Editor’s Summary: This article analyzes recent changes in Greek-Turkish relations, characterized by the emergence of a positive atmosphere in the bilateral relations of two countries historically associated with an enduring conflict. It considers the roots of these changes, especially the effects of the Cold War’s end and the problem of strategic disorientation embodied by the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996. The article concludes with an effort to provide a constructivist analysis of the ‘critical rethinking’ process in both countries.
‘Some want to say that what we are living through today in our Greek-Turkish relationship is simply a ‘fairy tale.’ And yet it is not. Because our people demand it! I therefore say this: it is time to dare the impossible.’
— Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, October 1999(2)
Greek-Turkish Relations: Beyond ‘Earthquake Diplomacy’
On August 17, 1999, Turkey’s Marmara region was hit by a devastating earthquake that killed thousands of people. There was a rush of humanitarian aid from all over the world. Greece was among the first countries to send condolences and rescue teams. On September 7, 1999, Greece was also hit by an earthquake, and this time Turkey was among the first countries to send condolences and rescue teams to Greece. The two countries, deemed to be ‘historical enemies’ and who came to the brink of war in the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996, began an unexpected process of improving relations.
One of the central arguments about the Greek-Turkish rapprochement has been that it was a product of what is usually called ‘civic diplomacy,’ ‘people’s diplomacy,’ or ‘seismic diplomacy’ initiated after the earthquakes by the peoples of both countries. According to this argument, the peoples of two countries showed their preference for friendship and peace, and the political leaders just followed after the ‘public’s wish’ in their diplomatic initiatives that gained pace in the post-quake period.
The statements of the foreign ministers themselves reflect the arguments of ‘people’s diplomacy.’ For example, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou wrote: ‘Through their moving expressions of solidarity, the citizens of Greece and Turkey effectively coined a new political term: ‘seismic diplomacy’…. They taught us that mutual interests can and must outweigh tired animosities.'(3) A similar statement is made by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in his speech at a ceremony honoring him and Papandreou for their contributions to improving Greek-Turkish relations: ‘As representatives of Turkey and Greece, George and I are standing before you today for one simple reason: We have faithfully translated the feelings of the Turkish and Greek peoples into policies and acts.'(4)
Clearly, the earthquakes did play a role in allowing positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations and especially in letting leaders on both sides claim a popular mandate for changing policies historically supported by a large majority on both sides. Yet the move toward rapprochement is well-rooted in a process of reevaluation or redefinition of political and strategic interests–a process initiated before the natural disasters made it more palatable to the Greek and Turkish publics.
Indeed, Cem argues that actual cooperation started two months before the earthquake: ‘Back in June 1999, we had already initiated, as two Ministers, a process of consultation and joint work on our bilateral issues, which was later expedited by the immense solidarity between our two peoples during the tragic earthquakes of last summer.'(5) Papandreou traces the cooperation back to the Kosovo operation in which both countries were involved as NATO allies: ‘For the first time, Turkish military planes flew over Greece carrying humanitarian aid to Kosovo.’ He states that after the war Greek and Turkish foreign ministers decided to cooperate in many areas such as tourism, environment, culture and education. He adds that the earthquakes and the Helsinki Summit improved this cooperative process.(6)
Just before the earthquakes, in May-June 1999, Cem and Papandreou exchanged a series of letters that included proposals for improving bilateral relations by cooperating in various fields. These letters showed that a key element in the change was a revision in the Greek perception of Turkey. Papandreou wrote, ‘Both Greece and Turkey have rich cultural traditions. Building a multicultural Europe means that we need to enhance our cultural identities and understand each other’s specificity.'(7) This type of statement is in sharp contrast with the view of his predecessor, Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, in 1997: ‘We have nothing to do with Turkey. A man can’t discuss things with murderers, rapists and thieves.'(8)
Other actions before the earthquakes also indicated the changing atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations: the 1997 Madrid Declaration to establish mutual respect for sovereignty rights, the decision to create a Southeastern European Brigade (SEEBRIG) for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans in 1998, and military cooperation during NATO’s Kosovo operation in 1999.
Clearly, then, a deeper process was at work pushing the two countries and their relationship in a new direction. The sources of this change lay in the wider changes transforming European and global politics: the end of the Cold War and the need to respond to the new political realities that emerged as a result.
