For 25 years, Egyptian-Israeli relations have often been characterized by tension. Today, their frosty relationship not only reflects past chapters but also competitive outlooks on how Middle East nations and peoples might relate to one another.
Their peace has survived misperceptions, regional and international political changes, and unanticipated governmental upheavals. Neither seeks a major confrontation with the other. Each believes the other has not done enough to stimulate improved understanding or agreement between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Both are firmly committed to avoid any friction which would threaten continued U.S. aid.
For Egypt, Israel has moved too slowly to return all the territories captured in the 1967 war. For Israel, Egypt has been too slow to improve relations and has discouraged other Arab states from doing so. Themes from this relationship’s history illuminate potential ArabIsraeli relations in nonwar environments.
Sadat’s aim was peace with the United States and nonbelligerency with Israel, a policy he persued before and after the 1973 war, and through the Camp David negotiations. In a sense, this contiuing gap between a full, formal peace treaty and the day-to-day reality of nonbelligerency is Sadat’s legacy.
Israel, wanting to remove Egypt from any future ArabIsraeli conflict, insisted on a commitment that this agreement had priority over previous military alliances with Arab states. Having given up significant defense assets: the Sinai’s strategic depth and the oilfields and military facilities there, Israelis wanted to believe that a real change in the situation and peace with other Arab states would result.
In the Camp David Accords framework for dealing with the Palestinians, both sides agreed to disagree. The Egyptians wanted “linkage” between the bilateral treaty and progress toward Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. Begin rejected the concept of linkage. The two sides both mistrusted each other and interpreted differently what needed to be done and what was promised at Camp David. Initial optimism gave way to disputes over the timing of Israeli withdrawals and establishment of diplomatic relations, U.S. commitments to both sides, Israel’s demand for guaranteed oil supplies and Egypt’s for a timetable to end Israel’s military government in the West Bank and Gaza.
But despite the fact that the Arab world ostracized them for much of the 1980s, Egypt and Egyptians still saw themselves as integral, even central, element of the Arab world. From Egypt’s standpoint, there was no contradiction between escaping the costly military conflict while still seeking total Israeli withdrawal from all the territories taken in the June 1967 War, a comprehensive political settlement, and an independent Palestinian state. As great a breakthrough as the Camp David agreements were, in the short- to medium run they changed neither the objectives nor perceptions of the two parties.
Even before Sadat’s assassination in October 1981, a cold peace prevailed. Egypt’s press depicted Jews as immoral, hypocritical, unreliable, unmanly, intransigent, insecure, greedy, illintentioned, and chronically suspicious. Israeli appeals to stop such articles were ignored.  When Israel invaded Lebanon in March 1978, the Egyptian daily Akhbar alYawm called this a “Hitlerite military adventure.” AlJumhuriyah described the move as “part of the Zionist plot to annihilate the Palestinian people.” 
Almost no tourism, academic or cultural exchanges from Egypt to Israel and few commercial deals materialized. Egyptian professional associations and the trade union formally boycotted Israel. Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Hasan alTuhami called Jews, “treacherous and hypocritical,” said they were rightly “labeled as such in history books and that Israel was a shibh dawla (quasistate) doomed to disappear.”
The difficult, unsatisfactory autonomy talks in 1979 and 1980 added to the tension. Each act of violence between Palestinians and Israelis became a reason to suspend or stop autonomy talks. Israeli actions like building Jewish settlements, changing laws, or deporting Palestinians, renewed Egyptian beliefs that Israel was uninterested in comprehensive peace. In March 1980, an Israeli newspaper reported that Egypt’s Foreign Ministry had instructed officials to keep cooperation with Israel to a minimum.  A 1980 Israeli Foreign Ministry report analyzing the normalization process said there was. “An Egyptian tendency, particularly at the subpresidential level, [to] deliberately slow down progress and the rate of normalization.”
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE NORM OF DISTRUSTFUL RELATIONS
Israel and Egypt certainly believed the other would not go to war but broader issues were unresolved. Israel was withdrawing from captured Egyptian territory while Egypt was maintaining diplomatic relations. But Egypt saw this as a step toward comprehensive peace and wanted to escape from the Arab boycott against itself. Israel hoped for full normalization as quickly as possible.
