,15.
22. KDS Folder Iraq Docs File
532-029 pp. 4, 5, 7, 8.
23. KDS Folder CD003 File
024-3-001 pp. 16-19.
24. KDS Folder 90809 File
124-6-009 p. 84.
25. KDS Folder 90809 File
124-6-009 p. 86.
26. KDS Folder 90809 File
124-6-009 p. 86.
27. KDS Folder CD004 File
048-5-002 p. 2.
28. Hiro, p. 57.
29. KDS Folder CD004 File
021-1-031 p. 2.
30. KDS Folder 90809 File
31. KDS Folder 90809 file
681-1-3 pp. 4-7.
32. KDS Folder 90809 file
681-1-3 pp. 4-7.
Ibrahim al-Marashi is a
research associate at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey,
California as well as a lecturer at the US Naval Postgraduate School. He is
currently working on a project on Iraqi intelligence operations in northern Iraq
and Kuwait. He is also the author of "How Iraq Conceals And Obtains Its Weapons
Of Mass Destruction" which appeared in the March 2003 issue of MERIA.
to Journal Volume 7 Number 2 Index