The End of the Cold War and Strategic Disorientation in Foreign Policy
For both Greece and Turkey, the end of the Cold War, and especially the disintegration of Yugoslavia, meant the collapse of a secure regional environment. It is impossible to define an international structure just in materialistic terms.(9) Not only for Turkey and Greece, but for all the actors involved, the Cold War provided a structure interwoven with common meanings, experiences, and understandings which helped make sense of the world around them and define their identities and interests accordingly. This structure’s collapse deprived many actors on the world scene of this conceptual framework, producing a sense of disorientation.
Many foreign policy analysts have emphasized the difficulties of foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War era. As Van Coufadakis puts it, ‘During the Cold War, the Soviet threat provided a convenient heuristic device to explain events, to assess emerging threats, and to formulate foreign and defense policies, even though many times such simplistic explanations only distorted interpretation of events. The post-Cold War era created great uncertainty as to the role of states and their institutions.'(10)
This sense of loss led to many fluctuations in foreign policy, and these fluctuations were all part of a new social learning process in Greek-Turkish relations. The main problem for Greece and Turkey in the post-Cold War era has been ‘a strong amount of lag in adjusting self-definition to current circumstances,’ or ‘a rear-view mirror self-perception.'(11) The world was in constant flux, and the actors on stage lacked the necessary tools to redefine their roles.
Both Greece and Turkey were going through a very difficult period of readjustment, and in this process both of them felt themselves isolated by their Western partners. In Greece, the Balkan crisis led to an increase in the feeling of insecurity by adding a new element to the old threat from the east (i.e., Turkey). As Loukas Tsoulakis argues, Greece’s European partners mostly remained indifferent to her concerns and fears. When Greece was “chastised by paternalistic Europeans for not behaving like civilized Scandinavians in the Balkans [this experience] confirmed to Greeks the profound ignorance of their partners of the history and the realities of the region.'(12)
Turkey went through a similar feeling of isolation with the end of the Cold War, and many people started to think that she had lost her strategic significance for the NATO alliance.(13) Furthermore, her uneasy relationship with the European Union led to the feeling that she was also marginalized in the European continent. This sense of isolation reached a climax especially after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit where the European countries excluded her from the list of prospective candidates for EU membership. Ziya Onis describes the result of the summit as ‘a generalized sense of isolationism, not present at any other stage in Turkish history during the post-World War II.'(14)
Overcoming the feeling of insecurity and sense of isolationism required a very difficult process of ‘social learning’ for Turkey and Greece during which a struggle between competing concepts of national security and interests emerged. At first, war in the Balkans led to the rise of a strongly nationalist approach in Greek political culture and an extension of the political influence of the Church.(15)
Similarly, Turkey’s frustration in its relations with Europe led to a quest for different methods of self-assertion. One of these proposed strategies was that of creating a ‘Turkish world extending from Adriatic to China.'(16) As Kostas Ifantis makes clear, this claim had a profound influence on Greek perceptions of the Turkish threat: ‘For the first time in Turkey’s post-Ottoman history, the country’s foreign policy elites attempted to revise the traditional Ataturkist precepts regarding the dangers of international activism… With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and turmoil in the Balkans, Ankara was poised to play a leading role across a vast region, from Eastern Europe to Western China.'(17) These types of neo-Ottomanist or neo-imperial claims calling for the extension of Turkish power over a wider region had negative effects on Greek-Turkish relations since they led to an increase in Greek sense of insecurity. Many of the Greek policymakers considered these types of Turkish claims a proof of Turkish expansionism or irredentism, and this inevitably led to an increase in the Greek perceptions of threat and insecurity.