Initially, in the fall and winter of 1980, a series of exchange visits of high-ranking officials served Sadat’s purpose in showing that the agreement was working. Israel was still to fulfill it obligation to withdraw from all of Sinai by April 1981.
Friction arose from several bilateral disputes, including the ownership of Tabah, a tiny border area; Egypt’s treatment of Israeli nationals on its soil; and Egyptian characterization of Israel’s prime minister, Israelis, Zionists, and Jews. Israeli citizens and diplomats were repeatedly attacked in Egypt. In 1985, an Israeli diplomat was killed in Cairo and an Egyptian soldier who killed five Israeli tourists was hailed by some in the Egyptian press as a national hero. In 1986 Israeli diplomats were attacked as they left the International Book Fair, and in February 1990, nine Israeli tourists are killed and 21 wounded in Sinai when masked men attacked an Israeli tourist bus.
Despite such issues, however, a series of regional crises–any one of which might have made Cairo stop adhering to the treaty–left the new arrangements unshaken. President Husni Mubarak’s priority was to handle Egypt’s serious economic and infrastructure needs. Preparing or waging war on Israel would have drained Egypt to the point of collapse. Consequently, Israeli actions against other Arab states and management of the Palestinian issue fueled Egyptian domestic opposition to the treaty and reinforced negative attitudes, but did not change the bilateral relationship.
These issues included:
1. The failure of Palestinian autonomy talks.
2. Israel’s June 1981 bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor.
3. Implementation of Israeli law on the Golan Heights in December 1981.
4. Israel’s June 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the September 1982 Sabra and Shatilla Palestinian refugee camp massacres.
5. Israel’s sustained presence in south Lebanon
6. Continued growth and expansion of Jewish settlements.
7. The October 1985 bombing of PLO Headquarters in Tunis.
8. Israel’s administration of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
9. The outbreak and Israel’s management of the Palestinian intifada after December 1987.
10. Soviet Jewish immigration, 1988-1991, seen as a threat to Palestinian demographic control of the West Bank.
11. The December 1992 deportation of Hamas activists to Lebanon.
12. The killing of Palestinians in the Hebron mosque in February 1993.
13. The September 1996 opening of a tunnel near the Western Wall in Jerusalem.
14. Delay in implementing the Hebron agreement in 1996.
By the late spring of 1981, especially after Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor three days after a BeginSadat summit, bilateral cultural, trade, tourist, and commercial relations were put into a deep freeze. Begin’s reelection as prime minister in June 1981, Sadat’s assassination in October, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, and the September 1982 massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps, all worked against developing a positive atmosphere in Egyptian-Israeli relations.
In addition, Egypt was determined to reverse the Arab states’ boycott against itself. Repeated Arab world condemnation of its policy influenced Egypt’s government to do the minimum in normalizing relations with Israel but also motivated it to prove the diplomatic process was the best way to regain Israeli-held territory and make progress on the Palestinian issue. Thus, during the 1980s and into the 1990s, Egypt’s government preserved the treaty with Israel while urging negotiations while also backing the Palestinian cause and opposing Israeli policies.
Mubarak defended his policy in this manner, asking in 1983, “Shall I return Sinai to Israel?…It means the declaration of a state of war with Israel. If I want to declare a state of war, it is imperative for me to be militarily prepared. In other words, I should halt development and the evolution of services….Who will foot the bill for war? The Arabs?…Suppose that we obtained the necessary funding from them….Who will give me arms to fight Israel?” These weapons would not be obtained from either the United States, Europe, or the Soviets. 
Addressing the connection between Egypt’s Arab commitments and relations with Israel, Mubarak said in 1987, “The peace treaty is not against the Palestine question….We did not and will not violate the [1950 Arab] Collective Defense Pact. We do not accept relinquishing one inch of land and will not negotiate over Palestine without the Palestinian people’s representatives. But if someone asks me to violate Egypt’s commitments and cancel the treaty, I will ask him to what use will this be to him and me? We are committed to peace and all the Arabs are committed to solving the issue peacefully.”
Progress on the Palestinian issue was linked to normalization. Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butros Ghali said in a 1986 interview, “Relations between Egypt and Israel would not reach a stage of full normalization, quantitatively and qualitatively unless a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East crisis materializes.”