The fluctuations in foreign policies of both countries indicate an uncertainty in strategic orientation that was a natural result of the post-Cold War international environment. For both countries, the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996 marks the culmination of this strategic disorientation. It is not easy to understand this crisis in materialistic terms. For many outsiders, it was a crisis over two tiny, barren islets inhabited only by goats. Indeed the challenge that this crisis posed for those who prefer to explain international relations in materialistic terms finds one of its most interesting expressions in the words of the U.S. National Security Council spokesman David Johnson: ‘Sovereignty prompts people to do strange things.'(18)
The Imia-Kardak crisis was an epitome of what Alexander Wendt calls the ‘social construction of power politics'(19). This crisis cannot be understood without its social context. First, the historical reservoir of negative images, prejudices and stereotypes about the ‘Other’ is very critical in the emergence and escalation of the crisis. This is one of the main points in constructivist analysis of international relations, which puts a special emphasis on the social context of state behavior. In his analysis of the Suez crisis, Paul Kowert argues that the crisis occurred not because of ‘what’ it involved, but rather because of ‘who’ it involved: ‘Just as people are not highly suspicious of every other person they encounter, so states are not equally threatened by (or suspicious of) every other state they ‘encounter’ ‘(20)
Similarly, it is necessary to understand that Greece and Turkey are two countries which achieved their sovereignty as a result of the wars of liberation they fought against each other. The collective memory in both Greece and Turkey is continuously nourished by reminders of past enmity in history textbooks and the media. These factors explain how a little island can turn into an issue of sovereignty bringing them to the verge of war.(21)
Second, it is important to consider the domestic context in explaining the Imia-Kardak incident since the crisis coincided with domestic turbulence in both countries and a concern as to how the Western powers perceived this situation. The end of the era in which Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (father of the current foreign minister) dominated Greece led to growing concerns in the West about the country’s political stability. Turkey was subject to similar concerns among Western partners due to the rise of Islamist politics, defined as one of the major threats to national security following the Welfare party’s electoral victory in December 1995.
In this context, the Imia-Kardak crisis can be seen partly as an effort by these two countries to disprove any domestic or Western perception that they were uncertain, unstable and weak at home or abroad. It is possible to argue that the failure of this attempt of reassertion was one of the strongest motives behind the ‘critical rethinking’ in Greek and Turkish foreign policies.
Some have argued that the Imia-Kardak crisis strengthened negative perceptions and hostile feelings in both Greece and Turkey, thus bringing an increase in the security dilemma.(22) It is possible to agree with this argument since the Imia-Kardak crisis had a negative influence on Greek-Turkish relations, even prompting talk of a civilizational clash on both sides of the Aegean: Greece portrayed Turkey as ‘barbarian,’ ‘uncivilized,’ and ‘Asiatic.’ Turkey, on the other hand, argued that Greece was the ‘spoilt child of the West.'(23) However, it is also possible to argue that the Imia-Kardak crisis created the first motives toward a rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations. In other words, the crisis can be considered as a ‘blessing in disguise’ since it generated strong pressure from the United States and the European Union, especially on Athens, to reach an understanding with Ankara, and compelled Simitis’ government to abandon Greece’s long-held policy of ‘no talks with Turkey.'(24)
Ironically, then, this crisis, with its influence on the initiation of a dialogue between two countries, marks not only the culmination of a conflict but also the first steps towards overcoming the obstacles in the way of cooperation and positive identification. It is also important to note that the Imia-Kardak crisis resulted in an increase in the ‘civic diplomacy’ or ‘second-track diplomacy’ which is usually associated with the earthquakes.(25)
The Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996 was not the only crisis that left a deep impact on the Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era. Two other significant crises were over the S-300 missiles and regarding the Turkish capture of the Kurdish insurgent leader Abdullah Ocalan.
The S-300 crisis erupted after Athens stationed anti-aircraft missiles in Cyprus to safeguard the aerial corridor from Greece to Cyprus. Turkish perception of these missiles as offensive weapons ushered in another stressful period in Greek-Turkish relations. As in the Imia-Kardak crisis, however, these problems were soon overcome after Greece removed the missiles from Cyprus and stationed them in Crete. This act, which was criticized as a concession by some circles in Greece, was clearly related with a redefinition of Greek interests and identity in line with the European collective identity under EU. As Amikam Nachmani argues, the positive reaction in Turkey to the Greek decision to remove the weapons from Cyprus was another early sign of the changing Greek-Turkish relations.(26)
Another crisis in Greek-Turkish relations broke out after the February 1999 capture of Abdullah Ocalan, head of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which had staged a long, bloody war against Turkey. It became clear that Ocalan had received material assistance and a safe haven from some official circles in Greece. Turkey accused Greece of giving support to terrorism, and Greece’s government also faced severe domestic criticism. Many expected Greek-Turkish relations to sour following the Ocalan affair but, similar to the previous crises, this problem also led to the emergence of new possibilities in Greek-Turkish relations.