The Egyptian media were allowed to express such sentiments in cruder, more inflammatory terms. In 1986, Israel was said to be “expansionist and intransigent in nature [and was] a menace to the entire region.” In criticizing Israeli Prime Minister Shamir personally, alAkhbar said, “His concept…indicates that riots, tension, and brutal acts of repression by Tel Aviv’s forces will continue.” A 1986 editorial in alJumhuriyah noted, “Actually the various parties in Israel do not differ on the objective. They want more territorial expansion and they want to expel the Arabs and slaughter them….They want the Arabs to be submissive sacrificial sheep without rights….If a Jew can do the work done by an Arab then the latter is dismissed or killed.”
After the Palestinian intifadah broke out in December 1987, the Egyptian media vilified Israel and her leaders, comparing them to Nazis as barbaric, murderous, and bloodthirsty. For example: “Those who planned to consolidate the Zionist entity on the land by deluding themselves that the Palestinian national personality would disappear through deportation and extermination, oppression and collective massacreall these methods, which are more horrible than those of the Nazis and Fasciststheir hopes collapsed in the face of Palestinian determination to lead a legitimate national struggle.” 
Egypt used Israel’s handling of the Palestinian uprising and worsened media image to support the Palestinians. Cairo indicted Israel for slowness in initiating IsraeliPalestinian talks. It did not, however, withdraw its ambassador from Tel Aviv (as it had done after Israel’s 1982 invasion into Lebanon) or stop meeting Israeli officials. But the flow of traffic was distinctly from Israel to Egypt. Egypt picked its Israeli interlocutors, and though meetings were held with Likud Party ministers, there was a distinct preference to meet Labor Party members or those leaning toward compromise with the Palestinians. Mubarak refused to meet Prime Minister Shamir, because he felt that would be “fruitless.”
From 1987 until after the October 1991 Madrid Peace, Conference, Egyptian sources leveled two distinct kinds of censure against Israel. Official government circles focused on the procedure, content, and possible outcomes of achieving a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. It was mild in tone, but firm in preference. The second came from the secular and Islamic Egyptian press. It was viciously rancorous, hurling attacks against Israel, Israelis, Zionists, and Jews.
Despite a very frosty relationship with the PLO in late 1989 and throughout 1990, Egypt did not diminish its commitment to Palestinian aspirations. Butros Ghali said in May 1991, “We have recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. We do not always agree with it, we disagreed with its support for Saddam Husayn during the Gulf crisis, but a role is reserved for the PLO.” Said Mubarak in July, “The dialogue with the Palestinians is continuing and does not stop, because the Palestinian issue is not the exclusive province of Arafat or anyone else. It is an issue of the whole people, and Egypt has worked from the outset to ensure that the Palestinian issue is the issue of a people and a state, not a question of refugees.”
But, as before, the Egyptian government also made clear the high value it put on maintaining peace with Israel, as Foreign Minister Amr Musa remarked in 1991, “Peace [with Israel] is no luxury, but a need.” Egyptian Presidential adviser, Usamah alBaz said, “Most Arabs and Israelis realize that their future security does not lie in the acquisition of sophisticated weapons…but only through mutual recognition and coexistence….What poses a threat is certain policy lines, and not Israel’s presence in the heart of the Arab world or the Arab presence around Israel.” Just before the Madrid Conference, alBaz said, “Talk about a final solution for the Palestinian problem has been postponed for the time being, because the Arab parties have accepted the principle of a gradual solution of the Palestinian issue.”
Skeptical Israeli analysts could conclude, as they have in 1997 from such remarks, that long-term Egyptian objectives were to use diplomacy to return Israel to the June 1967 borders and thereafter resolve the question of Palestine through Israel’s possible demise either territorially or demographically.
In interviews in April 1992, March 1994, and January 1995, however, Mubarak reiterated that pragmatism motivates Egypt’s relationship with Israel, that there is “no alternative to diplomacy in the new world order;” that “peace was made by Egypt, no one else” and that “we regret not implementing Camp David…today 75 per cent of the occupied territories are covered by settlements. We had them in our hands without settlements;” and that “if I cooperate strategically with Israel or anyone else, then it is because I have an interest.”
Meanwhile, the Egyptian press attacked Israeli leaders and particularly Shamir in the most severe antisemitic terms. AlMusawwar entitled an article, “ShamirHitler number two, must go away before his loathsome crimes finish his own people off.” A cartoon on the front cover of Ruz alYusuf portrayed Shamir in Nazi garb, decorated with both swastika and Star of David, raising his right arm in a Nazi salute and holding a club in his left. In the years before the Madrid Conference, President Mubarak, other leading Egyptian politicians, and the media constantly criticized Shamir for tardiness, procrastination, footdragging, and inflexibility for refusing to consider going to an international conference.
But such talk was also applied to bilateral relations. During 1991, Egypt’s media accused Israel of “trying to harm Egyptian tourism and agriculture, undermining Egypt by using counterfeit dollars and spreading drugs or AIDS, planning to deplete Egyptian water reserves, and using the Israel academic Center in Cairo for espionage purposes.”
With Saddam Hussein’s defeat in 1991, Egypt, having led in organizing the Arab part of the international coalition against Iraq, was back at the head of the Arab world. Egypt also felt it was on the road to vindication in having chosen diplomacy rather than war with Israel. In the months between the Gulf war and the Madrid peace conference, Egyptian officials laid out a plan for a comprehensive diplomatic solution to the ArabIsrael conflict. Arab capitals that had never before considered talking with Israel joined the process.
While condemnation of Israel from Egyptian sources continued, these were now more often Islamic groups which also criticized their own government over many issues and opposed the peace process generally. They argued that “Islam does not sanction peace with usurpers of Islamic lands and holy places…selling out the Palestine question… for the benefit of the Jews.” Lamenting the Arab race to legitimize relations with Israel, Dr. Ahmad alMalat, a Muslem Brotherhood official, said in April 1992, that “The sense of jihad is still very much alive in the heart of people who have opted for jihad until the Palestinian soil is liberated…. However, these mujahidin (strugglers) are now being accused of terrorism and extremism by Arafat, who wants to appease the Jews.”
Once Rabin replaced Shamir in June 1992, the level and rate of invective directed at Israel, at least from official government circles and the secular Egyptian press, subsided noticeably. A week after taking office, Rabin visited Cairo, the first meeting between Egypt’s president and Israel’s prime minister in six years; Mubarak promised a return visit to Israel, which came ironically at Rabin’s funeral in November 1995. A wave of Israeli politicians subsequently visited Egypt in 199293. Egyptian impatience turned to angry criticism when Rabin expelled over 400 Hamas activists in December 1992. Another wave of criticism came over Israel’s refusal to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 1995, Foreign Minister Musa took the lead role on this issue over a six-month period.
Israeli leaders were well aware of the dual nature of Egypt’s policy. On one hand, the peace had been maintained and had served as an example to other Arab states. In 1989, then Defense Minister Rabin remarked that Mubarak had “managed to prove to the Arab world specifically, but also to the entire world in general, that…Egypt can stand its own ground and attain a respectable place in the Arab and African world without giving up the peace agreement or the Israeli Embassy in Cairo and the fact that the Israeli flag flies over that city.”
On the other hand, though, normalization remained limited. As Defense Ministry Director-General David Ivri said in 1992, “The peace with Egypt is not peace, it is actually a ceasefire that has continued for 15 years; Mubarak has not created any Egyptian interest in Israel’s continued existence.” Defense Minister Moshe Arens repeated this statement, prompting Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa to reply that such statements “reflect stiffness of mind, disregard for ongoing world developments, and desire to abort the peace process as a whole.”
In 1991, Shamir had complained, “There is no normalization now. So many years after signing the peace treaty, there are no normal trade relations with Israel; there is no cultural cooperation; there is no Egyptian tourism to Israel. It is as if Israel and Egypt were not living in peace but were two absolute alien and estranged countries. This situation should come to and end.” Rabin, more understanding but no less critical, said just before his election as prime minister, “I am admittedly disappointed by the lack of satisfactory progress in normalizing ties between two countries at peace; however, I am also aware that the Egyptians have difficulties in promoting normalization before the peace process gathers momentum, especially in the IsraeliPalestinian sphere.”