The crisis led to the dismissal of three Greek cabinet members: Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, Interior Minister Alekos Papadopoulos, and Public Order Minister Philipos Petsalnikos. The reshuffling of the cabinet, and especially the dismissal of Pangalos, known for his uncompromising stance against Turkey, were other indicators of significant changes in Greek politics.(27) The elimination of the hardliners gave a strong hand to the moderates within the ruling PASOK party who favored rethinking Greek-Turkish relations and avoiding other crises in order to ensure Greece’s further integration with EU.
Critical Rethinking in Foreign Policy
As the brief discussion of three crises in Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era clearly reveals, there are significant changes in foreign policy practices in both countries, especially Greece. These practices, though in some cases clearly results of external pressures, imply some further changes regarding how Greece and Turkey perceive and define themselves and each other. Thus, in both countries, it is possible to observe the initial stages of a process of ‘critical rethinking’ in foreign policy which resulted in an intentional transformation of interests, roles and identities.(28)
Wendt argues that there are two preconditions for critical strategic thinking to take place: Firstly, there must be a reason to think of oneself in new terms. Secondly, the sanctions of rethinking must not be greater than its rewards. After claiming that the actors engage in self-reflection in case these conditions are present, he analyzes Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of ‘New Thinking’ as an example of this process. The analysis below aims to provide an explanation of the change in Greek-Turkish relations by referring to the preconditions and stages of transformative self-reflection outlined by Wendt.
In Greek-Turkish relations, the end of the Cold War provided a new structural context necessitating a redefinition of roles and identities. The most important reward of this rethinking was a secure regional environment, which is vital in a world of constant flux. A culture of cooperation formed on the basis of mutual trust and interests was apparently less threatening for security than a culture of conflict. Furthermore, it became clear that one’s own security depended on the security of the other.
According to Wendt, the first stage in the transformation of roles and interests through critical self-reflection is the breakdown of consensus about identity commitments.(29) In the case of Greece and Turkey, the identity commitments are centered on the belief that the nation is encircled by enemies. Since the establishment of Turkish Republic, Turkish foreign policy has been defined by what has been called the ‘Sevres Syndrome,’ a sense of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state.(30) This has led to a feeling of suspicion, especially toward neighboring countries.
A similar feeling of ‘encirclement’ can be seen in Greece. As Tsoulakis argues, ‘the image which most Greeks have of their country is that of a fort being surrounded by real and potential enemies'(31). This kind of a ‘siege mentality’ fueling mistrust has pervaded foreign policymaking in both countries for many years, and negatively influenced their bilateral relations by imprisoning both in a security dilemma(32).
The end of the Cold War and disintegration of Yugoslavia left Turkey and Greece with two options: They would either stay committed to an identity based on a sense of encirclement and try to survive the post-Cold War turbulence on their own, or they would cooperate to establish a security regime inconceivable without their mutual participation. Without a change in foreign policymaking in both countries alongside a reconceptualization of national identity, the second option would not be feasible.
In the post-Cold War era, both countries witnessed changes in the domestic scene. In Greece, the restructuring of the PASOK party under the leadership of Costas Simitis led to a transformation of foreign policymaking, also influenced by the European Union.(33) In Turkey, though the change was not less dramatic, the Cold War’s end led to a weakened consensus in foreign policymaking, making possible the emergence of alternative interpretations of national interest, identity, and threat.(34)
Apart from the role of the changing domestic actors, significant events in the international arena showed it would be harder to survive with the old conceptions of foreign policymaking. The Kosovo crisis was critical in pushing the leaders toward regional cooperation and clearly marked a shift away from traditional patterns of foreign policy, especially in Greece. NATO’s Kosovo operation had a tremendous influence on Greek-Turkish relations, providing the two countries with a common goal.
As George Papandreou puts it, ‘The harrowing war in Kosovo brought home to the Greek people the importance and necessity of good, neighborly relations. Fear and suspicion have long since given way to a policy of regional cooperation, based on mutual understanding and common interests…. Greece has made an effort to take the lead in promoting stability, cooperation, and democracy in the Balkans. Given this basic, but determined, foreign policy outlook, it would have been incongruous to exclude Turkey.'(35)
All of these factors do not necessarily mean an inevitable and permanent Greek-Turkish detente. The breakdown of internal consensus on traditional views and policies is part of an ongoing power struggle in both countries and the direction of Greek-Turkish relations is also dependent on the outcomes of these domestic debates and political battles.(36) In both countries, there are powerful actors and institutions still committed to a ‘siege mentality,’ and the view of ‘national identity’ under threat.