Yet once the Oslo agreements were signed, Cairo shifted into higher gear in pressuring Israel to be more forthcoming faster with the Palestinians. Gladly, Egypt took up the role of simultaneously playing intermediary and the Palestinians’ main advocate, of sustaining peace with Israel while regularly criticizing Israeli slowness in making concessions to the Palestinians. In late 1994, Egypt hosted a summit with Syria and Saudi Arabia aimed at slowing normalization of relations between Israel and other Arab states. Said Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Bellin on this point, “They have mixed feelings.”
Especially vexing for Cairo was Benjamin Netanyahu’s election as Israel’s prime minister in May 1996. Gone was Egypt’s preferred partner in negotiations, the Labor Party. After the election, Cairo increasingly berated Israel for not yet withdrawing from Hebron and totally blamed the Netanyahu government for PalestinianIsrael violence flowing from the Hasmonean Tunnel’s opening in Jerusalem in September 1996. Cairo increasingly became the central axis influencing Arab attitudes and the pace of normalization with Israel. Just before the November 1996 Cairo economic conference, Mubarak linked the meeting’s convocation and level of Israel’s participation to the Israeli government’s conduct of negotiations. Prior to the conference, Egypt announced the arrest of two individuals accused of spying for Israel and the media expressed fear of an Israeli economic takeover of the Middle East. 
Assessing Egyptian policy toward Israel in November 1996, Ron BenYishay noted, “All the Israeli intelligence bodies are certain that the Egyptians are still committed to peace with Israel…because they wish to preserve strategic ties with the United States and the annual flow of billions of dollars from Washington…..Egyptian opposition leaders have been demanding that Israel be dwarfed to its natural size; today it is official policy.” In a typical reaction at the time to Egypt’s role in Israel-Palestinian negotiations over Hebron, Ma’ariv called on Israel’s government to “mark the negative role being played by Egypt in these talks,” accused Cairo of “sowing discord between Israel and the Palestinians,” called Cairo’s involvement in negotiations “arrogant interference” and said it was “unacceptable that every move in the peace process will be conditional on the approval of President Mubarak.” 
Yet at the same time, Egypt’s involvement was useful for Israel in several respects. As stated by Dr. Dore Gold, then Netanyahu’s key foreign policy adviser,”Israel recognizes Egypt’s primary role….What we want is to build a positive relationship with Egypt, one that could become a model for other countries in the region, so that the peace process can be broadened. The worst thing that could happen is for the [Israeli] people to see the relationship with Egypt deteriorating. We do not want this to happen.”
When the Hebron agreement was finished in midJanuary 1997, Cairo radio proudly noted the “Signing of this agreement undoubtedly highlights the importance of Egypt’s role and the efforts President Husni Mubarak has been making to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.”
CONCLUSIONS AND AXIOMS IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS
In making peace, Egypt and Israel took a major step to remove war as an option in their relations. But interests, goals, and perceptions changed much more slowly. Normalization remained limited. Many Egyptians accept Israel’s existence; others do not but still advocate nonbelligerent policy toward Israel.
The Egyptian-Israeli relationship, as example and facilitator, also helped make possible IsraeliPLO recognition in 1993 and the 1994 JordanIsrael treaty. Egypt’s actions destroyed the “Israel hatred consensus” that had uniformly existed in the Arab world. No matter how difficult IsraeliPalestinian negotiations may be in the future or how angry Egypt is with Israel and viceversa on bilateral matters, the mode of communication is no longer all-out struggle and war, but mainly verbal exchanges.
For some Middle East states and groups, uncompromising conflict with Israel remains; for others, the issue is now defining a national relationship with Israel and Israel’s future role in the region. Today, there are relatively frequent high level exchanges between Arab and Israeli politicians and businessmen. Israeli tourists visit several Arab capitals; Israel and Arab academics and artists exchange visits and no longer meet just on neutral sites. Tensions are reduced over specific political issues and have in many cases generated a common ArabIsraeli cause toward curbing state-sponsored terrorism or creating lucrative joint commercial ventures. Economic conferences have been held in Amman, Cairo, and Casablanca aimed at developing cooperative interchange between Arab, Israeli, and other businesses. The Arab boycott of Israel is over and the question is the speed of economic normalization in correlation with progress on PalestinianIsrael negotiations.
Within this context, Egypt has been irritated at Israel’s pace in withdrawing from the territories captured in the 1967 war and agreed to a Palestinian state. Negative views toward Israel and Israelis are still widely held by Egyptian officials and citizens. Egypt acts both as Arab leader and champion in peaceful conflicts with Israel and equally as a mediator between Israel and Arab parties (especially Syria and the Palestinians).
Israelis remain disappointed at the extent of normalization and also the tone of harsh criticism from both Egyptian officials and media organs. They realize that their relationship with Egypt is not going to be like that of the United States and Canada. Perhaps much of public statements from Egyptian sources–while highly objectionable and contrary to a spirit of normalization–may have to be written off as necessary for the management of Egyptian domestic constituencies.
Both countries are learning to administer core ingredients of mistrust and tension that still typify their relationship.
CHARACTERISTICS OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS
1. On a formal level the treaty is meticulously preserved.
2. But negotiations or agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbors do not automatically change Arab attitudes toward Israel. Returning tangible assets may change strategic behavior of Arab states without resulting in much of an attitudinal change.
3. Egypt’s concept of full normalization had as a precondition a comprehensive peace including full Israeli withdrawal from the captured territories and an independent Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital.
4. Israel feels Egypt does not accept its need to maintain a strategic edge in the region since other counties are still seeking its destruction.
5. Some Israelis still have skepticism about Egypt’s long term intentions and objectives, whether there is a long-term concept of eliminating Israel in stages.
6. But as Israel has broadened relations with other Arab states, the public seems to have become less concerned about relations with Cairo, though Israel’s military still closely monitors Egyptian military capabilities and intentions.
7. Progress on other ArabIsraeli negotiation fronts may make Egypt more stringent in trying to secure Israel’s full withdrawal from all territories won in the June 1967 War, using normalization with itself or other states as leverage in this effort.
8. Mubarak has been able to couple a strong emphasis on advancing negotiations with Israel with an insistence on Egypt’s leadership role in interArab affairs.
9. Significant regional and international changes–the USSR’s demise, the Cold War’s end, the Gulf War, and the peace process–have had little impact on this bilateral relationship.
10. Egyptian opinionmakers have slowly been concluding there is a difference in policies between Likud and Labor. However, the Labor Party’s presence in office does not necessarily mean that shrill accusations against Israel would halt.
11. U.S. support for Egypt has not waned because Cairo remains tough on Israel and urging other Arab states to do so. Washington’s refusal to pressure Egypt to tone down antagonistic verbal assaults at Israel reduces any incentive for Cairo to change its behavior. At the same time, Egypt’s special status as Washington’s most trusted Arab ally has slipped as other Arab states and the Palestinians build their relations with the United States. Despite its own benefits, Egypt also remains jealous of the U.S.-Israel special relationship.
12. There is an emerging Israeli-Egyptian competition for regional leadership. Cairo wants to remain key Arab leader as well as controlling Israeli acceptance in the region. Israelis do not want Cairo to have veto power over their future in the area.
1] Interviews with President Anwar Sadat in October magazine, March 12, 1978 and March 26, 1978 as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information ServiceMiddle East and North Africa (hereafter FBISMENA), March 14 and March 28, 1978.
 Author’s interview with Zaid Rifa’i, January 9, 1993, Amman, Jordan.
 Author’s interview with Abd alHalim Khaddam, July 18, 1993, Damascus, Syria.
 Author’s interview with Nabil ElAraby, February 26, 1993, Atlanta, Georgia.
 Study Group, “Lessons Learned From ArabIsraeli Negotiations,” Remarks by Joseph Sisco and Roy Atherton, participants in Secretary of State Kissinger’s 19731976 Shuttle Diplomacy, U. S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1991.
 Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East, (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1976), p. 37.
 Author’s interview with General Muhammad Abd alGhani alGamasy, Chief of Operations of the Egyptian Armed Forces during the October 1973 War, November 10, 1992, Heliopolis, Egypt.
 William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 206.
 Colin Legum, (ed). Middle East Contemporary Survey (hereafter MECS), MECS, Vol.II, 19771978, ( New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp. 102.
 Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel, The Camp David Accords, (New York: Metheun Inc., Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 5862.
 AlAkhbar alYawm, March 18 and March 27, 1978, or as quoted in FBISMENA, March 22 and March 31, 1978 respectively.