Breakdown of consensus, however, did make the second stage of critical examination of old ideas about Self and Other possible. As Wendt maintains, this is a process of critical self-examination rather than ‘problem-solving.'(37) Turkey and Greece are going through this process of demystifying what has been taken to be ‘natural’–i.e., being ‘historical enemies’ forever. At this point the role of the earthquakes on Greek-Turkish relations becomes significant: Without the earthquakes, it would be impossible to think of a general public approval of a modernization and reform at the elite level.
The role of domestic constituencies in foreign policymaking is as significant in this case as are the international factors. While formulating their foreign policy strategies, governments take into consideration the demands of various interest groups in domestic politics.(38) After the earthquakes, the Greek and Turkish governments were active and innovative in working to legitimize their foreign policy practices in the eyes of their domestic constituencies through a very successful mobilization of the public.(39)
This process included not only a public legitimization of a new policy course but also a process of demystifying the ‘enemy.’ The post-quake media shows how this ‘demystification’ process took place on the popular level. The mutual empathy expressed in the Greek and Turkish media following the earthquake in Turkey were the first signs of emerging common bonds between the two peoples. A Greek newspaper cried, ‘We are all Turks’ in its issue following the earthquake in Turkey,(40) and a Turkish newspaper responded in Greek: ‘Efharisto Poli, File’/’Thank You, Neighbor.'(41)
Furthermore, journalists directly contradicted the view of an inevitable ‘centuries’ old enmity’ in their writings on these events. Just after the earthquake in Turkey, Greek journalists criticized the policies of their government:
When we saw the corpses of Turkish mothers and babies, our eyes were filled with tears. Maybe these same mothers would be crying over their children after a possible Greek-Turkish conflict…. We have been spending millions of drachmas for armament, and now we feel something that we never felt before…. The pains of these people left a sour taste in us and there was a lump in our throats. As we see the victims of the earthquake in the neighboring country, we feel as if this lump will strangle us.(42)
Turkish journalists shared the same empathetic tone: ‘You Nicos, with the helping hand you provided, not only saved our daughters and sons, but also took away a century-old prejudice from our lands…. We are just like two brothers who have found each other after so many years….We were bloody enemies just a few days ago; and we have became blood brothers after the earthquake.'(43)
Although some people are suspicious of this process because of still unresolved problems, it may be that only after an extensive period of critical self-examination and demystification of the ‘historical enemy’ will it be possible to think of solutions acceptable for both parties. In short, the ‘problem-solving’ process cannot start before this critical process which is significant in terms of building mutual trust.
The third step in the transformation of state identities is ‘altercasting‘ in which one of the actors tries to induce the other to take on a new identity by treating the other as if it already had that identity.(44) This seems to be the strategy followed by Greece at the Helsinki Summit, apparently concluding that changing its own practices by dropping its veto of Turkey’s EU candidacy, and giving a full support to Turkey’s future membership would change how Turkey was conceiving herself.
This strategy represented a significant shift from classical Greek policy. As George Papandreou states, ‘Helsinki was…a culmination of the new phase in Greek foreign policy. What instigated this fundamental change in our foreign policy? Three major elements can be credited: political forces engulfing the region in the post-Cold War period, new realities of the ‘globalized’ world, and a reevaluation of Greece’s national interests.'(45) It can be argued that Greece, after a critical self-examination, perceived that it is not in her interests to define Turkey in alienating, hostile terms such as ‘Asiatic,’ ‘barbarian,’ and ‘uncivilized.’ Thus, she has come to the realization that her security and interests lie not in a ‘clash of civilizations’ with Turkey, but rather in entering into a dialogue with a ‘European Turkey.’ In Papandreou’s words, ‘It is in Greece’s interests–more than any other member of the EU–that Turkey moves closer to Europe. Turkey’s approach to Europe will be an important factor in the creation of a climate of cooperation, which is an essential pre-condition if we hope to solve the differences between us.'(46)
PASOK’s electoral victory in April 2000 confirmed this new policy’s continuity with the re-election of Prime Minister Kostas Simitis and Foreign Minister George Papandreou. However, the election campaigns also showed there was no sharp difference between PASOK and its main rival, the New Democracy (NDP). Just before the elections, Kostas Karamanlis, the NDP leader, stated that he favored good neighborly relations with Turkey, and added that he supports Turkey’s integration with EU.(47) Thus, even an NDP victory would not necessarily bring a dramatic change in Greece’s new definition of Turkey as a neighbor whose EU integration would benefit Greece. Further, neither PASOK nor NDP used ‘hate speech’ against Turkey as part of their electoral campaigns, in contrast to past practices.