 AlJumhuriyah, March 16, 1978, or as quoted in FBISMENA, March 17, 1978.
 Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, Daniel Dishon (eds.), MECS, Vol. IV, 19791980 (1981), pp. 115116. For the Tuhami interview with Muscat’s, alNahda, see as published by the Middle East News Agency, Cairo, 5 April 1980 and quoted in this MECS, p. 116.
 Yediot Aharonot, March 26, 1980.
 Legum, Shaked, and Dishon (eds.), MECS, Vol. V, 19801981, (1982), p. 156.
 Interview with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak interview in alTadamun, 5 November 1983 as quoted from Shaked and Dishon (eds.), MECS, Volume VIII, 19831984 (1985), pp. 380381. For a similar attitude expressed by Mubarak, see his interview in alRa’y al’Amm, October 8, 1986.
 Interview with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, alIttihad (Abu Dhabi), December 12, 1987, as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information ServiceNear East and South Asia (hereafter FBISNESA), December 15, 1987.
 See alAkhbar, 20 February and April 8, 1986.
 See alAkhbar, November 25, 1987.
 Signed editorial by Muhammad alHayawan, alJumhuriyah, September 3, 1986.
 See Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked (eds.), MECS, Vol. XI, 1987 (Westview Press, 1989), pp. 351.
 AlAkbar, 16 December 1987 and alAhram, 20 December 1987 as quoted from Rabinovich and Shaked (eds.), MECS, Vol. XI, 1987 (1989), p. 351.
 See Yediot Aharonot, March 24, 1989.
 Davar, May 15 1991, p. 7.
 AlHayat, (London), July 16 1991, p. 5 as quoted in FBISNESA, July 18 1991, p. 8.
 See Ami Ayalon (ed.), MECS, Vol. XV, 1991 (1993), p. 366.
 Davar, May 17, 1991, p. 14.
 Remarks by Usamah aBaz, Middle East News Agency (Cairo), July 26, 1991 as quoted in FBISNESA, August 5, 1991.
 See Yediot Aharonot, (Sabbath supplement), November 22, 1996.
 Remarks by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak as quoted from Egypt Radio Network, April 30, 1992, FBISNESA, May 1, 1992; remarks by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak as quoted from the Middle East News Agency, March 6, 1994, FBISNESA, March 7, 1994; and remarks by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, Egypt Radio Network, January 31, 1995, as quoted in FBISNESA, January 31, 1995, as quoted in FBISNESA, January 31, 1995.
 AlMusawwar, April 14, 1989 as quoted in Ami Ayalon (ed.), MECS, Vol.XIII, 1989 (1991), p. 321.
[32} Ami Ayalon (ed.), MECS, Vol. XIII, 1989 (1991), p. 321.
 Ami Ayalon, (ed.), MECS, Vol. XV, 1991 (1993), p. 366.
 Ami Ayalon, (ed.), MECS, Vol. XV, 1991 (1993), p. 367.
 AlSha’b, November 29, 1994, quoted in FBISNESA, December 7, 1994.
 Remarks by Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Jerusalem Domestic Service, September 22, 1989, as quoted in FBISNESA, September 22, 1989, p. 28.
 The Jerusalem Post, April 14, 1992.
 Remarks by Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa as quoted in FBISNESA, April 16, 1992.
 Remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, as quoted from Kol Yisrael, July 29, 1991, FBISNESA, July 29, 1991.
 Remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Davar (Passover Supplement), April 17, 1992.
 See Ami Ayalon and Bruce MaddyWeitzman (eds.), MECS, Vol. XVIII, 1994 (1996), p. 279.
 See Ma’ariv, November 11, 1996.
 Yediot Aharonot, (Sabbath supplement), November 22, 1996.
 Ma’ariv, January 5 and 12, 1997. See for examples, Yediot Aharonot, November 17, 1996, Hatzofe, December 16, 1996, and Ha’aretz, January 5, 1997.
 Remarks by Dr. Dore Gold, October 4, 1996, taken from MBC (London) as quoted in FBISNESA, October 4, 1996.
*A different, longer version of this article was in Israel Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3 & 4, Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 296320 and will be published in Efraim Karsh, “From Rabin to Netanyahu,” (Frank Cass, London, 1997).