The fourth stage in the intentional transformation of roles and interests is the degree of reciprocation by the other side. Unilateral initiatives or self-binding commitments must be rewarded in order to institutionalize norms of positive identification.(48) This seems to be the most difficult stage of the transformative process in Greek-Turkish relations. Greece is expecting some concessions from Turkey in response to her removing the veto at the Helsinki Summit. In the summer of 2000, Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos stated that ‘there is no prospect for Turkey’s accession to the European Union if [it] does not contribute and make concessions on Cyprus.'(49) Papandreou reminded everyone that the Cyprus issue is a problem Turkey is obliged to face as a result of being officially named a candidate country seeking entry into the EU.(50)
Turkey’s ‘Accession Partnership’ with the European Union once more showed that Turkey’s membership is significantly interrelated with the resolution of the border disputes in the Aegean and promoting solutions of the Cyprus issue.(51) Turkey was expected to finalize her National Program on the basis of the Accession Partnership Document by January 2001. By the end of January, though, it became obvious that there will be a delay in Turkey’s submission of her National Program to the European Union. This document is expected to outline various reforms that could be the most radical changes in Turkish politics since the reforms in the early Republican era.(52)
Due to the significance attached to the document, a very intense debate has been going on among the major political actors and institutions of Turkey. The Turkish military opposes some of the proposed reforms–such as broadcasting and education in Kurdish–as threatening the territorial integrity of the Turkish state.(53) There are also differences of opinion among leaders of the coalition government, which delayed completion of the National Program. It is very possible that Turkey’s National Program will fall short of EU expectations given domestic concerns about accepting some elements in the EU’s political criteria, including broadcasting and education in Kurdish, abolition of the death penalty, and a change in the status of the National Security Council to reduce military involvement in politics.(54) Further, Turkey wants to complete the document’s final version only after ratification of the Framework Agreement postponed by the European Union to protest the handling of prison riots by Turkey.(55)
Moreover, it is also likely that the National Program will fall short of EU expectations regarding the Aegean and Cyprus problems. To avoid any commitments, Turkey will include these issues under the proposals’ section and not as political criteria.(56) This lack of commitment certainly falls short of Greece’s expectations for Turkish reciprocation to Athens’ removal of its veto at the Helsinki summit. This problem could challenge a thorough, successful transformation of Greek-Turkish relations toward greater rapprochement on the basis of institutionalized norms of cooperation. This lack of institutionalization could counter the factors that have promoted major changes. In this case, instead of entering a new era, Greek-Turkish relations could shift between crisis and rapprochement in the pattern that has long existed.
1. An earlier version of this paper, entitled ‘Critical Rethinking in Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,’ was presented at the Halki International Seminars 2000, Session 00.2 on ‘The Mediterranean & the Middle East: Looking Ahead’ (September 13-18, 2000, Halki-Greece). The paper is part of a research project sponsored by Bogazici University Research Fund and supervised by Prof. Kemal Kirisci (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bogazici University).
2. George Papandreou, ‘Inaugural Speech at the University of Istanbul,’ October 3, 1999. <http://www.mfa.gr./gpap/october99/Istanbul_University_speech_31099.html>
3. George Papandreou, ‘Working Together: Why Greece Supports Turkey’s European Future.’ <http://www.greece.org/POLITICS/EuropeanUnion/GapGreekTurkishOpEd.stm>
4. ‘Speech Delivered by FM Ismail Cem at the East-West Institute On the Occasion of Presentation of ‘The Statesman of the Year’ Award,’ May 2, 2000. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/bi/05.htm>.
6. Interview with George Papandreou, ‘Resolving Old Enmities,’ Newsweek, Newsweek International, February 21, 2000.
7. ‘Letter from Mr. George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to Mr. Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey,’ June 25, 1999. <http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu_c2.htm>.
8. Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin, September 27, 1997.
9. For a ‘social’ conceptualization of structure and a discussion of four ‘sociologies’ of structure, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 20; pp. 22-29.
10. Van Coufadakis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges,’ Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1996), p. 41.
11. Theodore A. Couloumbis and Thenos Veremis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the 21st Cntury,’ 2000. <http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/International/ForeignPolicy21stCentury.stm>.
12. Loukas Tsoulakis, ‘Is Greece an Awkward Partner?’ in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds), Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 28.
13. See Kemal Kirisci, ‘Turkey and the Mediterranean,’ in Stelios Stavridis, Theodore Couloumbis, and Thanos Veremis (eds), The Foreign Policies of the Euroepan Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s (London: MacMillan Press, 1999), pp. 280-281.
14. Ziya Onis, ‘Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization,’ Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 10 , No. 3 (Summer 1999), p. 125.
15. James Pettifer, ‘Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy,’ in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds), Greece in a Changing Europe, p. 21.
16. Kirisci, ‘Turkey and the Mediterranean,’ p. 265.
17. Kostas Ifantis, ‘Greece and the USA after the Cold War,’ in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds), Greece in a Changing Europe, p. 154.
18. ‘Brinkmen on the Rocks: Greece and Turkey Stop Just Short of War Over a Pair of Stony Outcroppings in the Wine-Dark Sea,’ Time International, February 12, 1996, Vol. 147, No. 7.
19. Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: social construction of power politics.’ International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), 391-425.
20. Paul Kowert, ‘Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National Identity,’ in Vendulka Kubakova Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds), International Relations in a Constructed World (New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 108. In his analysis of the social construction of anarchy, Alexander Wendt puts forward a similar argument: ‘People act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.’ See Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it,’ pp. 396-7.
21. Herkul Millas has extensively studied the role of historical perceptions and prejudices in Greek-Turkish relations; for a collection of essays on this topic, see Herkul Millas, Turk-Yunan Iliskilerine Bir Onsoz: Tencere Dibin Kara (Istanbul: Kavram, 1995).
22. See Gulden S. Ayman, ‘Kardak Krizinin Turk-Yunan Iliskilerine Etkisi,’ Foreign Policy (Yaz 1998), pp. 111-119.
23. For a critical analysis of the ‘hate speech’ used during the Imia-Kardak crisis, see Mariana Lenkova (ed.), ‘Hate Speech’ in the Balkans (Vienne: The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1998).
24. Ekavi Athenassopoulou, ‘Blessing in Disguise? The Imia-Kardak Crisis and Greek-Turkish Relations,’ Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1997), p. 97.
25. Especially the economic interest groups in both countries acted in opposition to the official line followed by their governments. After mentioning that the Greek and Turkish tourist operators signed a ‘protocol of cooperation’ following the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996, Ioakimidis makes the following conclusion: ‘Never in the past had Greek economic interests been so openly at odds with the official policy pursued by the country over such a sensitive area (Greek-Turkish relations).’ See P.C. Ioakimidis, ‘The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions,’ in Stelios Stavridis, Theodore Couloumbis, and Thanos Veremis (eds), The Foreign Policies of the Euroepan Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s, p. 157.
26. See Amikam Nachmani, ‘What Says the Neighbor to the West: Turkish-Greek Relations,’ in Kemal Kirisci and Barry Rubin (eds.), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multi-Regional Power (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).
27. For a brief analysis of the positive effects of Ocalan crisis, see S. Gulden Ayman, ‘Springtime in the Aegean,’ Privateview, Spring 2000, pp. 56-60. <http://www.tusiad-us.org/documents/Springtime.pdf>.
28. For a definition of the term, see Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it,’ pp. 418-422.
29. Ibid., p. 420.
30. For a further definition of ‘Sevres Syndrome,’ see Kirisci, ‘Turkey and the Mediterranean,’ 258-9.
31. Tsoulakis, ‘Is Greece an Awkward Partner?’, p. 26.
32. For a further analysis of the ‘siege mentality’ in Greek foreign policy, see P.C. Ioakimidis, ‘The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece,’ p. 148.
33. For a critical analysis of modernization in Greek foreign policy, see Alexander Kazamias, ‘The Quest for Modernization in Greek Foreign Policy and Its Limitations,’ Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Autumn 1997), pp. 71-94. For an excellent study on the traditional model of foreign policy-making in Greece and the challenges to this established model, see Ioakimidis, ‘The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece.’
34. For the breakdown of consensus in Turkish foreign policymaking and the positive effects of interest groups especially on Greek-Turkish relations, see Kirisci, ‘Turkey and the Mediterranean,’ pp. 260-262.
35. George Papandreou, ‘Revision in Greek Foreign Policy,’ Western Policy Center, January 2000. <http://www.papandreou.gr/february2000/wpc_jan2000.html>.
36. Here it is especially significant to consider the role of military in Turkish politics; see Gencer Ozcan, ‘The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey,’ in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multi-Regional Power (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).
37. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it,’ p. 420.
38. For a seminal work on the role of domestic constituencies in foreign policymaking and international negotiations as a two-level game, see Robert Putnam. ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.’ International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460.
39. In his analysis of Greek foreign-policy making, Kazamias argues that the most significant limitation of Simitis’s modernization efforts is his elitist and exclusive attitude: Due to the lack of domestic support, most of the time Simitis feels the need to appease the nationalists within PASOK and Greece by a nationalist rhetoric that targets Turkey. Kazamias concludes that unless Simitis gathers domestic support for his modernization efforts, it is impossible to think of more imaginative approaches for Greek-Turkish relations (Kazamias, ‘The Quest for Modernization in Greek Foreign Policy and Its Limitations,’ p. 91). It is possible to argue that through a mobilization of public support following the earthquakes, it became possible to overcome the problem of elitism and legitimize the alternative projects of foreign policy.
40. Ta Nea, August 20, 1999. Quoted in Dis Basinda Deprem Felaketi (Ankara: T.C. Basbakanlik Basin-Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel Mudurlugu, 1999), p. 797.
41. Hurriyet, August 21, 1999.
42. Anna Stergiou, Eleftherotypia, August 19, 1999. Quoted in Dis Basinda Deprem Felaketi pp. 792-3.
43. Can Dundar, Sabah, August 30, 1999.
44. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it,’ p. 421.
45. George Papandreou, ‘Revision in Greek Foreign Policy,’ Western Policy Center, January 2000. <http://www.papandreou.gr/february2000/wpc_jan2000.html>
46. George Papandreou, ‘Statements following a meeting with representatives of Greek NGOs who offered humanitarian aid to Turkey after the earthquake,’ 03.09.1999. <http://www.mfa.gr/gpap/september99/ngoturkey_e3999.html>
47. Milliyet, April 10, 2000.
48. See Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it,’ p. 422.
49. Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin, August 2, 2000.
50. Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin, September 4, 2000.
51. The Draft Document of the Accession Partnership for Turkey was made public on November 8, 2000 by the European Commission. In line with the Helsinki conclusions, the Accession Partnership emphasizes that Turkey as a candidate state should ‘make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues,’ and in case these efforts fail, the dispute should be brought to the International Court of Justice within a reasonable time. The European Council aims to settle the dispute at the latest by the end of 2004. Regarding Cyprus, the Accession Partnership ‘encourages Turkey, together with all parties, to continue to support the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring the process, aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, to a successful conclusion.’ For the draft document of the Turkish Accession Partnership, see Turkish Foreign Ministry’s website: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/EU/explanatory.htm>.
52. Radikal, January 16, 2001.
53. The Office of the Chief of the General Staff issued a statement arguing that broadcasting in one’s mother language, a cultural right promoted by the European Union for the minorities, is a part of PKK terror, and that some European countries are giving support to PKK. This statement is interesting because of its timing since it coincides with the EU Summit in Nice in December 2000, attended by the Prime Minister Ecevit and the Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. This once more shows the clash of opinions in domestic politics and the military intervention in Turkish politics. This power struggle between various actors will significantly influence the content of the National Program, and consequently the relations of Turkey with the EU and Greece. For the statement made by the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, see the Turkish dailies on December 8, 2000.
54. Turkish daily Radikal described the draft program as a ‘lame program’ (January 16, 2001) and ‘a program without criteria’ due to the lack of any commitments to the EU’s political criteria (January 17, 2001).
55. Radikal, January 17, 2001.
56. Ibid., January 16, 2001.
*Ayten Gundogdu is writing her thesis, “Redefining the National Interest: Post-Cold War Dynamics of Change in Greek-Turkish Relations,” at Bogazici University (Istanbul).